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The unprecedented international economic integration in the past few decades,
in the form of global trade and activities of multinational corporations, has spurred
heated discussions among policy makers and academics on the costs and benefits
of globalization. Despite active research in this area, however, many aspects of
globalization and its consequences are still not well understood. This dissertation
examines the welfare implications of globalization, focusing on two specific aspects.
The first part of this dissertation studies the determinants and welfare impli-
cations of multinational corporations’ decisions to perform R&D outside their home
countries, or offshore R&D. In the first chapter, I develop a quantitative model
that incorporates two motives for offshore R&D: the talent-acquisition motive, and
the market-access motive. I calibrate the model and perform counterfactual experi-
ments to understand the welfare implications of offshore R&D. I find that offshore
R&D increases countries’ gains from global integration by a factor of 1.2 on average,
with much larger increases for developing than for developed countries. I also find
that incorporating offshore R&D has important implications for understanding the
welfare impact of traditional forms of global integration, namely trade and offshore
production. In the second chapter, I test the key implications of the two offshore
R&D motives using firm-level data from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. The evidence supports the theory.
The second part of this dissertation, the third chapter, studies the effect of
international trade on income and inequality of a country characterized by large
domestic trade costs and migration restrictions. I develop a multi-region general
equilibrium model featuring domestic trade and migration, both of which are sub-
ject to spatial frictions. Quantifying the model using data from China, I find that
the trade between China and the rest of the world increases China’s real income,
but at the same time exacerbates the inequality in China. More than half of the rise
in inequality comes from between-region inequality, while the rest comes from the
skill premium. Moreover, there is an interaction between the spatial and the skill
dimension of the effect of trade on inequality. Both results underscore the impor-
tance of incorporating domestic geographic frictions in understanding the welfare
impacts of trade. As an additional contribution, I construct a city-level panel of
the Hukou policies in China, and use it to quantify the interaction between Hukou
reforms with China’s international trade integration.
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Chapter 1: Talent, Geography, and Offshore R&D
1.1 Introduction
Global integration in the form of international trade and multinational acti-
vities is one of the most significant economic phenomena of the past decades. Its
impact has become an important topic for policy discussion and academic research.
Existing studies on globalization focus on trade and multinationals’ offshore pro-
duction activities, but abstract from their offshore R&D activities, which also occur
at significant levels. Figure 1.1 plots the share of R&D expenditures in a country
incurred by the affiliates of foreign multinationals located in that country as a me-
asure of offshore R&D. Uncolored bars are for 2012, and colored bars are for the
first year with available data for each country, dating back to as early as 1985. By
this measure, offshore R&D increased in most countries in the past two decades. In
2012, foreign affiliates accounted for more than 30% of R&D expenditures in the
median country in the sample.1
The offshore R&D decisions of multinationals could have important aggregate
implications. By determining the location and efficiency of R&D activities, offshore
1In appendix I show that the importance of offshore R&D can also be established using inter-
national patent statistics.
1
Figure 1.1: The Level and Growth of Offshore R&D, 1985-2012
Notes: The measure for offshore R&D in country i is R&D expenditures in country i by foreign firmsTotal private R&D expenditures in country i .
Uncolored bars indicate the value of this variable in 2012; colored bars indicate the value at the
beginning of the sample, which differs by country and dates back to as early as 1985. Data source:
OECD.
R&D directly affects the income of countries. Moreover, in a world interconnected
through trade and offshore production, offshore R&D can affect income indirectly,
by shaping countries’ specialization in innovation or production.
In this chapter I model and quantify the impact of offshore R&D. I address
three questions. First, what are the determinants of offshore R&D? Second, how
large are the welfare gains of opening up to offshore R&D? Third, how do these
gains depend on and interact with the traditional forms of economic integration,
namely trade and offshore production?2
I develop a unified framework for firms’ global R&D and production decisi-
ons. In the model, firms differ along two dimensions: innovation efficiency, which
governs how effective a firm is in converting researcher input into new product blu-
2Throughout this dissertation, I use the term offshore production to refer to cases in which a
product is produced in a location different from where it is developed. This is related to the term
“multinational production” used in recent studies (Ramondo, 2014; Ramondo and Rodŕıguez-Clare,
2013; Irarrazabal et al., 2013; Arkolakis et al., 2014; and Tintelnot, 2016).
2
eprints, and production efficiency, which governs a firm’s productivity in converting
production labor into output. Researchers differ in their talent. Firms can enter fo-
reign countries (hosts) to perform offshore R&D. In each host, the firm matches with
local researchers to develop new varieties. I model R&D as an assignment problem
between firms and researchers, in which researcher talent and firm efficiency are
complements. This setup deviates from the efficiency units assumption, and implies
that quality and quantity of researchers are not perfect substitutes, an important
feature of R&D in reality.3
I embed this offshore R&D decision into a multi-country general equilibrium
model of global production and trade (Arkolakis et al., 2014). Specifically, after
a product is developed by an R&D center, whether onshore or offshore, the firm
first chooses which countries to sell it to, and then decides where to produce it. A
firm from the U.S. therefore can develop a new product in the U.K., produce it in
China, and export from there to India. These flexible decisions capture the complex
strategies employed by modern multinationals.4
The model allows for two motives for offshore R&D commonly cited by firms:
“market-access” and “talent-acquisition”.5 The former is straightforward: firms
want to produce near their markets to save on trade costs. If separating the lo-
cations of innovation from production is costly, firms have incentives to offshore
3The output distribution of researchers is highly skewed. Akcigit et al. (2016) shows that the
average top 1% inventor has 1019 lifetime citations, while the median inventor has only 11.
4DuPont offers a good example. Headquartered in Delaware, U.S., it has major R&D centers
located in the U.S., Brazil, China, Switzerland, Korea, Germany, and Japan. Moreover, it has
production facilities in 19 countries, from which it serves around 90 countries.
5According to firm-level surveys (see, for example, Thursby and Thursby, 2006), the quality of
research personnel and host country market potential are the two most important factors firms
consider, when choosing where to build their offshore R&D centers.
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their R&D to large markets. The latter motive depends on both firm and host
country characteristics. First, it reflects the host country’s inventor wage, which
depends on the abundance of talented inventors—an input supply effect, and the
abundance of efficient firms competing for talent—an input demand effect. Second,
because of the complementarity in innovation, host inventor wage interacts with
firm efficiency to reinforce the talent-acquisition motive for high-efficiency firms.
Despite being rich, the model is tractable. I derive an analytic expression for
the model-implied gains from openness, which augments the expression in Arkolakis
et al. (2014) with an additional term that captures the importance of foreign compa-
nies in domestic R&D.6 The expression makes it clear that offshore R&D represents
a new channel for countries to benefit from global integration.
I study the quantitative importance of the two offshore R&D motives, and the
magnitudes of the welfare gains. Specifically, I calibrate the model to 25 countries
and a composite of 22 other countries. I parameterize each country’s distribution
of firm efficiency using the World Management Survey developed by Bloom et al.
(2012), and its talent distribution using the international cognitive test score data-
base developed by Hanushek and Woessmann (2012). I determine other parameters
by matching various statistics of the firm size distribution in the U.S. and the inten-
sities of bilateral international activities, including trade, offshore production, and
offshore R&D. The model matches several non-targeted patterns in the data, better
than an otherwise similar model without complementarity between firm efficiency
6Gains from openness is defined as the change in real income as a country moves from complete
isolation to the observed equilibrium.
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and researcher talent.
I quantify the importance of international differences in the distributions of
firm efficiency and researcher talent in explaining the observed level of offshore R&D.
I eliminate the incentives of offshore R&D arising from these distribution differences
by first giving each individual country the management distribution of the U.S.
(the highest in the world), and then the talent distribution of Brazil (the lowest in
the world). The former reduces the average level of offshore R&D by around three
quarters, whereas the latter reduces this average by around one third. So differences
in the distributions of talent and management efficiency are an important driving
force for offshore R&D.
I further examine how a country’s access to foreign markets through expor-
ting, and to foreign producers through offshore production, affect its attractiveness
as a destination for R&D. While both consumer and producer access increase the
return to innovation in partial equilibrium, I find that they have opposite general
equilibrium effects: consumer access reduces inward offshore R&D, while producer
access increases it. Therefore, increasing access to foreign markets through reducing
exporting costs would not necessarily help a country in attracting R&D-intensive
FDI. Country specialization in innovation or production is the key to understanding
this result. When a country loses access to foreign consumers through exporting,
its competitiveness in production weakens, which lowers wages and makes it more
attractive as a host for offshore R&D centers. As a result, it specializes more in in-
novation, and firms do R&D there and offshore their production to other countries.
Such specialization is not possible without offshore production, so when both consu-
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mer and producer access are shut down, the average offshore R&D across countries
decreases to less than half of the benchmark level.
Together, these two sets of experiments suggest that the talent-acquisition and
market-access motives in the model are strong enough to account for the observed
level of offshore R&D on average.
I further examine the normative implications of offshore R&D. The median
welfare gains from offshore R&D, defined analogously to the gains from trade, are
around 2.2% of real income. Compared to a restricted version of the model with
only trade and offshore production, the welfare gains from openness in the full mo-
del with offshore R&D are larger by a factor of 1.2. Importantly, this amplification
is substantially larger for emerging countries than for developed countries, mainly
because a larger share of R&D in emerging countries is carried out by foreign af-
filiates. Overlooking this channel therefore will not only result in underestimating
the gains from globalization, but also bias the assessment of the relative size of the
welfare gains across countries.
Existing quantitative studies on multinational activities do not separately mo-
del offshore R&D and offshore production, even though they are very different acti-
vities that can be targeted by specific policies.7 Is this an innocuous assumption
for policy simulations? To answer this question, I compare the effects of policies
designed to promote these two multinational activities, focusing on China and In-
dia as an example.8 First, I reduce the inward offshore R&D costs in these two
7For example, countries can grant tax credits or open their borders specifically to R&D intensive
FDI. An example is the U.K. “patent box,” which reduced the corporate tax rate on revenues from
R&D by 10 p.p.
8This policy evaluation is interesting in its own right because these two emerging giants are
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countries; second, I reduce inward offshore production costs. I find that, in the
first experiment, China and India reap most of the benefits, whereas in the second
experiment, developed countries also benefit significantly. The gains are small for
developed countries in the first experiment because offshore R&D liberalization we-
akens the comparative advantage of China and India in production, which reduces
the welfare gains from global specialization for everyone. In the second experiment,
in contrast, the changes are more aligned with countries’ comparative advantage.
This comparison highlights the different implications for other countries of liberali-
zation in offshore R&D and production. Such differences are especially relevant for
studying multilateral investment agreements.
Offshore R&D also has implications for the welfare gains from other types of
economic openness. To make this point, I perform an experiment with the same
unilateral reductions in inward offshore production costs as in the previous experi-
ment, but in a restricted version of the model without offshore R&D. Compared to
the previous experiment, this experiment leads to substantially higher welfare gains
for developed countries, and lower welfare gains for India and China. The distribu-
tion of profit from innovation is the key to the difference. More offshore production
in China and India increases wages and reduces the profits from performing R&D
there. At the equilibrium level of offshore R&D, the profit decreases are shared
among domestic and foreign firms in these two countries; without offshore R&D,
all the losses would be borne by domestic firms. This experiment shows that it is
becoming popular destinations for offshore activities. Related to this trend, their governments are
attempting to attract more foreign companies, especially R&D intensive ones, by cutting red tape
and speeding up the approval process.
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important to model offshore R&D, even if one’s goal is to evaluate the effects of
offshore production.
1.2 Related Literature
This chapter is related to the recent literature that quantifies the gains from
globalization, especially studies on the aggregate implications of technological trans-
fer through multinational activities (see, among others, McGrattan and Prescott,
2009; Ramondo and Rodŕıguez-Clare, 2013; Irarrazabal et al., 2013; Arkolakis et al.,
2014; Tintelnot, 2016; Burstein and Monge-Naranjo, 2009; Alviarez, 2016; and Hol-
mes et al., 2015).9 Within this literature, the most closely related paper is Arkolakis
et al. (2014), which studies the welfare gains from trade and offshore production.
The present chapter differs in two aspects. First, rather than treating innovation
efficiency of a country as a single exogenous parameter, I decompose it into two
measurable components, firm innovation efficiency and researcher talent, and exa-
mine the role of each in shaping a country’s comparative advantage in innovation.
Second, I allow firms to perform offshore R&D by mobilizing their managerial ca-
pacity abroad, so a country’s comparative advantage in innovation is endogenous. I
show that this channel has quantitatively important implications for both the gains
from openness, and the effect of specific policy changes.
This chapter is also related to the literature explaining the pattern of FDI,
9See Antràs and Yeaple (2014) for a recent review of the literature on multinational corporations.
Also see Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) for a review of quantitative studies on the aggregate
implications of international trade, which encompasses the bulk of the research on the gains from
globalization.
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dating at least as far back as the theoretical work by Helpman (1984) and Marku-
sen (1984) (for vertical and horizonal FDI, respectively). More recently, researchers
have examined the determinants of M&A FDI (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; Nocke and
Yeaple, 2008; and Head and Ries, 2008), and have incorporated firm heterogeneity
into the model (Helpman et al., 2004).10 This chapter contributes to this literature
in two ways. Theoretically, I outline a rich model of R&D, which can be viewed as a
model of FDI with two-tiered vertical linkage: one between headquarters and R&D
centers, and one between R&D centers and production sites. This structure allows
the model to capture the complex strategies frequently seen in modern multinatio-
nals, in a way that existing two-country models of offshore R&D cannot (Gersbach
and Schmutzler, 2011). Quantitatively, I calibrate a general equilibrium model to
assess the strength of each factor.
In terms of modeling, this chapter is related to a number of studies that use
an assignment framework to understand international trade and offshoring.11 I
apply a matching framework to innovation decisions in a model of multinational
production and trade, and quantify the effects of complementarity between firms
and researchers. In doing so, I develop a computational algorithm that can solve
the matching function efficiently in the presence of multiple countries and when
endogenous offshore R&D decisions lead to discontinuities in innovation efficiency
distributions. This setup and computational algorithm could have applications in
10Studies have also examined empirically the impact on FDI flows of various factors, including
skill endowments (Yeaple, 2003), institutions (Alfaro et al., 2008), and taxes and corruption (Wei,
2000).
11See, among others, Grossman and Maggi (2000), Yeaple (2005), Costinot and Vogel (2010),
and Antras et al. (2006).
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other contexts.12
This chapter’s focus on international cooperation in R&D is shared by several
recent papers (Kerr and Kerr, 2014; Kerr et al., 2016; and Branstetter et al., 2013).
These papers discuss international cooperation either among inventors from different
countries, or between inventors and firms from different countries, made possible by
international migration or multinational activities. This chapter contributes to this
literature by developing a model of offshore R&D, testing its specific predictions,
and quantifying the aggregate implications of offshore R&D.
I organize the remainder of this chapter as follows. I set up a general equili-
brium model of offshore R&D in Section 1.3. I parameterize this model to match
the data in Section 1.4, and perform counterfactual experiments using the parame-
terized model in Section 1.5. I conclude and discuss directions for future research
in Section 1.6.
1.3 A Model of Offshore R&D and Production
This section sets up the model and describes firms’ global innovation and
operation decisions.
12Roys and Seshadri (2014) quantifies a general equilibrium model of team production based on
Antras et al. (2006) in a closed-economy setting. Their model fixes the team size each of manager
exogenously, so wages do not play an allocative role. In the present chapter, wages determine team
size and firm size distribution.
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1.3.1 Environment
There are N countries in the model, indexed by i = 1, 2, ...N . Country i
is endowed with LRi measure of researchers, who differ in their talent, θ ∈ Θ,
distributed according to Hi(θ), and LPi measure of homogenous production workers.
There are no immigration or education choices in the model, so LRi , LPi , and Hi(θ)
are both exogenous.13
Researchers work with R&D centers to develop new differentiated varieties.
Production workers manufacture these varieties and perform operational tasks for
R&D centers (in the form of fixed costs). Country i is also endowed with Ei measure
of heterogeneous firms with different innovation efficiencies, z̃R ∈ Z̃R, distributed
according to GEi (z̃R). Firms build R&D centers in different countries, which then
recruit local researchers to develop new varieties. I use Ri to denote the measure of
R&D centers in country i. In equilibrium Ri is an endogenous outcome determined
by firms’ offshore R&D decisions.
The representative consumer in country i decides how much to spend on each
13The talent distribution in a country reflects the quality of the education system, education
choice, as well as cultural traits such as openness to innovation. By taking the talent distribution
as given, this chapter abstracts from the effect of international integration on these factors. To
better focus on offshore R&D, this chapter also abstracts from immigration, which is especially
relevant when it comes to highly skilled workers such as the inventors in this model. In an extended
version of the model that incorporate immigration, high skill immigration and offshore R&D likely
work as substitutes for firms and inventors from different countries to work together, so the gains
from offshore R&D might be smaller compared to the benchmark model presented in this chapter.
The magnitude of the difference, however, depends crucially on the leniency of the immigration
policy. I leave a quantitative evaluation of the interaction between immigration and offshore R&D
policies to future work.
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where Ωi denotes the set of product varieties available in country i, qi(ω) is the
consumption of variety ω, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Let the










dω is the ideal demand price index aggregated over
pi(ω), the price of variety ω in country i.
1.3.2 Firm Decisions: Overview
This subsection overviews firms’ decisions. In the model, firms operate in mul-
tiple countries, and make sequential decisions on R&D, production, and exporting. I
will use the following indexing conventions throughout this dissertation: o denotes a
firm’s headquarters, that is, the country where a firm originates; i denotes the coun-
try where a product is developed—the location of the R&D center; l denotes the
country where the product is manufactured; and d denotes the destination country
where it is consumed.
Consider a firm from country o. Knowing its innovation efficiency in the
home country, z̃R, the firm decides how many R&D centers to open and in which
12
Figure 1.2: Firm’s Two-tiered Decisions
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countries. To open an R&D center in country i, it pays a fixed cost of cRi in
country i production labor. An R&D center’s innovation efficiency depends on that
of its parent.14 Motivated by evidence on spatial frictions in knowledge transfers
within firms (see, for example, Irarrazabal et al., 2013; Keller and Yeaple, 2013), I
assume that firms can only transfer part of their innovation management efficiency
to offshore R&D centers. Letting φRoi ≤ 1 be the proportion of innovation efficiency
that can be transferred, the innovation management efficiency for an R&D center in
country i operated by a country o firm is zR = z̃RφRoi. This efficiency governs how
many varieties can be developed by a given number of researchers.
Innovative firms are not always the most efficient in carrying out manufac-
turing. To allow for this heterogeneity, each R&D center upon entry also obtains
a random draw of production management efficiency, denoted zP ∈ ZP , which is
common to all products developed by the R&D center. To capture positive correla-
tion between innovation efficiency and production efficiency, the distribution from
which zP is drawn increases in zR in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. I
use GP (zP |zR) to denote the CDF for production efficiency draws, with gP (zP |zR)
being the corresponding probability density function (PDF).15 This offshore R&D
module is illustrated in Figure 1.2a. As the figure indicates, firms can open multiple
R&D centers in different countries, but at most one R&D center in each country.
14This assumption follows a long tradition in the theory of multinationals, see, for example,
Helpman, 1984; Helpman et al. (2004); and Nocke and Yeaple (2008). Empirically, Guadalupe et
al. (2012) documents an increase in innovation and adoption of foreign technology upon acquisition
by foreign companies.
15Under this assumption, the production management efficiency is specific to each R&D center.
R&D centers with different innovation management efficiencies affiliated with the same parent will
draw from different distributions. An alternative interpretation of this production management
efficiency is the quality of products developed by an R&D center.
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Given the production and innovation efficiency of affiliated R&D centers,
(zP , zR), firms recruit researchers in each center to develop new differentiated va-
rieties, and decide which countries to sell their products to. To sell products to
destination country d, a per-variety fixed marketing cost of cMd in terms of country
d production labor needs to be paid.
As Figure 1.2b indicates, firms can potentially manufacture products deve-
loped by their R&D centers in a third country l , where they do not necessarily
perform R&D, and then export to destination countries. By separating production
from R&D (offshore production), firms can take advantage of cheaper production
labor and save on shipping fees. However, geographic separation makes it difficult
for R&D centers to communicate with production plants, reducing production effi-
ciency. I use φPil ≤ 1 to denote the fraction of productivity that a firm can transfer
from its R&D center in country i to production site in country l. For an R&D
center with production efficiency zP , the preserved plant-level offshore productivity
in country l is zPφPil . I further assume that there is a stochastic element, ηl, idiosyn-
cratic to a production site and a variety, which enters productivity multiplicatively,
so the variety-level productivity in l is zPφPil ηl. The cost of producing and delivering




, which takes into account the cost of production labor,
wPl , and shipping fee, τld.
In the model, firms perform offshore R&D for several reasons. First, if a
country is relatively abundant in talented inventors, foreign firms might want to
enter to make full use of their skills. Anecdotes abound about MNCs establishing
offshore R&D centers in order to tap into the local talent pool. Google, for instance,
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recently announced a plan to train two million Android developers in India within
the next three years. According to a survey of 200 R&D executives (Thursby and
Thursby, 2006), MNCs rank being close to highly qualified R&D personnel as the
most important factor for the location choice of R&D centers in their home countries
and other developed countries, and as the second most important factor, right after
growth potential, for their new R&D centers in emerging economies.
The aforementioned production and trade decisions also imply that firms might
choose to perform R&D in places close to major destination markets, or places with
good access to countries with cheap production labor, in order to produce and
distribute their products more efficiently.
By allowing for both offshore R&D and production decisions, the model cap-
tures the complexity of multinationals’ global strategies. This stands in contrast to
existing quantitative studies of multinationals that do not allow for offshore R&D.
Such restriction might not be important if R&D activities performed by foreign
affiliates are simply product adaption to local markets, a “by-product” of offshore
production. Figure 1.3 demonstrates that, while U.S. multinationals’ R&D expendi-
tures and total wage payment both increase with host income, the former increases
much faster (note that the two panels are on the same scale, so the slope of the fitted
line in the first panel is twice of that in the second panel). This figure highlights that
product adaption unlikely to be the whole story, and offshore R&D is not simply a
by-product of offshore production.
Importantly, I assume that different varieties developed by a firm, either in the
same or in different R&D centers, are differentiated from each other and from vari-
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Figure 1.3: Overseas R&D and Employment by U.S. Multinationals
(a) U.S. Multinational Affiliate R&D (b) U.S. Multinational Affiliate Wage Payment
Notes: The left panel plots the log of total R&D expenditures by U.S. multinationals in each host
country against host income. The right panel plots the total wage payment of U.S. multinationals
against host income. Data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
eties developed by all other firms. Such an assumption is consistent with how R&D
is organized in many multinational firms. General Electric, for example, organizes
its ten research labs by scientific disciplines in five countries (the U.S., Germany,
India, China, and Brazil).16, 17 This assumption implies that firms make offshore
R&D decisions for each country independently and that R&D centers affiliated with
the same firm operate as if they are independent from each other.
Given this independence, in the remainder of this section, I first consider the
16Alternatively, this assumption can be interpreted as capturing M&A FDI. More than 70%
of FDI flows in the data are in the form of mergers and acquisitions (Nocke and Yeaple, 2008).
One explanation for this observation is that, by transferring know-how and managerial capacity
to targets, acquiring firms can improve the operating efficiency of the targets. The differentiated-
variety assumption adopted in the present chapter is consistent with this perspective of FDI—
multinationals transfer their managerial technology to newly acquired foreign R&D centers, and
increase the efficiency of these R&D centers in carrying out their independent product development.
17This assumption treats R&D at headquarters and R&D in offshore centers symmetrically.
Recently, Bilir and Morales (2016) estimates the effects of R&D on productivity for multinational
firms. They find that R&D at headquarters have stronger spillover effects to foreign affiliates than
R&D at affiliates to other affiliates. The current model cannot account for this finding. But an
extension of the model that allows firms to first invest in R&D to build up ”core management
capacity” before performing product innovation at home and abroad would be consistent with this
finding.
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production and trade decision of a firm, after a variety has been developed. I then
describe the innovation decision of each R&D center, and firms’ decisions to build
offshore R&D centers. Finally, I characterize the market for researchers and analyze
the welfare gains from openness under a special case.
1.3.3 Production and Trade
Consider a variety developed by an R&D center (zP , zR) in country i, which
can potentially be produced in any country by production labor using a linear
production technology. For each variety, an R&D center obtains a vector of N
idiosyncratic productivity draws, one for each potential production site, denoted
η = (η1, η2, .., ηN ). I assume that ηl is independent across countries, and follows a
Frechet distribution: F (x) ≡ Prob(η ≤ x) = exp(−Λlx−δ), where Λl governs the
mean of the draws for country l, and δ governs the dispersion of the draws across
varieties and countries. The productivity for a variety produced in country l is:
zPφilηl.
Letting wpl denote the wage rate for each unit of production labor in country




is the iceberg shipping cost from l to d. Given the monopolistic competition market







Conditional on serving destination market d, a firm chooses the lowest cost pro-
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duction location for each of its varieties. Because there are no fixed costs in offshore
production, all countries are potentially production sites. The price of this variety







For each variety and each destination market, production will take place in one
country. However, since each R&D center develops a continuum of varieties, in
equilibrium, a firm will serve each destination through all countries in the world.18
For tractability, I assume that each R&D center needs to decide first which des-
tination markets to enter and pays the fixed marketing cost before knowing the
idiosyncratic country-specific productivity draws, so firms make destination mar-
ket entry decisions based on expected profits. The expected per-variety profit from



























)−δ. The first term in this




minl(pild(η)1−σ)dF̃ (η), with F̃ (η) being
the distribution of η = (η1, η2, ..., ηN ).
This expected profit increases in the production efficiency of an R&D center,
18This result implies that the model cannot capture the extensive-margin of firms’ offshore
production decisions. This is not necessarily an important drawback, as the focus of this chapter is
on offshore R&D and its interaction with offshore production in the aggregate. In the next chapter
I show the model predictions on firms’ offshore R&D decisions are supported empirically.
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zP , so there exists a threshold ẑpid such that R&D centers from i will expend mar-
keting costs and enter country d if and only if their production efficiency is above
this threshold. This cutoff is given by:
πdi (ẑ
P
id) = 0. (1.1)
A firm makes an independent entry decision for each destination market. The
per-variety expected profit for a firm with production efficiency draw zP , taking into








1.3.4 Innovation and the Market for Researchers
R&D centers choose the talent of researchers, θ, and their quantity, l(θ), to
develop new differentiated varieties. Let y be the measure of differentiated varieties
developed:
y = f(zR, θ)l(θ)γ ,
where γ measures the return to the number of researchers, and f(zR, θ) captures
how firm innovation efficiency and researcher talent affect innovation output. I
assume that 0 < γ < 1, implying decreasing returns to scale in the number of
researchers. This assumption has several interpretations. First, it can be thought
of as a reduced-form approximation to a model in which R&D requires supervision
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from top management, but managerial time is limited in a company. In such a
context, hiring more researchers results in less supervision time for each of them,
reducing researcher productivity.19 An alternative is to think of innovation output
as a function of both accumulated knowledge capital and researcher input. In a
static model in which the distribution of knowhow and accumulated knowledge is
given, the research output features decreasing returns to researcher input. Finally,
decreasing returns to scale might stem from increases in coordination costs, free-
riding, and disagreement among researchers as teams expand.20
Given πi(zP ), the per-variety expected profit, the optimization problem for
the R&D center is
πRi (z
P , zR) = maxθ∈Θ,l(θ)[πi(zP )f(zR, θ)l(θ)γ −wi(θ)l(θ)],
where wi(θ) is the wage for a researcher with talent θ. As is clear from the equation,
the production efficiency of a firm affects innovation incentives because it determines
the profit for each variety. I make the following assumption about f :
Assumption 1 f is twice continuously differentiable and increasing in its argu-




The assumption that f1, f2 > 0 simply means that more efficient firms and
more able researchers are more productive in innovation. The log-supermodularity
19See Antras et al. (2006) for an analysis of the effects of offshoring in a model in which managers
can only supervise a fixed number of workers.
20Such coordination costs have been documented empirically. For example, Haas and Choudhury
(2015) finds that, while total patenting increases with the number of members in a team, the
increase is smaller than the increase in the team size—there is decreasing returns in the number
of researchers in a team.
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assumption implies strong complementarity between researcher ability and firm ef-
ficiency. Under this assumption, more productive firms have a comparative advan-
tage in working with more able researchers.21 R&D activities require cooperation
between researchers, and a large amount of managerial and monetary resources.
Moreover, after a product prototype is developed, testing and marketing costs are
big hurdles to clear before the product can reach consumers. A well-managed firm
can do all of these tasks better, so it is especially profitable for them to work with
talented researchers. The model captures this idea with the log-supermodularity of
f .
The setup here deviates from the efficiency units assumption. A researcher
with high talent is more valuable than multiple researchers with lower talent. Simi-
larly, a firm with high innovation efficiency is more productive in R&D than multiple
firms with lower efficiencies. These implications are in line with a few observations
in the literature. First, as mentioned earlier, the quality of research talent is one of
the top considerations when firms choose where to build their offshore R&D centers,
along with the cost of research labor.22 Second, it is well documented that there
are a large number of small and less productive firms in developing countries, the
prevalence of which can account for an important fraction of cross-country income
differences (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Management efficiency might be a source
21The log-supermodularity assumption has been adopted in a growing literature in international
trade which uses assignment models to study questions such as the determinants of specialization
and the impacts of trade integration, as reviewed recently by Costinot et al. (2015). The framework
here is similar to the one in Grossman et al. (forthcoming).
22Branstetter et al. (2013) conducts interviews with foreign-affiliated R&D centers in China.
The interview responses stress the scale and quality of the research talent in China, rather than
its cost.
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of performance differences between firms (Bloom et al., 2013). To the extent that
many developing countries have a large number of very small firms, they might not
necessarily lack a sufficient stock of management efficiency. The model here is con-
sistent with view that it is not necessarily a lack of management efficiency stock,
but rather the lack of exceptional firms like Apple and Google, that explains the low
incomes in developing countries.23 Finally, complementarity also implies that the
same inventor will be paid more to work in a more efficient firm. This is consistent
with the finding that larger and more productive firms pay a wage premium (see,
for example, Schank et al., 2007), and the evidence on positive assortative matching
between firms and inventors I provide in the appendix.
I now characterize the market for researchers. Let Ti(zP , zR) : (ZPi , ZRi )→ Θ
be the optimal choice of talent for an R&D center characterized by (zP , zR). We
have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Assortative matching between firms and inventors) Ti is conti-
nuous and strictly increasing in zR. Moreover, Ti is independent of zP .
Proof See appendix.
The proof of Lemma 1 is an extension of assortative matching results in the
literature (see, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 2014; Grossman et al., fort-
hcoming; Sampson, 2014) to the case with an additional source of heterogeneity,
namely production efficiency. Because high zR R&D centers enjoy a higher margi-
23Roys and Seshadri (2014) builds a model of matching between heterogeneous entrepreneurs
and workers, enriched with human capital accumulation, to show that the model can account for
the differences in life cycle dynamics between firms in rich and poor countries, and can explain a
substantial share of income differences between countries.
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nal productivity increase from hiring better researchers, they have a comparative
advantage in working with high-ability researchers, leading to assortative matching.
Since zP enters firms’ innovation output multiplicatively in the form of πi(zP ), hig-
her zP does not affect the type of researchers hired by an R&D center, but only
their quantity. In the following I will write the matching function simply as Ti(zR),
omitting the argument zP .
Given the equilibrium wi(θ), the demand of an R&D center for researchers, if
it chooses researchers with talent θ, is
li(z






The corresponding measures of invention and profit are therefore:
yi(z


















In equilibrium, firms choose the type of researchers to maximize profit. This
requires the improvement in marginal output from higher-quality researchers to be
exactly offset by their higher wages. We can obtain this equation by differentiating
Equation (1.5) with respect to θ:
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γf(zR, θ) |θ=Ti(zR). (1.6)
Proof See appendix.
The formal proof of Lemma 2 establishes the differentiability of wi(θ). The
proof is similar to that in Sampson (2014) and is relegated to the appendix.
Since researchers are heterogeneous, labor market clearing requires that the
total demand equals total supply for each type. Let θi and θi be the lower and upper
limits of the support for the researcher talent distribution, and let zRi and zRi denote
the lower and upper limit of the support for the innovation efficiency distribution,
respectively. To derive the researcher market clearing conditions for each type, I
start with an aggregate version: for all θi < θ < θi, the number of researchers with





























where Ri is the measure of R&D centers in country i and gRi (z) is their PDF, both
of which are determined in equilibrium by firms’ offshore R&D decisions. On the
left side of this equation is the total number of researchers with talent below Ti(zR),
and on the right side is the corresponding total demand.
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Differentiating this equation with respect to zR, we have the following equation















1−γ gP (zP |zR)dzP
(1.7)
Equation (1.7) then characterizes the market clearing condition for each researcher
type. Equations 1.6 and 1.7, together with two boundary values,
Ti(z
R
i ) = θi, Ti(zRi ) = θi, (1.8)
determine the matching function Ti(zR) and the wage schedule wi(θ). In summary,
we have the following results:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1,
1) Firms with higher innovation efficiency hire strictly better researchers. Firms
with the same innovation efficiency but different production efficiencies hire the
same type of researchers in different quantities.
2) The researcher labor market is characterized by Equations 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8.
How does the output of R&D centers with different innovation efficiencies
depend on the talent distribution of a country? Since a change in the talent dis-
tribution affects the entire matching function, characterizing the effect of a general
24Because of offshore R&D decisions, gRi is not necessarily continuous. At the finite discontinuous
points of gRi , the matching function might not be differentiable. In this case, Equation 1.7 is not
defined on the discontinuous points of gRi . While Ti is still well defined and continuous, the kinks
in T ′i make it challenging to solve the matching function numerically. In the quantitative section,
I describe a computational algorithm suited for this context.
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change is difficult. I consider changes to the talent distribution that can be ranked
by the following criterion:
Definition 1 Consider h(θ) and h̃(θ), probability density functions for the talent





This notion of factor abundance, which is stronger than first-order stochastic
dominance, is introduced by Costinot and Vogel (2010) to characterize how relative
factor supply and factor demand determine allocation and prices. According to this
definition, a more talent abundant distribution has a higher relative share of the
higher-skill type than a less talent abundant distribution. Letting y(zP , zR;h(θ))
denote the measure of R&D output by an R&D center (zP , zR) when the talent
distribution is h(θ). We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider two R&D centers in country i, with innovation efficiencies
zR2 > z
R
1 and a common production efficiency zP . Further assume that ĥ(θ) is more






, if either 1) zP and zR
are independent; or 2) There are no fixed marketing costs, that is, cMd = 0.
Proof See appendix.
Proposition 2 states that, the R&D output of firms with high zR relative to
that of firms with low zR is larger, when the researcher distribution is more talent
abundant. The intuition for this result is that, under the additional conditions stated
above, increases in talent abundance improve the quality of researchers for all firms.
This benefits efficient firms disproportionately more, because of the complementarity
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between talent and efficiency.25
Importantly, since this proposition works through improving of match quality
for firms, it also applies to a change in the firm innovation efficiency distribution
that results in improvements in match quality for all firms between (zR1 , zR2 ). An
example of such a change is a decrease in the “efficiency abundance” of the firm
distribution in the spirit of Definition 1. The talent abundance in the proposition
should thus be broadly interpreted as a relative measure—the log difference of R&D
output between the two centers increases as the talent abundance of the inventor
distribution increases, relative to the efficiency abundance of the firm distribution.
Although Proposition 2 is stated in the context of domestic firms, it applies to
all active R&D centers in a host country. We can test the model by comparing the
innovation output of R&D centers affiliated with companies with different innovation
efficiencies. If Proposition 2 is correct, then this difference will be larger in host
countries with higher relative talent abundance. In the next section I show that
the complementarity channel underlying this prediction is quantitatively relevant in
determining the pattern of offshore R&D across host countries with different talent
distributions. In the next chapter, I test this implication directly and show that the
data supports this prediction.
25Grossman et al. (forthcoming), Sampson (2014), and Costinot and Vogel (2010) obtain similar
results on the effects of trade on income inequality under the log-supermodularity assumption.
Compared to these papers, additional technical assumption is needed to ensure that the general
equilibrium changes in return to R&D, πi(zP ), due to the distribution change do not decrease the
quality of match for any firms.
28
1.3.5 Offshore R&D
Now we can characterize firms’ decisions to open offshore R&D centers. I make
the following assumption about gP (zP |zR).
Assumption 2 The distribution from which an R&D center draws its production
efficiency zP increases in its innovation efficiency in the sense of first-order sto-
chastic dominance.
Define πRi (zR) as the expected profit (over the possible zP draws) for an R&D






P , zR)gP (zP |zR)dzP
Firms compare the expected profit from building an offshore R&D center to
the fixed cost of setting up the center, cRi wPi . By definition (Equations 1.5 and 1.2) ,
πRi (z
P , zR) increases in zP . We can also show that πRi (zP , zR) increases with zR.26
Assumption 2 then implies that πRi (zR) increases strictly in zR, so the decision
to offshore R&D follows a threshold rule: there exists a cutoff ẑRoi, so that a firm
from country o will perform offshore R&D in country i if and only if its innovation






















1.3.6 R&D Center Efficiency Distribution
Firms’ offshore R&D decisions determine gRi , the distribution of innovation
management efficiency, and hence the distribution of production management effi-
ciency, in each country. Given ẑRoi, we can now derive R&D centers’ production and
innovation efficiency distributions. Let GRi (zR) be the CDF for innovation manage-
ment efficiency of the R&D centers active in country i, and let GEo (z̃R) be the CDF






































The PDF for R&D centers with (zP , zR) is gi(zP , zR) = gP (zP |zR)gRi (zR).
1.3.7 Aggregation
Knowing gi(zP , zR), I derive the total measure of varieties that are invented
in a country, denoted Mi, and the distribution of these varieties over different pro-
duction efficiencies. Letting mi(zP ) be the measure of varieties innovated in country
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i by R&D centers with a production efficiency of zP , then we have:
mi(z











where yi(zP , zR) is given by Equation 1.4. The price index in country d is then





























To express the aggregate objects in the model, let Xid be the total sales in























P )(zP )σ−1dzP .
(1.13)
These sales can be fulfilled through production in any country. Letting Xild
denote the value of production in country l, then we have ∑lXild = Xid. I further
define Yl to be the total production of the varieties in country l, so
∑
i,dXild = Yl.
The Frechet assumption on idiosyncratic productivity draws also implies that, for
each R&D center located in country i, the share of products it sells in country d
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)−δ. Because this probability is the same for all R&D centers
from country i, it also applies to the aggregate sales:
Xild = ψildXid. (1.14)
Production workers are used to produce output, and to pay fixed R&D and
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Recall that the density of firms from country o with innovation efficiency z̃R
is gEo (z̃R). We can integrate πRi over gEo (z̃R) to compute the total profits made by









This profit is after deducting R&D, marketing, and production costs, but
before deducting fixed costs for building R&D centers.
32
Let Ii be the total R&D expenditures in country i, defined as total compensa-
tion to researchers in country i. Let Ioi be the expenditures in Ii that are incurred










The income of country d comes from three sources: wages of production labor,
compensation to researchers, and the net profit made by domestic firms from the

















Definition 2 The competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of allocations and pri-
ces, such that:
1. Firms’ market entry decisions satisfy Equation 1.1.
2. The matching function, Ti, and wage schedule for researchers, wi satisfy Equa-
tions 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8.
3. Firms’ offshore R&D decisions satisfy Equation 1.9.
4. The distribution of R&D center innovation efficiency in each country satisfies
Equation 1.10.
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5. The distribution of productivity efficiency for varieties satisfies Equation 1.11.
6. The price index in each country satisfies Equation 1.12.
7. The wage for production labor satisfies Equation 1.15.
8. The total expenditure in each country satisfies Equation 1.16.
1.3.8 The Gains from Openness
In this subsection I focus on a special case to derive an expression for the
welfare gains from openness, defined as the percentage change in real income (XdPd ),
as a country moves from complete isolation to the degree of openness observed in
the data. This expression makes it clear that offshore R&D is a new channel for
countries to benefit from globalization. It also relates the size of this benefit to
observable information and model parameters. Specifically, I make the following
assumption:
Assumption 3 1) f(zR, θ) = zRθβ;
2) Production efficiency, zP , is independent of zR, and follows a Pareto distribution:
GPd (x) = 1− ( xzPd
)−κP ;
3) There is no fixed marketing cost: ∀d, cMd = 0;




The first part of the assumption maintains that f(zR, θ) takes a multiplicative
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form.27 Under this assumption, ∂
2logf(zR,θ)
∂z∂θ = 0, so f(z
R, θ) no longer satisfies the
strict log-supermodularity requirement in Assumption 1. Since a CES function
with elasticity of substitution smaller than 1 satisfies strict log-supermodularity, the
multiplicative case represents the limiting case as the elasticity approaches 1. This
simplification will allow us to solve for the equilibrium wage schedule and firm-level
decisions analytically.
In the general model, because firms endogenously choose how many varieties
to develop, aggregation is difficult. The first three components of Assumption 3,
however, imply a Pareto distribution of production efficiency for varieties, which
admits analytical aggregation. The fourth component in turn allows us to derive
the total fixed costs of R&D in each country. With these simplifications, we have
the following:
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 3, the gains from openness for country d, defined



































This expression highlights various forces through which a country benefits from
27The assumption that the power of zR is 1 is without loss of generality, because the units of zR
can always be scaled so that it enters f(zR, θ) with a power of 1.
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economic integration. The first term, Xddd∑
lXdld
, captures the benefits from offshore




, captures the benefits from
foreign innovation for consumption. These two terms are direct effects of offshore
production and trade in the model. The third term, IddId , captures the importance
of foreign firms in domestic R&D. Intuitively, the smaller is this ratio, the more a
country relies on foreign affiliates for R&D, and the more significant are the welfare
gains from offshore R&D. The last term in the equation captures the effects of profit
flows on welfare through their impacts on total expenditures. This indirect effect
tends to bring positive welfare impacts, for countries that specialize in R&D (smaller
Yd
Xd
), and countries that rely more on domestic firms in R&D (smaller Id−IddXd ).
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I compare the gains-from-openness expression in this model to the expression
in Ramondo et al. (2015) and Arkolakis et al. (2014), both of which feature trade
and offshore production, but not offshore R&D. Their formulas are as follows:
GOd =














κP ]︸ ︷︷ ︸











Like Equation 1.17, this equation consists of a direct and an indirect effect.
There are three main differences between the two equations. First and most im-
portant, Equation 1.17 features an extra term, IddId , the gains from having foreign
affiliates doing R&D domestically. The second difference is that, the power on the
direct effect is different across these two equations. Specifically, κP , the dispersion
28Finite aggregate fixed R&D costs require (1− γ)κR − 1 > 0.
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parameter for production efficiency distribution, does not appear in Equation 1.17.
This is because by assuming away the fixed marketing costs, the extensive margin
of exporting vanishes, and the elasticity of substitution between varieties alone de-
termines trade elasticity. Third, while in Equation 1.18, the strength of the indirect
effect only depends on YdXd , in Equation 1.17, it depends on
Id
Xd
and IddId , too.
The comparison across the two expressions highlight the novel role of offshore
R&D for countries to benefit from globalization. To see this, consider two calibra-
tions, based on my model and the model in Arkolakis et al. (2014), respectively.
With flexible international frictions, both model are able to match the observed




are both equal to the data. As KR
approaches 11−γ from above,
29 the indirect effect in Equation 1.17 converges to XdYd ,
the indirect effect in Equation 1.18. Under suitable choice of κP and σ, the only
remaining difference between the two expressions is that in Equation 1.17, there is
an extra term IddId , which captures the importance of foreign firms in domestic R&D
activities.
To have an idea of how large this term is, consider the median country in the
quantitative section, with about 30% of its R&D done by foreign affiliates. The va-
lue of ( IddId )
− 1−γσ−1 is around 1.055, when γ = 0.4 and σ = 5. All else equal, this term
generates a 5% real income change. So offshore R&D indeed represents a quantita-
tively important channel through which countries benefit from global integration.
29κR must be greater than 11−γ for the equilibrium to be well defined.
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1.4 Parameterization
I perform a quantitative analysis of the determinants and the welfare impli-
cations of offshore R&D, using the model developed in Section 1.3. I focus on a
sample with 25 countries and a statistical aggregation of another 22 countries.30 I
parameterize the model to be consistent with the data in its predictions on the in-
teractions between countries and the size distribution of firms within the U.S. This
section describes the parameterization procedures, starting with the functional form
assumptions.
1.4.1 Additional Assumptions
In the quantification, I embed an occupational choice into the model. Throug-
hout the rest of the chapter, I assume that each country is endowed with Li number
of workers, with talent distribution Hi(θ). Workers sort into production labor or
research. Each production worker has one unit of production labor, and each re-
searcher has θ units of talent in research. Adding occupational choice generates
endogenous responses in the supply of inventors in the counterfactual experiments.
The function f(zR, θ) determines the complementarity between the innovation
management efficiency of firms and the talent of researchers. I assume that f is a
CES function with elasticity of substitution α < 1:







30The list of countries in this statistical aggregation is provided in the appendix.
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This specification satisfies the log-supermodularity assumption. As α approaches 1,
the complementarity between researcher talent and firm efficiency weakens.
The capture the long right tail in inventor and firm R&D output size distribu-
tion, the distributions of worker talent and firm innovation efficiency are parameteri-
zed to be truncated Pareto distributions. A more commonly used parameterization
in the literature is the Pareto distribution. By truncating the distribution at a
potentially arbitrarily large value that is determined by the data, I reduce the com-



















In these expressions, the letters with upper and lower bars indicate the upper and
lower bounds for their respective distributions. κRi and κθi are the truncated-Pareto
counterparts to the shape parameter in the Pareto distribution.
To capture the correlation between innovation and production efficiency at the
firm level, I assume that there are two distributions, indicated by H and L (for high
and low, respectively), from which firms draw their productivity zP . The probability
of drawing from the high distribution depends on a firm’s innovation efficiency in
the following fashion:
Prob(zP ∈ H|zR) = exp(A+B × z
R)
1 + exp(A+B × zR) , (1.19)
where A and B are parameters to be estimated. A positive value for B means that
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more innovative firms tend to be more productive as well. H and L are both Pareto
distributed with the same shape parameter κP :
GH(z








I assume that zPL < zPH , so the H distribution first-order stochastically dominates
the L distribution.
1.4.2 Parameters Assigned Directly
I set the number of workers in a country, L, to total employment from the
Penn World Tables. To focus on differences in the firm efficiency distributions and
to abstract from differences in the number of firms, I set E, the measure of firms,
to be proportional to L. This proportion is chosen so that the average employment
per firm in the model equals the average employment per firm in the U.S.
I directly assign values to a few parameters in the model. Parameter σ, the
elasticity of substitution between varieties, determines the markup charged by firms.
I set this parameter to be 5, following recent studies in international trade (see
Simonovska and Waugh, 2014, for example). This value also implies that 20% of
sales are variable profits. In the U.S., R&D expenditures account for about 8%
of manufacturing sales. The model counterpart of R&D expenditures is researcher
compensation. I set γ, the share of researcher compensation in variable profit, to
0.4, so that researcher compensation accounts for about 8% of sales in the model.
Equation 1.14 implies log(Xild) = αid+ βil − δlog(τld), where αid and βld are
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pair fixed effects. δ therefore determines the elasticity of Xilds with respect to the
cost of shipping from l to d. Based on Arkolakis et al. (2014), which estimates
this specification using the affiliate production and sales data of U.S. multinationals
(i = U .S.), I set δ to 10.9.
Calibrating firm efficiency and worker talent distributions for each country
requires comparable data across countries. I use the World Management Survey by
Bloom et al. (2012) and the cognitive test score data by Hanushek and Woessmann
(2012) to calibrate these distributions, as explained below.
The World Management Survey provides firm-level management scores for
each country in the sample. In the survey, interviewers rate each firm based on
its talent management policy and production efficiency along various dimensions.
The overall management score for a firm is then averaged over these subscores. The
talent management score intends to capture whether firms follow good managerial
practice for retaining and incentivizing its talent, so it is closely related to whether
a firm is able to make full use of its research talent. I use it to calibrate innova-
tion management distributions. I obtain three distribution statistics of z̃R for each
country: mean, standard deviation, and skewness.
I use firm-level talent and production management scores to estimate A and B,
the coefficients linking a firm’s innovation and production efficiencies. Specifically,
I classify a firm as being from a high productivity distribution if its production
management score falls into the top 1% of the distribution in the world (the top 4% in
the U.S.). I then estimate the relationship between a firm’s innovation management
score and the probability that it is from a high productivity distribution using
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the Logit model given by Equation 1.19. This procedure determines A = −6.3,
B = 0.167.31
In using the World Management Survey to calibrate firm efficiency distribu-
tion, I take the stand that survey scores capture fundamental differences about
management practises across countries which, in turn, lead to different innovation
and production performances. Consistent with this assumption, Bloom et al. (2012)
shows that the average management score of a country correlates strongly with per-
capita income. An alternative calibration strategy to this approach would be to use
a measure for the output of R&D—for example, the patent data—to capture firms’
innovation efficiency distribution in a country. This alternative approach has two
shortcomings compared to the current approach. First, the interpretation of R&D
in this model is broader than activities that generate patents. In the model, firms
perform only R&D and manufacturing. This R&D should therefore be interpreted
as non-production activities that add values to products, including product inven-
tion, development, marketing, etc. A firm’s efficiency in all these activities likely
depend on its management practise, captured by the World Management Survey.
Using patent data would miss an important part of this difference among countries.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, firms that apply for patents at the USPTO
are a selected subset of all firms. Such selection depends on firms’ costs and benefits
31The choice of the top 1% cutoff is motivated by the importance of the most productive firms in
international business and in production in general. A high cutoff allows me to better capture the
distribution of the very top firms. The implicit assumption underlying this calibration strategy is
that firms drawing their production efficiency from the L distribution constitute the bottom 99%
in the production efficiency distribution, whereas firms drawing from the H distribution constitute
the top 1% of production efficiency. This assumption does not hold exactly because under the
Pareto assumption, GL(zP ) will always overlap with GH(zP ). Given the choice of the cutoff (1%),
however, the calibrated ZPH will be large enough so the overlap is negligible.
42
from patenting in the U.S. For example, firms from countries that export intensively
to the U.S., or countries that enforce a strong IPR protection policy, are more li-
kely to apply for patents from the USPTO. Without explicitly modelling patenting
decision, this differential selections across countries might affect the measured firm
efficiency distribution.
For the talent distribution, I obtain average cognitive score and the share
of students reaching “basic” and “top” performance from the test score database.
These measures are defined based on a common absolute level across countries. To
pin down the relative scale of management efficiency and talent, I take the U.S. as
the benchmark. Specifically, I set HUS(θ) and GRUS(z̃R) to be the same, and use the
three statistics on the talent management score to pin down all three parameters
in GRUS(z̃R) (and hence HUS(θ)).32 I then determine the distributions for other
countries, by relating their distribution statistics to those of the U.S.33
Table 1.1 summarizes the information on the parameters determined directly.
I choose additional parameters jointly in equilibrium, a process I describe below.
32The talent management score is approximately normal in the data. Since it is well known that
the firm size distribution has a fat tail, I take the exponential of original scores and use that to
match firms’ innovation efficiency distribution. The statistics I use to pin down each country’s
distribution are based on these exponents of scores. A few countries in the quantitative analysis
are not covered by the World Management Survey. I impute their statistics based on country
characteristics. The calibration appendix reports the procedures used in the imputation process.
33For firm innovation distributions, the three moments can be perfectly matched by the three
parameters in the truncated Pareto distribution. For the talent distribution, however, the truncated
Pareto distribution cannot perfectly match all three moments. I therefore use only the average
score and the top student share to pin down the upper bound and the shape parameter, while
setting the lower bound to be the same across countries. This simplification, however, does not
leave out important information, as the correlation between the share of students reaching basic
performance and the average score is 0.92.
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Table 1.1: Parameters Calibrated Externally
Symbol Descriptions Value Source
σ Elasticity of substitution between varieties 5 Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
γ Return to research team size in R&D 0.4 Manufacturing R&D share
δ Dispersion in offshore production efficiency draws 10.9 Arkolakis et al. (2014)
A Probability of having a high production efficiency -6.3 Estimated
B Dependence of zP on zR 0.17 Estimated
1.4.3 Parameters Determined in Equilibrium
Overview The remaining parameters to be determined include international
frictions, {τld}, {φRoi}, {φPil}, {cMd }, and {cRi }; country-specific productivity, {Λl};
production efficiency distribution parameters, zPL , zPH , and κP ; and complementarity
between management and talent, α. Although in equilibrium these parameters are
jointly identified, for certain parameters some moments are more informative than
others. I describe below how each parameter is determined.
The iceberg components of international frictions, {τld}, {φRoi}, and {φPil},
determine the aggregate flows of international integration. I use them to match
bilateral trade shares, offshore R&D shares, and offshore production shares. To
reduce measurement errors, I average bilateral patenting and trade data over the
period 1998-2007.34 The data sources for these bilateral relationships include: the
multinational production data sets introduced in Ramondo et al. (2015); bilateral
trade including domestic absorption from the World Input-Output Database; and
bilateral offshore R&D information based on patenting statistics at USPTO from
the OECD patent database.
The offshore R&D measure warrants some explanation. When filing for a
34The multinational production database is averaged over 1996-2001 in the original source.
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patent at the USPTO, the applicant needs to write the address of the inventors, and
the address of the assignee, or the owner of the patent. The OECD patent database
documents the number of patents invented in country A (defined as the location of
the inventor) but assigned to owners located in another country B, which I use to
measure the extent of offshore R&D by firms from country B to country A.35 In
Appendix A, I show that this measure of offshore R&D correlates strongly not only
with similarly defined measures based on patents at the European Patent Office and
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, but also with an expenditure-based offshore R&D
measure.
The fixed components of international costs, {cMd } (for marketing) and {cRi }
(for R&D), determine the extensive margins of firms’ global operations. Due to the
lack of this information for a large sample of countries, I assume that these fixed
costs are the same for all country pairs, and choose them to match the share of ex-
porters (0.35) and the share of foreign affiliates among research active firms (0.037)
in the U.S. manufacturing sector, respectively. The assumption that the fixed costs
are the same for firms from all countries performing offshore R&D in, or exporting
to, all destinations, is obviously a violation of the reality. This assumption likely
affects the model’s predictions on the extensive margins of offshore R&D and ex-
porting, however, it might not be very important for the aggregate outcomes we are
interested in. In the context of exporting, the literature has shown that, when firms’
35In the next chapter, I use the firm-level data based on the same underlying database for
empirical analysis. The notion of offshore R&D in this OECD harmonized data and the firm-level
data I construct is the same, but the OECD took extra efforts to ensure, to the extent possible,
that patents filed under the name of affiliates in host countries are rightly classified as invented
in by foreign affiliates, rather than domestic firms. For example, a patent filed by Apple China
should be classified as invented by a foreign affiliate, rather than a domestic Chinese company.
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productivity distribution is Pareto, the import share predicts the welfare gains from
trade (Arkolakis et al., 2012). In the current context, I show analytically (Section
1.3.8) and quantitatively (Section 1.8.2) that the gains from offshore R&D are also
strongly tied to the share of foreign firms in domestic R&D. In the calibration,
while the fixed costs are the same across countries, the iceberg exporting and offs-
hore R&D costs differ across country pairs, which allows me to match offshore R&D
and trade shares perfectly for all country pairs through the intensive margin. As a
result, even without variation in fixed costs, the model is still able to capture the
strength of trade and offshore R&D for countries.
I calibrate {Λl}, the labor productivity in production, by matching the real
per-capita income of each country. I normalize zPL to 1, and determine α, zPH , and
κP jointly. α affects both the pattern of matching between firms and researchers,
and the firm size distribution. Strong complementarity (small α) puts efficient firms
at an advantage in working with talent, which affects the shape of the matching
function and the concentration of researchers. Figure 1.4a plots the model matching
function under various α. The matching functions corresponding to smaller α tend
to be more convex, with a larger share of researchers working for the top firms.36 I
measure the overall convexity of the matching function using the ratio between the
average slope of the matching function for the top 50% zR firms, and the average
slope for the bottom 50% firms. This convexity conveys information about the value
of α, and will be used as a calibration target. I discuss below how I construct the
36From Equation 1.7, other things equal, the slope of the matching function reflects the size
of the research teams. The steeper the curve, the larger is the research team. A more convex
matching function thus means a more unequal distribution of research team size, similar to the
Lorenz curve.
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model and empirical measures for this convexity.
By determining the distribution of talent across firms, α also affects the number
of products a firm develops, and hence the firm size distribution. Numerically, it is
mostly informative about the size of firms in the top 1%. In addition to α, κP and
zPH are also important for the firm size distribution: κP directly affects the Pareto
shape of the firm size distribution at the very top, while zPH effectively determines
the scale of the top 4% firms relative to the bottom 96%, as about 4% of U.S. firms
draw from the H distribution.
Specifics about the matching function I estimate the parameters of
matching function using evidence of positive assortative matching between inventors
and firms in the next chapter. Specifically, using inventor-firm linked patenting
data from the USPTO, I measure firm innovation efficiency using the per-inventor
innovation output, and inventor talent using past innovation. Focusing on a sample
of job switchers, I then estimate nonparametrically how the talent of an inventor
is related to the innovation efficiency of the new firm, controlling for inventor and
firm characteristics as well as time and patent category fixed effects. A positive
correlation indicates positive assortative matching. The solid line in Figure 1.4b
presents the estimates, along with a 2 s.e. band. The overall convexity measure of
this empirical matching function is 1.71.
We cannot directly compare the model convexity measure to its data coun-
terpart. In the data, matches are noisy, so the range of the estimated matching
function is not [1, 100], whereas in the model, this is always the case. To make the
two comparable, I take the stand that in choosing the optimal types of researchers,
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Figure 1.4: The Model and Empirical Matching Function
(a) Model matching function
(b) Empirical and “noisy” model matching function
Notes: In both panels, the horizontal axis plots percentiles of firm innovation efficiency, and the vertical axis plots
percentiles of researcher talent. The upper panel is the model matching function under different α. The lower panel
shows the empirical matching function estimated by the author using the USPTO data (solid line), and simulated
“noisy” model matching functions under different α.
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firms make mistakes. They cannot differentiate among workers whose talent satis-
fies firms’ first order condition (Equation 1.6) within a certain “error margin”. I fix
the wage schedule at the benchmark equilibrium, and then choose the size of this
margin so that the estimated matching function using simulated data has the same
range as the empirical matching function. I then compute the convexity measure
based on this simulated matching function.37
Figure 1.4b plots the simulated noisy matching function when α is 0.7, which
will be the benchmark calibration, and two different values. The benchmark value
offers the best fit for the overall concavity, determined by the value of the matching
function at the 50th firm percentile. A smaller α could fit the overall shape reaso-
nably well, but misses the top range. A larger α, on the other hand, is a poor fit
overall.
1.4.4 Computational Algorithm
A detailed account of the computational algorithm is provided in the appendix.
This section briefly describes the nested procedure I use. In the outer loop, I choose
zPH , κP , cM , cR, and α to match the targets described above. In the middle loop,
I iterate over {τ}, {φR}, {φP}, and {T} to match all bilateral shares and per-
capita real income of countries. The inner loop solves the model given exogenous
parameters.
37For different α, the size of the “error margin” needed to match the range of the empirical
matching function varies. But as long as α < 1, the simulated matching function can always
match the range of its empirical counterpart. When α approaches 1, firms become increasingly
indifferent between different researchers. A small amount of mistakes in recruiting would then
result in a flat matching function.
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This computation algorithm requires solving the researcher market equilibrium
for all countries at different parameter values. With offshore R&D decisions in the
model, the distribution of R&D center innovation efficiency, gRi (zR), is an endo-
genous outcome. The cutoff rule in offshore R&D decisions implies that gRi (zR)
could have multiple discontinuities. As a result, the matching function, Ti(zR), is
not necessarily differentiable. In this case, general boundary value problem solvers
routinely fail or takes a long time to find the solution. In the appendix, I develop
a computational algorithm that is well-suited for this exercise. In essence, I show
the solution to the boundary value problem can be found by solving a sequence of
initial value problems.
1.4.5 Model Fit
Table 1.2: Fit of the Targeted Moments
Parameter Value Moments Model Data
cM 0.0693 Share of exporters 0.35 0.35
cR 2.6 Share of foreign affiliates 0.042 0.037
zPH , α, κP
zPH = 1.2 Fraction of firms with emp.<100 0.99 0.99
α = 0.7 Fraction of firms with emp.<20 0.95 0.95
κP = 8.16 Matching function slope between 0%-50%/ slope between 50-100% 1.58 1.71
Share of emp. in firms with >500 emp. 0.41 0.47
Power law coefficient of firm size dist. 1.04 1.05
The calibration process determines that cM = 0.069, cR = 2.6, zPH = 1.2,
κP = 8.16, and α = 0.7. Table 1.2 reports the value of parameters and the model
moments that help pin down these parameters. Overall, the model is able to fit data
along these dimensions well.
The value of α suggests strong complementarity between innovation efficiency
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and researcher talent. Since the complementarity and the resulting talent-acquisition
motive are an important channel in the model, in the following, I first discuss the
role of α in determining the model predictions and explaining the patterns in the
data. I then present additional non-targeted implications of the model under the
benchmark calibration and compare them to the data whenever possible.
Figure 1.5: Complementarity and Offshore R&D
Notes: The vertical axis plots the percentage point difference between the benchmark parameterization and
an alternative parameterization with α = 0.98 in the share of R&D expenditures by foreign affiliates. The
horizontal axis is host average talent. Host average innovation efficiency is netted out from both axis.
The importance of complementarity To understand the role of com-
plementarity in shaping offshore R&D between countries, I solve a counterfactual
experiment with α = 0.98, keeping other parameters at the benchmark. This para-
meter value implies much weaker complementarity than the benchmark calibration.
The vertical axis in Figure 1.5 shows the percentage point difference between the
benchmark and the counterfactual equilibrium in the share of domestic R&D done
by foreign affiliates. The horizontal axis is host average talent quality. The figure
indicates that higher complementarity increases offshore R&D, particularly in host
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countries with high talent, so complementarity is an important force for the pattern
of offshore R&D.
The calibration suggests that a relatively strong complementarity (α = 0.7) fits
the pattern of matches and moments of the firm size distribution well. Does it also
explain the pattern of offshore R&D better than under weak complementarity (as
α approaches 1)? The next chapter shows using firm-level patent data that offshore
R&D increases with firm innovation efficiency, host talent, and their interaction.
Here I evaluate the model’s ability to generate these features under α = 0.7 and
α = 0.98.
Because the calibration exactly matches bilateral offshore R&D and the distri-
bution of talent and innovation efficiency in the cross section, I evaluate the model in
changes. I simulate a counterfactual equilibrium in which countries receive random
shocks to their distributions of talent or efficiency.38 I then use the simulated data
to perform a difference-in-difference regression of changes in offshore R&D on chan-
ges in the distributions of host talent and home innovation efficiency, in which each
pair of country is an observation.
Columns 1-3 of Table 1.3 report the results under the benchmark specifica-
tion. Bilateral pair fixed effects are included in all three columns, so the model is
identified from changes. The first two columns show that the host country talent
and home country innovation efficiency both have significant positive impacts. The
third column in addition adds an interaction term. The interaction is positive and
38Specifically, I reduce the upper bound of the talent distribution by a random fraction for one
third of the countries, reduce the upper bound of innovation efficiency by a random fraction for
one third of the countries, and then keep the remaining one third of countries intact.
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Table 1.3: Complementarity and the Patterns of Offshore R&D: Simulated Data
Benchmark Calibration Weak Complementarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(average home mgt. efficiency) 0.157*** -0.650* 0.010*** -0.018
(0.044) (0.375) (0.003) (0.025)
Log(average host talent) 0.071* -0.625** 0.006** -0.020
(0.038) (0.298) (0.003) (0.019)
Interaction 0.353** 0.012
(0.164) (0.011)
Bilateral FE X X X X X X
Observations 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352
Within R2 0.019 0.005 0.025 0.019 0.007 0.021
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
significant, while the non-interactive terms turn negative. So the effects are concen-
trated in the pairs of countries that experience improvements in both host talent
and home efficiency, consistent with the empirical findings. Columns 4-6 of Table
1.3 report the same specifications under the case where α = 0.98. In this case, host
talent and home efficiency both have significant marginal impacts on offshore R&D.
The within R square terms in the first two columns are also similar to those under
the benchmark specification. However, the interaction term is not significant, in
contrast to the data presented in the next chapter.
Together, these results suggest that under the benchmark calibration, the
model is able to generate a relationship between offshore R&D and the distributions
of endowments that is similar qualitatively to that observed in the data, while a
model with weak complementarity cannot.
The management score difference between large and small firms The
calibration procedure for κP and zPH takes the stand that management efficiency
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differences are the fundamental cause of performance differences among firms.39
To validate this assumption, I examine the model’s performance in matching the
mapping from management score to firm size. This is a valid test because the
calibration uses the information on management scores and the firm size distribution
separately, but puts no restrictions on how a one-point increase in the management
score at different percentiles of the firm size distribution translates into increases
in firm size. For this comparison, I use the total management score, defined as the
sum of the innovation and production score, for a consistent comparison with the
empirical evidence.
Table 1.4: Additional Untargeted Moments
Management Score and Firm Size Model Data
Management score difference between large and small firms 1.18 1.32
The Management Efficiency of Foreign Affiliates
Foreign affiliate advantage 1.33 1.16
Coefficient of variation across countries 0.094 0.075
Correlation with domestic average score -0.67 -0.84
The first panel of Table 1.4 reports the difference in average total management
score between firms with 10000 employees and firms with 10 employees for the
model and data.40 In the model, the difference in total management score between
an average firm with 10000 employees and an average firm with 10 employees is
1.18 times the standard deviation of the management score, which is close to the
empirical counterpart of 1.32.
39The calibration essentially takes the management score distribution from data, and chooses
κP and zPH so that the variation in firm size is close to that in the data.
40The empirical counterpart of this number is from Bloom et al. (2014), which estimates this
relationship nonparametrically, focusing on medium-sized U.S. manufacturing firms with 10-10000
employees. Because the two surveys have different scales for scoring, I normalize the increase by
the standard deviation of total management score.
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Figure 1.6 plots nonparametrically the relationship between management score
and firm size from the model and the data. The estimated curve from the data, in
the left panel, displays some convexity: initially, firm size increases relatively slowly
with management score; at the top range, however, a small increase in management
score results in a larger percentage increase in firm size. Such a relationship can
always be captured by the model by choosing how management score scales into
productivity, which is partially determined by zPH . The question is whether the
scale chosen to match other moments is able to generate this relationship. The
right panel is the model relationship between management score and employment.
Consistent with the data, the model also generates some convexity.
Figure 1.6: Management Score and Firm Size
(a) Data (b) Model
Notes: The left panel shows the model relationship between management score and firm employment in the data
estimated in Bloom et al. (2014); the right panel shows the model counterpart. Both are based on the sub-sample of
firms with employment between 10 and 10000. The range of variation in x-axis is 1.18 times the standard deviation
of the management score in the data, and 1.32 in the model.
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The multinational managerial advantage One important assumption of
the model is that affiliates’ innovation efficiency depends on that of their parents,
rather than that of host country domestic firms. This assumption, together with the
self-selection mechanism, implies that foreign affiliates tend to be more management
efficient than domestic firms, and that the managerial advantage of foreign affiliates
is larger in countries with worse domestic innovation management efficiency.
I validate these implications quantitatively by calculating the foreign affiliate
managerial advantage for each country. The measure I use is the ratio between
average foreign affiliate innovation efficiency and average domestic firm innovation
efficiency. I then compare the statistics of this measure among the model countries
to their data counterpart, constructed using the database introduced in Bloom et
al. (2012).
The bottom panel of Table 1.4 reports the statistics of the foreign affiliate ma-
nagerial advantage for the sample countries. Both the model and the data indicates
a larger innovation management score for foreign affiliates compared to domestic
firms, although the difference is larger in the model (33%) than in the data (16%).
The variability of the foreign affiliate advantage measure across countries, captured
by its coefficient of variation, is 0.094 in the model, and 0.075 in the data. The
correlation between this measure and the host country average domestic innovation
score is −0.67 in the model, and −0.84 in the data. So quantitatively, the model fits
the cross-country pattern of foreign affiliate innovation advantage well. In the ap-
pendix, I also plot the model foreign affiliate managerial advantage against its data
counterpart for individual countries that are common to both samples. Overall the
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Figure 1.7: Share of R&D in Income: Model versus Data
Notes: This figure plots the share of income from non-production labor in the model against the share of R&D in
GDP in the data across countries. The measure for the U.S. is normalized to have 1 in both the model and the
data.
model is a reasonable fit.
Share of non-production income in GDP The model predicts countries
will specialize differently in R&D or production. Figure 1.7 plots the share of income
from non-production labor in the model against its counterpart in the data, the share
of R&D in GDP. There is a strong correlation between the model and the data across
countries, even though the model best captures the manufacturing industry while
the data is from the aggregate economy.41
International Frictions Finally, I check if the calibrated bilateral frictions
are reasonable by comparing their correlations with geographic distance. The cor-
relations between the logs of τ , φR, and φP and the log of distance are 0.2, −0.22,
and −0.42, respectively. The signs of these correlations are consistent with larger
international frictions for longer distances (φP and φR are the inverse of costs). The
41The model prediction better matches the ratio between R&D expenditures and manufacturing
value added.
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difference between offshore production and offshore R&D in distance elasticity also
supports that these two activities are different in nature.
1.5 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section I perform counterfactual experiments using the parameterized
model to shed light on the determinants and impacts of offshore R&D.
1.5.1 What Determines Offshore R&D
I first examine the quantitative importance of the talent-acquisition and market-
access motives for offshore R&D. This is a relevant exercise, because policy makers
around the world are looking to attract R&D intensive FDI. Domestic research ta-
lent and access to foreign countries through trade and offshore production are cited
as important determinants of the attractiveness of a country as a host for offshore
R&D centers (Guimón, 2009). I perform a set of experiments in which I either
change the distribution of talent or management endowments, or the market access
of a country. To isolate the effects from changes in other countries, when compu-
ting these counterfactual equilibria, I change parameters for one country at a time,
keeping model parameters at the benchmark for all other countries.
The role of endowment distributions The first set of experiments aim
to quantify the importance of cross-country differences in the distributions of firm
efficiency and researcher talent in determining offshore R&D. Specifically, I increase
innovation efficiency of each host country, and decrease the talent of their workforce,
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Table 1.5: The Determinants of Offshore R&D
“Talent Acquisition” “Market Access” All
Country Benchmark Efficiency Talent Both Consumers Producers Both
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Developed
AUS 26.83 0.05 7.61 0.00 30.30 17.83 0.27 0.00
AUT 50.21 5.87 25.81 0.00 51.46 39.88 0.00 0.00
BEL 57.12 12.25 14.98 2.48 68.15 31.62 0.00 0.00
CAN 33.52 13.38 12.19 0.13 38.88 22.73 0.00 0.00
DEU 23.85 4.22 7.53 1.03 36.32 11.51 1.65 0.00
DNK 33.55 0.93 15.98 0.13 41.22 18.88 0.00 0.00
ESP 42.92 0.28 30.96 0.00 45.64 41.03 29.53 0.00
FIN 17.93 0.00 0.46 0.00 26.86 1.62 0.00 0.00
FRA 33.74 1.00 17.66 0.31 40.32 23.61 2.89 0.00
GBR 45.65 17.83 29.04 7.13 54.25 33.23 5.63 0.08
GRC 58.00 10.46 53.50 5.72 56.90 57.02 49.54 1.37
IRL 55.20 30.23 29.72 0.01 55.21 51.22 0.00 0.00
ITA 29.20 0.33 22.11 0.21 32.05 26.31 19.19 0.10
JPN 5.05 0.00 2.03 0.00 9.00 2.39 2.35 0.00
KOR 4.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.80 3.34 1.36 0.00
NLD 34.66 1.13 2.83 0.07 54.67 0.81 0.00 0.00
POL 60.79 31.85 49.68 21.07 60.72 60.52 43.06 0.25
PRT 50.21 0.14 41.17 0.00 60.27 46.95 0.00 0.00
SWE 26.97 0.65 3.22 0.00 31.92 7.07 0.00 0.00
USA 7.93 7.93 2.97 2.99 13.89 1.92 1.18 0.45
Median 33.64 1.07 15.48 0.10 40.77 23.17 0.72 0.00
Emerging
BRA 37.14 5.37 37.14 5.37 40.15 36.49 34.23 4.68
CHN 52.13 22.66 46.33 19.40 53.46 52.12 51.28 18.73
IND 57.88 35.06 57.08 34.66 58.67 57.74 56.96 33.99
MEX 49.26 24.32 49.49 24.40 54.50 48.07 36.78 14.80
TUR 51.79 12.04 46.24 9.38 52.43 51.60 49.40 8.37
Median 51.79 22.66 46.33 19.40 53.46 51.60 49.40 14.80
Median 37.14 5.37 22.11 0.21 45.64 31.62 1.65 0.00
Notes: The numbers reported in this table are the share of domestic R&D expenditures incurred
by affiliates of foreign companies in each country. All numbers are in percentage points. The first
column shows the results from the benchmark calibration. The second column changes the firm
innovation efficiency distribution for each country to that of the U.S. The third column changes
the worker talent distribution for each country to that of Brazil. The fourth column combines the
changes in the second and third columns. The fifth column increases exporting costs to infinity. The
sixth column increases countries’ outward offshore production costs to infinity. The seventh column
combines changes in the fifth and sixth columns. The last column combines changes in the fourth
and seventh columns.
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to see how these two factors affect the equilibrium offshore R&D. I choose the
U.S. innovation efficiency distribution and the Brazilian talent distribution as the
benchmarks, because these two countries respectively have the highest management
efficiency, and the lowest average talent.
The second column in Table 1.5 reports the share of R&D done by foreign
affiliates for each host country when it is given the U.S. management efficiency dis-
tribution. With an improvement in domestic management efficiency, domestic firms
are more competitive in both labor and product markets. Domestic wages increase
and prices decrease, reducing foreign firms’ incentive to enter. Indeed, compared
to the share of foreign R&D in the benchmark equilibrium in the first column, the
shares in these counterfactual equilibria are much lower. The median share of R&D
done by foreign affiliates across all countries is 5.37% , or one-eighth of the bench-
mark value. Perhaps surprisingly, for many developed countries, the offshore R&D
share decreased significantly. For example, Germany sees its offshore R&D decrea-
sing by 18 percentage points. This is not due to Germany having a particularly bad
calibrated firm efficiency distribution—as shown in Table A.1, the average mana-
gement score of Germany is 8.21, the third highest among all countries (right after
the U.S. and Canada). Rather, the large change is due to the U.S. having a signi-
ficantly better efficiency distribution than all other countries. Developing countries
also experience significant decreases in offshore R&D—it decreases by more than
20 percentage points in all developing countries in the sample. While these coun-
tries have worse calibrated firm efficiency distributions compared to the developed
countries (see Table A.1), their decrease in offshore R&D are not larger in percent,
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so that significant offshore R&D remains. This likely arises for two reasons. First,
these developing countries in general have large domestic markets. Second, offshore
production into these countries tend to be costly due to their geographic locations.
These two together imply a strong product market entry motive in offshore R&D.
I then change each country’s talent distribution to that of Brazil, while keeping
its firm efficiency distribution at the benchmark. Intuitively, when domestic talent
distribution improves, R&D outputs of both domestic and foreign-affiliated R&D
centers increase. The increase in the latter is larger for two reasons. First, foreign
affiliates are on average more productive, so they benefit more from the improvement
in researcher quality. Second, the increase in R&D output allows more foreign firms
to overcome the fixed costs and enter. Column 3 of Table 1.5 reports the share of
R&D by foreign affiliates in each country. In the median country, foreign affiliates
now account for about 22% of domestic R&D, which is a decrease of around one-third
from the benchmark value. The size of the decrease, again, varies considerably across
countries. Perhaps because developed countries had better talent distributions to
begin with, they experience larger drops in inward offshore R&D.
Finally, I combine the two experiments by changing the distributions of both
management efficiency and talent. As can be seen from the fourth column of Table
1.5, the global median share of R&D done by foreign affiliates is around 0.21%.
Overall, cross-country differences in the distributions of talent and firm efficiency
can account for most of the observed offshore R&D for developed countries, and a
smaller but still significant share for large developing countries.
The role of foreign access I now examine the impact of the host country’s
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access to foreign countries on offshore R&D. In the model, foreign access consists of
two channels: access to foreign consumers through exporting, and access to foreign
producers through offshore production. I consider the separate and joint impacts of
these two channels.
In the first experiment, I increase each host country l’s iceberg export cost,
τld, l 6= d to infinity. This shuts down host countries’ direct access to foreign consu-
mers, but R&D centers there can still indirectly access foreign consumers through
offshore production. The shares of R&D by foreign affiliates in these counterfactual
equilibria are reported in column 5 of Table 1.5, which shows small but universal
increases in offshore R&D shares across countries.
This result might seem surprising at first glance, given the partial equilibrium
intuition that eliminating access to foreign consumers through direct exporting re-
duces the return to doing R&D in a host country. This effect seemingly should be
especially strong for more productive firms, because they export more. So fewer
foreign firms should enter, and their share in total R&D should decrease. In a mo-
del with both trade and offshore production, however, this direct channel is muted.
Even if they cannot export directly, firms can still serve foreign consumers indirectly
by offshoring their production to other countries. Moreover, due to the lower de-
mand for labor from production, wages for both inventors and production workers
decrease, which makes the country more attractive as a host for R&D centers. An
increase in export costs thus has a similar effect to a decrease in a host country’s
production efficiency, which strengthens its comparative advantage in innovation,
driving it to specialize in R&D activities.
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In the second experiment, I increase the costs of offshore production in each
country to infinity (by setting φRil , i 6= l to zero), so it is impossible for R&D centers
to perform offshore production in other countries. The 6th column of Table 1.5 shows
that, compared to the benchmark equilibrium, most countries experience a decrease
in offshore R&D. The median share of R&D by foreign affiliates decreases by about
5 percentage points from the benchmark economy, to around 32%. Because firms
located in emerging economies in this sample do not perform outward offshoring
activities to begin with, the decrease in offshore R&D resulting from this change
tends to be more significant for developed economies than for emerging economies.
The general equilibrium effect works in the same direction as the partial equi-
librium effect in this case. When the option of offshore production is eliminated,
R&D centers in the host countries have to produce locally to serve both foreign
and domestic customers, which increases wages for production workers and inven-
tors, making the country less attractive as a host for R&D centers. An increase
in offshore production costs is therefore similar to a reduction in R&D innovation
efficiency of a country, which strengthens its comparative advantage in production.
Column 7 of Table 1.5 reports the experiment when both exporting and offs-
hore production are shut down. Compared to column 5, the share of offshore R&D
is much smaller for developed countries, because when offshore production is not an
option, countries can no longer specialize in innovation. For developing countries,
the differences between columns 5 and 7 are small, mainly because they do not
perform much outward offshoring production in the benchmark equilibrium.
Finally, I combine the two sets of experiments reported in this section, by
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changing the two distributions and also eliminating host access to foreign consumers
and producers. The median of foreign R&D shares, reported in the last column of
Table 1.5, is 0. The only countries that attract a significant share of offshore R&D
are large emerging economies, such as Brazil, China, and India. The large markets of
these countries, and their relative remoteness for exporting and offshore production
from other countries, are the reasons for foreign firms to perform R&D in those
countries.
In summary, the experiments in this section show that the two main forces
incorporated in the model have significant impacts on firms’ offshore R&D decisions.
On average, differences in the management and worker quality distributions together
explain about 86% of the equilibrium offshore R&D (the global average decrease from
37.14% in the benchmark economy to 5.38% in the fourth column). Host access to
foreign customers reduces offshore R&D in the country, while its access to foreign
producers increases it. Combined, international differences in the distributions of
talent and firm efficiency, and access to foreign markets and producers, explain more
than 92% of the average level of offshore R&D in the benchmark equilibrium (the
average value in the 8th Column is 3.31%). The small remaining offshore R&D
activities are concentrated in emerging economies with large domestic markets.
1.5.2 The Gains from Offshore R&D
I now turn to the normative aspect of offshore R&D. As a starting point, I
examine the welfare gains from various forms of economic integrations by eliminating
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each channel from the model separately. I define the gains from offshore R&D as the
increase in real income as a country moves from an equilibrium where offshore R&D
is not allowed to the baseline equilibrium. I define the gains from trade and gains
from offshore production analogously. Finally, I define the gains from openness as
the combined effects of the three channels. Since these three channels interact with
each other, the sum of gains from trade, offshore production, and offshore R&D,
does not necessarily equal the gains from openness.
It is worth emphasizing that, defined this way, these welfare measures are about
the level of welfare gains a country has currently achieved through international
economic integration. Smaller gains from openness for a country do not mean that
this country has little to benefit from further economic integration. On the contrary,
if a country currently benefits very little from international economic integration
because of its high distortions, it means there is a larger scope for future gains
through eliminating these distortions. In this chapter I mainly focus on the level
of achieved welfare gains so that the results are more comparable to the existing
literature. I perform some experiment on further liberalizations in section 1.5.3.
The first column in Table 1.6 presents the welfare gains from offshore R&D.
The median welfare gain is 2.18%. The median, however, masks a great deal of
country heterogeneity. Some countries, such as China, India, and Greece, benefit by
4% or higher. Meanwhile countries like Japan and Korea barely receive any benefits
or even lose, due to the general equilibrium effects from international competition.
Figure 1.8 plots the gains from offshore R&D against the model share of foreign
affiliates in domestic R&D for each country. Countries with a higher share of R&D
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Table 1.6: The Welfare Gains from International Economic Integration
ISO Offshore R&D Trade Offshore Prod. Openness Trade & Offshore Prod.
1 2 3 4 5
Developed
AUS 1.14 5.64 2.09 19.47 17.24
AUT 3.28 10.67 3.12 52.43 43.98
BEL 4.51 15.94 4.52 74.15 61.53
CAN 1.76 9.43 3.53 43.56 38.74
DEU 1.18 7.08 3.17 24.87 22.88
DNK 1.77 17.23 2.32 43.02 40.40
ESP 2.67 3.95 0.32 17.61 12.69
FIN 1.17 8.12 3.00 21.70 20.86
FRA 1.91 6.90 2.34 22.51 19.62
GBR 2.51 8.47 4.59 34.68 28.82
GRC 4.51 7.67 0.03 20.54 13.32
IRL 4.11 12.55 2.17 60.98 48.39
ITA 1.23 3.33 0.42 11.35 9.22
JPN -0.29 3.16 1.31 4.75 4.69
KOR 0.03 3.83 0.15 6.60 6.45
NLD 2.18 19.47 9.43 64.29 62.48
POL 4.93 5.01 0.61 28.20 17.45
PRT 3.24 5.23 2.48 43.77 33.17
SWE 1.93 8.79 3.52 34.33 31.72
USA 1.93 8.92 3.97 16.08 15.90
Median 1.93 7.89 2.41 26.53 21.78
Emerging
BRA 2.12 -0.46 0.09 6.91 3.27
CHN 4.11 -0.92 -0.05 7.96 2.40
IND 4.93 -0.53 0.04 9.48 3.70
MEX 2.97 3.61 0.73 20.73 13.60
TUR 3.95 3.27 -0.18 12.06 6.14
Median 3.95 -0.46 0.04 9.48 4.15
Median 2.18 6.90 2.17 21.70 18.28
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Figure 1.8: The Welfare Gains from Offshore R&D
Notes: The vertical axis shows the welfare gains from offshore R&D (%), and the horizontal axis shows the share
of R&D in a host country performed by foreign affiliates in the model economy.
done by foreigners tend to benefit more from offshore R&D.
The second and third columns report the gains from trade and the gains from
offshore production, respectively. The median gain is around 7.0% for trade, and
2% for offshore production. Again, the welfare gains take a wide range of values.
As expected, smaller economies and countries that are closer to major markets,
such as Belgium, Netherlands, and Ireland, gain more from both trade and offshore
production. Larger and more remote economies, such as India, gain less. Some
countries even receive modest losses from trade and offshore production.
In the fourth column are the overall gains from openness. They range from 16%
for the U.S. to 74% for Belgium, with a median of 21.7%. The gains from openness
are almost always larger than the sum of the gains from the three forms of econo-
mic integration, which means these three forms of integration are substitutes—the
benefit from additional openness is smaller once a country is already open in other
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dimensions. The substitution between trade and offshore production is intuitive—
since these two are alternative ways of serving goods from where they are invented to
where they are consumed, when one channel is present, the marginal benefits from
the other channel are lower. The last column of Table 1.6 reports the combined gains
from trade and offshore production, computed from a counterfactual scenario where
both trade and offshore production are eliminated. Indeed, the values in column 5
are universally larger than the sum of columns 2 and 3. This result is consistent
with the finding in Arkolakis et al. (2014), in a setting without offshore R&D.
The interaction pattern between offshore R&D and the combined effect of
trade and offshore production is more nuanced—while in most countries, the sum of
columns 1 and 5 is still smaller than column 4, the difference is small. In countries
like the U.S., the sum of gains from offshore R&D and the gains from trade and
offshore production is actually larger than the overall gains from openness.
This difference is again related to the interaction among various forces through
country specialization. First, there is a demand-for-R&D channel. The option to
export and to produce offshore raises the return to innovation. Because of the fixed
marketing cost, this benefits more efficient firms particularly, who are also the ones
most likely to perform offshore R&D. This demand side channel therefore tends
to increase the gains from offshore R&D when trade and offshore production are
present. However, there is also a labor-supply channel. Since innovation and pro-
duction compete for workers, the general equilibrium effect discussed in the previous
section sets in. When one sector expands in a country, wages increase, making the
country benefit less from new opportunities in the other sector.
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Offshore R&D tends to increase the R&D efficiency in countries that are re-
latively scarce in high efficiency firms, which weakens the comparative advantage
of these countries in production. Because those are also the countries that tend to
specialize in production, offshore R&D reduces their gains from trade and offshore
production by weakening their comparative advantage. The substitution between
offshore R&D, trade and offshore production is stronger for countries with strong
comparative advantage in production. We can use the ratio between the sum of gains
from offshore R&D and the combined gains from trade and offshore production over
the overall gains from openness as a measure of the strength of this substitution.
A lower ratio means smaller marginal gains from further integrating the economy
once it is already integrated through other ways, and therefore represents stronger
substitution. I use the share of income generated by R&D labor in the calibrated
equilibrium as a measure for comparative advantage in innovation. Figure 1.9 dis-
plays the relationship between these two measures. As conjectured, the substitution
effect is more important for countries with comparative advantage in production.
How important is accounting for offshore R&D in understanding the gains
from openness? Figure 1.10 plots the relationship between host income and the
ratio between the gains from openness in the benchmark model, shown in Table 1.6,
and the gains from openness in a restricted-version of the model without offshore
R&D. With offshore R&D as an additional channel for gains from openness, the
ratio is generally larger than 1, indicating higher gains from openness in the ben-
chmark model. The average of this ratio among the model countries is 1.2. This
amplification, however differs significantly across countries. For emerging countries
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Figure 1.9: The Substitution Between International Activities
Notes: The vertical axis shows the sum of gains from offshore R&D and the combined gains from trade and offshore
production, divided by the overall gains from openness. The horizontal axis shows the share researcher compensation
in total income.
Figure 1.10: Relative Importance of Offshore R&D
Notes: The vertical axis shows the ratio between gains from openness in the benchmark model, and the gains from
openness in a model without offshore R&D. The horizontal axis shows host income.
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in the sample, such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey, the gains from openness
are more than 100% higher in the benchmark model with offshore R&D. This am-
plification is much lower for developed countries. For example, for the U.S., the
inclusion of offshore R&D only increases the gains from openness by 15%. The
wide range of this ratio also underscores the importance of incorporating offshore
R&D—overlooking this channel will not only understate the gains from openness,
but also bias the comparison of the gains from openness across countries.
Why do developing countries benefit more from offshore R&D? Further ex-
amination of countries’ participation in various forms of integration suggests that
during the sample period, developing countries participated more intensively in offs-
hore R&D than in trade and offshore production. By fitting this pattern, the model
implies that the frictions impeding offshore R&D increase more slowly with distance
than the frictions impeding trade and offshore production. As a result, developing
countries which are far away from major home countries of innovating firms—U.S.,
West Europe, and Japan—participate more intensively in offshore R&D, and less
intensively in offshore production.
To sum up, the counterfactual experiments in this section demonstrate that
offshore R&D represents a quantitatively important new channel through which
countries benefit from globalization. It is a weak substitute for trade and offshore
production in general, although the substitution patterns depend on a country’s
specialization in innovation or production in the world economy. Further, by showing
that offshore R&D and other forms of globalization have very different impacts
across countries, the results also highlight the importance of modelling offshore
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R&D separately, rather than treating it as part of the offshore production process.
1.5.3 Further Liberalization of China and India
Existing quantitative research on multinational activities usually does not al-
low firms to make independent decisions on offshore R&D and production. I evaluate
whether this is an important restriction by comparing the welfare implications of li-
beralizing offshore R&D and offshore production. Doing so is potentially important
because policy makers usually have at their disposal policies that specifically target
production or innovation activities.
As an example, I focus on the case of China and India and evaluate two
types of openness policies. This exercise is interesting in its own right, because
both countries are becoming popular destinations for offshore production and R&D.
Related to this trend, their governments are attempting to attract more foreign
companies, especially R&D intensive ones, by cutting red tape and speeding up the
entry approval process.
I first consider an inward offshore R&D liberalization that makes it easier for
foreign firms to open R&D centers in India and China. More specifically, I reduce
the fixed costs of R&D in these countries by 20%. This reduction in cost can be
interpreted as a tax credit for the upfront investment in R&D, subsidized land, or
speedy approval of entry. The magnitude of the reduction is well within the range
of policies commonly used.42 The first column of Table 1.7 reports the results. As
42For example, in 2012, to attract a $30 billion investment in a chip factory from Samsung
Electronics Co. Ltd., the Chinese city Xi’An offered a package of favorable policies, including free
land, infrastructure, and tax credits. The land alone was valued at $4 billion, more than 10% of
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Table 1.7: Further Inward FDI Liberalization in China and India
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3
CHN 0.65 0.20 0.13
IND 0.89 0.19 0.12
DEU 0.00 0.17 0.21
JPN 0.00 0.15 0.24
USA -0.01 0.09 0.26
Notes: All numbers are in percentage point terms. Policy 1 is a uni-
lateral reduction of 20% in fixed inward offshore R&D costs for China
and India from the benchmark equilibrium. Policy 2 is a unilateral
reduction of 10% in inward offshore production costs for China and
India. Policy 3 simulates the same shock as in Policy 2 in a restricted
version of the model without offshore R&D.
we can see, China and India benefit by 0.6 and 0.9 percent in welfare from such a
policy, while other countries are not significantly affected.
The second experiment is a liberalization in inward offshore production, which
increases φPoi by 10% for i = India, China, o 6= i. Because these two types of liberali-
zations do not necessarily share the same fiscal costs or administrative burdens, I do
not compare the levels of the welfare gains, but instead focus on the distributions of
the welfare gains across countries. The second column of Table 1.7 shows that India
and China still benefit from this liberalization. But differently from the first expe-
riment, major developed countries also benefit significantly. The difference between
these two experiments is due to the interaction between offshore R&D and countries’
existing specialization in the world economy. Because offshore R&D into China and
India reduces these two countries’ existing comparative advantage in production, it
pushes developed countries to be less specialized in innovation. As a result, they do
not benefit much in the first experiment. Inward offshore production liberalization,
the initial investment cost.
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on the other hand, allows China and India to be more specialized in production, and
developed countries to be more specialized in innovation, thus benefiting everyone.
These two experiments demonstrate that openness to offshore R&D and offshore
production could have different welfare implications for other countries. It is thus
very important to separate offshore R&D and offshore production in the model, to
better evaluate specific policies.
Because of the interactions among the three forms of global integration, incor-
porating offshore R&D also affects our understanding of the effects of other types
of policies. I focus on China and India as an example to illustrate this point. Spe-
cifically, I consider the same liberalization for China and India in inward offshore
production as in the second experiment, but in a restricted version of the model
without offshore R&D. The welfare impacts of this experiment are reported in the
third column of Table 1.7. Compared to the second column, the welfare gains are
significantly smaller for China and India, but larger for developed countries. The
reason for the difference is that, when there is no offshore R&D, openness to offshore
production only crowds out R&D by domestic firms, so Chinese and Indian firm ow-
ners bear all the reduction in profit from increased inward offshore production. This
reduces the aggregate welfare gains in these two countries, but increases the welfare
gains to developed countries. The difference in welfare impacts suggests that even
if one’s goal is solely to understand the effect of liberalizing offshore production, it
is important to incorporate offshore R&D into the model.
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1.6 Conclusion
Talented researchers and efficient firms are both necessary inputs to invention
of new products, but they are distributed unevenly across countries. By carrying out
their R&D activities offshore, firms mobilize their management technology across
borders, which might generate important aggregate gains. This chapter develops
a unified model of firms’ global R&D and production decisions, featuring talent-
acquisition and market-access motives for offshore R&D. I use the model to perform
quantitative analysis on the determinants and welfare implications of offshore R&D.
The welfare gains from offshore R&D are on average 2.5% of real income.
Incorporating this channel amplifies the welfare gains from openness by a factor of
1.2 on average, with more amplification for developing countries than for developed
countries. Further experiments show that a country’s openness to offshore R&D and
offshore production have very different spillover effects to other countries. Moreover,
because of the interaction among various forms of international integration, whether
offshore R&D decisions are allowed makes a difference when evaluating the effects
of liberalizing offshore production. All these results point to the importance of
incorporating offshore R&D into existing trade models for a better understanding
of globalization.
As a first step towards quantitatively evaluating offshore R&D, this chapter
abstracts from three important features of the reality that might affect the results.
First, I do not allow spillover effects between foreign and domestic R&D centers.
Technological spillover from foreign firms is one of main benefit cited by policy
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makers across the world when making a case for FDI. Indeed, if domestic firms
can learn from innovative and efficient foreign firms, then the gains from offshore
R&D could be larger than predicted in the current model. More generally, not
only offshore R&D, but also offshore production by multinationals might generate
knowledge spillover to domestic firms. In the current model, I assume that there is
no such spillover. The main reason for this assumption is that the literature has not
yet reached a consensus on the size of such spillovers. Understanding the magnitude
of the spillover from FDI, and incorporating this channel into the analysis is thus
an important task for future research.
Second, I do not consider the migration of high skill workers across countries.
In the data, a substantial fraction of world patents are invented by workers residing
outside their home country (Miguelez and Fink, 2013). As an alternative for firms
and inventors from different countries to work together, the migration of inventors
will likely have an important effect on firms’ offshore R&D decisions, which in turn
will affect the impact of government policy on offshore R&D. This might lead to
interactions among policies on offshore R&D and high skill immigration. For exam-
ple, taxing firms’ profits from offshore R&D will incentivize firms to perform more
R&D domestically if high-skill immigration is allowed, compared to if it is banned.
In the future, I intend to incorporate migration into the analysis and shed light on
the interaction of high skill immigration and offshore R&D policies.
Third, this chapter assumes perfect intellectual property right (IPR) protection
in all countries, whereas in reality, countries differ in this regard and firms likely take
this difference into account when deciding where to perform R&D. Understanding
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the effect of IPR protection is important for policy, not least because requirements
on IPR protection have become an important clause of many regional trade and
investment agreements. Given the prevalence of offshore R&D documented in this
chapter, it is crucial that we incorporate multinational firms’ decisions when trying
to understand the effect of such IPR clauses. The framework presented in this
chapter provides a natural starting point to model and quantify the effect of IPR
protection on the income of nations, while changes in IPR protection driven by the
past trade and investment agreements provide a source of data for empirical analysis.
Combining these two approaches to understand the effect of IPR protection is a
direction I intend to pursue in the future.
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Chapter 2: Offshore R&D: Evidence
2.1 Introduction
The model presented in the first chapter generates several predictions that
relate offshore innovation to firm innovation efficiency and host country characte-
ristics. The first goal of this chapter is to test these predictions. Specifically, firm
heterogeneity implies that more efficient firms will offshore their R&D to a larger
number of host countries, and perform more R&D in each of them. At the host
country level, the market-access motive implies that larger countries are more at-
tractive as a host for offshore R&D centers. The talent-acquisition motive has two
implications. First, host countries with higher relative inventor talent abundance
attract more offshore R&D. Second, as Proposition 2 indicates, this effect is espe-
cially strong for more efficient home country firms, because of the complementarity
between researcher talent and firm innovation efficiency in R&D.
The primary source of data I use in testing these predictions is patent-level
information from the USPTO. While all patents in the USPTO are filed in the U.S.
for the protection in the U.S. market, they could be invented anywhere in the world.
A patent can be invented in one country (based on the location of its inventor(s)),
but assigned to an owner in another country (based on the location of the owner).
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As an example, I classify a patent by an inventor living in India, but assigned to
a company registered in the U.S., as the output of offshore R&D conducted by the
American firm in India. I perform such classification patent by patent, and then
aggregate the data to the firm and country level, so that I know, for example, how
many patents General Electric invented in Japan, Germany, Britain, etc. I construct
measures of firm efficiency and researcher talent in a country based on the shares
of highly innovative firms and highly prolific inventors located in the country, using
the USPTO database. These different pieces of information from the USPTO are
then combined with other country characteristics, such as market size, income, and
country-pair characteristics, such as geographic and cultural distances.
Evidence from the combined data set supports the model’s predictions. At
the firm level, along the extensive margin, a firm’s R&D efficiency in its country of
registry (home country), as proxied by the number of patents invented by the firm
in that country, correlates strongly with the number of foreign countries it enters to
perform R&D. A typical firm registered in the U.S. conducts R&D only in the U.S.,
while the most innovative firms, such as IBM, Microsoft, and P&G, conduct R&D
in more than ten countries. Along the intensive margin, a host subsidiary whose
parent has an above-median innovation efficiency in the home country performs 62%
more R&D in the host country than a subsidiary with a below-median parent from
the same home country.
At the host country level, a 1% increase in host country GDP increases offshore
R&D output in the country by 0.08%. A 1% increase in host country relative talent
abundance increases offshore R&D output by 0.09%. These results are supportive
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of the talent-acquisition and market-access motives. Importantly, the positive effect
of host country relative talent abundance is concentrated in the most efficient firms,
consistent with complementarity between firm efficiency and researcher talent.
In addition to its direct predictions on offshore R&D, the complementarity
assumption in the model also implies that more innovative firms work with more
talented researchers (Lemma 1). The second goal of this chapter is to test this impli-
cation using firm- and inventor- level data from the USPTO. Using past innovation
as a proxy for inventor talent, and various measures of firms’ R&D efficiency, I show
that, among a sample of job-switching inventors, the more talented ones tend to
switch to more efficient firms, consistent with assortative matching.
This chapter contributes to three strands of literature. First, I add the ma-
nagement literature that investigates firms’ offshore R&D incentives. Most studies
in this literature are either based on firms’ self-reported motives, or focus on firms
in or from a single region.1 This chapter complements existing studies by testing
the talent-acquisition and market-access motives of offshore R&D using patenting
information for firms from a large number of countries.
Second, I contribute to the empirical economic research on the patterns of
FDI, as reviewed in Chapter 1. Most of existing studies in this literature focus on
examining capital investment or output foreign firms. This chapter instead focuses
on R&D, which is also an important decision made by multinational corporations.
The use of patent data is not new. Indeed, a growing literature on globalization of
1See, for example, Ambos (2005), Shimizutani and Todo (2008), and Ito and Wakasugi (2007).
See also Hall (2011) for a review.
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R&D has used patent data (Kerr and Kerr, 2014; Kerr et al., 2016; and Branstetter
et al., 2013). This chapter differs in that it uses the patent data to construct firm-
level measures for offshore R&D, as opposed to other forms of R&D globalization,
such as international co-invention or high-skill immigration.
Finally, I establish positive assortative matching between inventors and firms,
a prediction of the model assumption of complementarity in innovation. While
several existing studies have documented positive assortative matching in general
labor markets and the market for managers, this chapter is, to my knowledge, the
first to document positive assortative matching between inventors and firms.2
2.2 Specification and Hypothesis
2.2.1 Direct Predictions on Offshore R&D
I use mainly the following specification to test the model predictions on offshore
R&D:
log(yfoi) = β0δf + β1γi + β2γiqf + β3xoi + εfoi, (2.1)
where f , o and i index for parent company, home country, and host country, respecti-
vely. The dependent variable, yfoi, is a measure of innovation output by company
f ’s affiliated R&D centers in country i (multiple affiliates in the same countries are
aggregated into one). The first independent variable, δf , is the firm fixed effect,
2Existing research mostly focuses on the match between workers in general and firms (see for
example, Abowd et al., 1999 and the references thereto). More recently, research has focused on
the match between firms/projects and CEO (Terviö, 2008, among others).
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which controls for characteristics that are common to all R&D centers affiliated
with the same firm. I exclude the firm fixed effect in some specifications to examine
the effect of firm innovation efficiency. γi is a vector of host country characteristics
that might affect offshore R&D and patenting, including size, relative talent abun-
dance, per-capita income, intellectual property right protection (IPR), and general
human capital. When these characteristics are not of primary interest, I use host
country fixed effects instead. qf is firm innovation efficiency. The interaction term
γiqf captures how host country characteristics affect firms with different efficien-
cies. Of prime interest among these is the interaction between host country relative
talent abundance and firm efficiency. xoi is a vector of variables that vary across
host-home pairs, including various measures of distance. When the interest is not in
host country or bilateral characteristics, I use country-pair fixed effects to capture
this term. εfoi is the error term.
The talent-acquisition and market-access motives imply that market size and
relative talent abundance increase offshore R&D into a host country, with the latter
having a stronger effect for more efficient firms. Moreover, as most models with firm
heterogeneity would predict, more efficient firms enter more countries for offshore
R&D, and innovate more in each of them. In the context of econometric specification
2.1, these model predictions imply positive coefficients for measures of host market
size, host relative talent abundance, firm innovation efficiency, and the interaction
between firm innovation efficiency and host market size.
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2.2.2 Positive Assortative Matching
The log-supermodularity assumption implies strict positive assortative mat-
ching between firms and researchers. To test this implication, my empirical strategy
is to measure the qualities of firms and inventors, and then assess whether there
high-quality firms are matched with high-quality inventors. The idea is that, if
there are greater values for high-talent inventors to work with high-efficiency firms,
such matches should show up more in the data than other kinds of matches.
2.3 Data Description
2.3.1 Direct Predictions on Offshore R&D
I use patent data from the USPTO to construct three key measures used in
the specification: offshore R&D center innovation output, firm innovation efficiency,
and host country relative talent abundance.
Firm and inventor classification To construct these measures, I need
to be able to identify individual inventors and firms. This is challenging because
patent data is self-reported, so there are no individual or firm identifiers. Moreover,
typos and misspellings are frequent, and the same company might have different
abbreviations. I follow the patent literature in addressing these issues. For the firm
side, I use the 2006 update of the disambiguated data set introduced by Hall et al.
(2001), which covers patents granted from 1976 to 2006. By combining automatic
cleaning procedures—which take care of common abbreviations in company names—
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with manual checks, Hall et al. (2001) generates a unique identifier for each patent
owner. For inventors, I use the unique inventor identifiers provided in Li et al.
(2014), which uses a supervised learning approach to automatically generate inventor
identifiers.
Offshore R&D output measure When applying for a patent at the US-
PTO, the applicant, usually the owner, reports address information for both the
inventor and the owner of the proposed patent. I classify a patent as invented in a
country-i offshore R&D center, affiliated to firm f from country o, if its inventor is
located in country i and its owner in country o.3 Counting the total number of such
patents by each firm in each host country, I obtain the benchmark measure for yfoi.
In essence, this is a firm-level counterpart of the offshore R&D measure used in the
quantitative section of Chapter 1.
Firm innovation efficiency measure I use the total number of patents
invented by firm f in its home country o as a proxy for its innovation efficiency. I
focus on home country innovation for this measure, and drop observations from the
home country of each firm when estimation Equation 2.1, so that the results are
not driven by the mechanical correlation between home innovation and the measure
of innovation efficiency. To reduce measurement error, in benchmark regressions, I
classify a firm according to whether its innovation efficiency is above the median in
its home country. Later I will show results with different cutoffs.
Host country relative talent abundance All research firms in a country
3Importantly, this information is reported at the time of patent application, so transfers of
patents between owners from different countries are unlikely to be important.
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compete for talent. It is the abundance of talented inventors relative to the abun-
dance of efficient firms that matters for the type of inventor a foreign offshore R&D
center is able to recruit. Following Definition 1 from the theoretical model presented
in the first chapter, I construct the measure for absolute inventor talent abundance
as the share of inventors in a country that are in the top 1% most productive in-
ventors in the world; I construct the measure for absolute firm efficiency abundance
analogously. I then use the log of the ratio between the two as the benchmark me-
asure for relative abundance. Taking the ratio also nets out some of the differential
selection across countries into patenting in the U.S.4
I use a relative quality measure, not relative quantity measures (e.g., the num-
ber of inventors relative to the number of firms), because the model predicts that
a change in the relative quantity will have no impact on the matching function or
the wage schedule.5 In robustness checks, I also include this relative quantity. The
choice to use the top 1% of inventors and firms in constructing this measure is moti-
vated by the importance of exceptional inventors and firms in aggregate innovation.
In robustness exercises, I use different cutoffs for computing the top shares, and
other measures of quality in constructing the ratio.
Discussion on the use of patent data to measure R&D The advan-
tages of using patent data for these measures are obvious: in addition to having
4For example, patenting might be easier in some countries, so marginal firms and inventors self
select into patenting, resulting lower measured average inventor and firm quality.




only enters as a ratio, and by taking derivatives
of both sides with respect to zR, we can see that this ratio does not affect T ′′i ; hence it will not




will thus only affect
the research team size and output of all R&D centers in country i proportionally.
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a wide country coverage, patents are also highly correlated with firm-level R&D.
Figure A.1 and Table A.2 in the appendix show that a patent-based offshore R&D
measure correlates reasonably well across countries with a measure based on R&D
expenditures. However, the drawbacks of patent data are also well known (Pavitt,
1988). First, the benefits of patents differ across countries, so that firms might have
different incentives to apply for patents in the U.S. These differences might stem
from market size, intellectual property right protection, or other country characte-
ristics, such as connections to the U.S. Second, different industries have different
reliance on patents for the protection of their intellectual property. Third, patents
have heterogeneous values, so patent counts are a noisy measure of firms’ innovation
output.
I add additional controls to address these concerns. Specifically, for the first
concern, I either control directly for host country size, IPR protection, and other
country characteristics, or simply include host country fixed effects. For the second
concern, I use firm fixed effects to absorb firms’ characteristics, including their in-
dustry. Moreover, I construct measures at the patent-category level so that host
country specialization does not drive the results. Finally, to address the third con-
cern, I also use patent citations as an alternative measure of innovation output.
Sample period The patent data spans 1976-2006. Since both the dependent
variable, offshore R&D output, and the key independent variable, the relative talent
abundance, are constructed based on patenting data, measurement error will lead to
correlation between the two measures. To avoid this problem, I split the sample into
two periods, 1976-1996 and 1997-2006. I use only information from the first period
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to measure the number and quality of innovating firms and individuals. I then use
the 1997-2006 data to measure R&D output for each parent company and its foreign
subsidiaries. Further, my regressions include only observations from new offshore
R&D centers—those that enter in the second period—in order to prevent any R&D
centers used as regression observations from affecting host talent quality measures.
This sample split also prevents reverse causality, i.e., the entry of innovative and
efficient foreign firms attracting more talented individuals to become inventors.
Additional data Additional variables used for the regressions are from the
following sources: GDP, population, per-capita income, and a human capital index
come from the Penn World Table 8.0; bilateral distance information is from the
CEPIT outdistance database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011); and intellectual property
protection information is taken from Park (2008). All these variables are averaged
over 1997-2006 for consistency.
2.3.2 Positive Assortative Matching
I rely also on the USPTO patent-level data for this test. As in the previous
subsection, I construct a panel of inventors and firms using the inventor identifier
from Li et al. (2014) and the firm identifier from the NBER patent database project
(Hall et al., 2001). This data set has a structure that resembles that of a matched
employer-employee data set, except that here a match only shows up in a given year,
when a patent is filed.
Using lagged innovation as a proxy for inventor ability, and various lagged
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measures of firm innovation efficiency, I investigate whether more talented inventors
are more likely to switch to high-efficiency firms. Since patents are invented jointly
by inventors and firms, correlating these two measures would pick up their mechani-
cal correlation. To avoid this problem, I focus on a sample of inventors that switch
firms and examine, among them, whether the more innovative ones are more likely
to move to more productive firms.
2.4 Results on Offshore R&D
I first discuss the results on Offshore R&D.
2.4.1 Baseline Results
Figure 2.1 provides evidence on the effect of firm innovation efficiency on
offshore R&D through the extensive margin over the period 1997-2006, focusing
on firms headquartered in the U.S. Each dot represents a firm. The horizontal axis
is the number of patents granted to the firm and invented in the U.S. The vertical
axis is the number of countries in which the firm performs R&D. The figure indicates
that firms with higher innovation efficiency tend to perform offshore R&D in more
countries. Among the firms that enter the largest number of countries, IT and
chemical companies are the most common.
I now estimate Equation 2.1 to test additional model predictions. Table 2.1
presents the baseline results. The first column includes the indicator for firm in-
novation efficiency, a vector of host country characteristics, bilateral distance mea-
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Figure 2.1: Firm Efficiency and Offshore R&D Entry
Notes: Each dot represents a firm headquartered in the U.S. The horizontal axis is the log of the number of patents





sures, and home country fixed effects. Consistent with the first implication of the
talent-acquisition motive, host country relative talent abundance has a positive and
statistically significant impact on innovation output. The estimate has an elasticity
interpretation: a 1% increase in host relative talent abundance increases firm-level
offshore R&D by around 0.1%. Consistent with the market-access motive, host GDP
also has a positive effect with a similar point estimate. Firms with above median
innovation efficiency generate 63% higher R&D output, on average, so innovation
efficiency increases offshore R&D through not only the extensive margin, but also
the intensive margin. The estimate for host country intellectual property right pro-
tection is small and statistically insignificant, reassuring us that differential selection
into patenting due to intellectual property protection differences are not driving the
results. Host per-capita income does not have a significant effect. Distance measures
are mostly insignificant, except for the common language indicator.
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The second column adds the interaction term between the host country re-
lative talent abundance and firm innovation efficiency. This interaction term is
positive and statistically significant, with a point estimate of 0.15. While most ot-
her coefficients do not change, the coefficient for host relative talent abundance is
no longer significant: consistent with the prediction from Proposition 2, the impacts
of host talent quality are mainly concentrated in the top half of firms as ranked by
innovation efficiency.
Results so far are supportive of a market-access motive and a talent-acquisition
motive. Since the market-access motive is closely related to the extensive existing
literature on the effects of market size on innovation (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004)
and the location choice of multinational firms (Head and Mayer, 2004), I now focus
on the talent-acquisition motive by further examining the interaction term. In the
third column, I add host country and parent firm fixed effects to further absorb
unobserved heterogeneity. The point estimate of the interaction term rises to 0.177,
meaning that a 1% increase in relative talent abundance in the host country increa-
ses the R&D output by 0.17% more for R&D centers with above-median efficiency.
After adding these better controls for host country and firm heterogeneity, bilate-
ral geographic distance becomes significant, with an elasticity of -0.119. Common
language, on the other hand, is no longer significant. The fourth column adds coun-
try pair fixed effects to capture differential economic connections between countries.
The point estimate of the interaction term barely changes.
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Table 2.1: Determinants of Offshore R&D: Baseline Results
Dependent Variable: Log (Offshore patents invented in a host country)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Host relative talent abundance 0.091** 0.020
(0.039) (0.041)
I (Parent R&D >median) 0.625*** 0.994***
(0.076) (0.077)
Host inventor relative abundance * I (Parent R&D >median) 0.147*** 0.177*** 0.171***
(0.026) (0.040) (0.040)
Host GDP 0.083** 0.088**
(0.035) (0.035)
Host per-capita income -0.004 -0.001
(0.076) (0.075)
Host IPR protection 0.032 0.026
(0.117) (0.118)
Distance -0.007 0.003 -0.119**
(0.026) (0.028) (0.055)
Common border -0.009 0.003 0.203
(0.051) (0.052) (0.131)
Common language 0.152*** 0.151** 0.095
(0.056) (0.056) (0.094)
Colonial tie -0.075 -0.074 0.027
(0.049) (0.051) (0.092)
Home country FE X X X
Host country FE X
Home-Host FE X
Firm FE X X
Observations 14803 14803 7914 7716
R2 0.050 0.053 0.454 0.490
Notes: The level of observation is host country-parent company. The dependent variable is the log of the total
number of patents invented by an affiliate of a parent company in a host country over 1997-2006. For the I(Parent
R&D ¿median) indicator, Parent R&D is measured by the total number of patents invented by the parent in its
home country during the same period, and median is computed for all patenting firms in the home country of the
parent company. Host relative talent abundance is defined as the log difference between the share of inventors in
a host country that fall into the global top 1%, and the share of firms in that country that falls into the global top
1%. This measure is constructed using only patenting information for 1976-1996 to avoid mechanical correlation.
Host IPR is the intellectual property right protection index from Park (2008), averaged over 1997-2006. Other
host country characteristics are from the Penn World Table 8.0, averaged over 1997-2006.
Standard errors (two way clustered at the host-country and parent-company levels) are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.4.2 Robustness and Heterogeneous Effects
As discussed earlier, firms’ incentives to perform R&D and to patent their R&D
output are potentially affected by country characteristics. There may be plausible
alternative theories that generate heterogeneous effects of these other characteristics
for higher productivity firms. I now examine whether such alternatives can explain
the baseline findings and generally find they cannot.
First, relative talent abundance might pick up an income effect. High-income
consumers prefer high-quality products, which might be more R&D intensive than
low-quality products. If efficient firms have comparative advantage in doing R&D,
they might perform more R&D in high income host countries. I capture this by
including the interaction between host country per-capita income and firm efficiency.
Second, the returns to both R&D and patenting are higher in large countries.
Firms with higher efficiency might benefit disproportionately more because they
tend to be more efficient in production. This concern motivates me to include
the interaction between host country GDP and firm efficiency. Following the same
reasoning, the effect of stronger patent protection enforcement might also benefit
efficient firms more, encouraging them to patent more. Therefore I further include
the interaction between firm efficiency and the IPR protection index.
Finally, the complementarity between talent and firm efficiency might happen
in the production stage. Firms with better management can make better use of
skilled workers in production, which reduces production costs and increases the
return to R&D. I incorporate the interaction between the host country human capital
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index and firm efficiency to address this concern.
The first column of Table 2.2 reports the regression with these additional
terms. The interaction between host talent and home efficiency is still significant,
although it shrinks by about 40%. The variable that explains this drop is the
interaction between host GDP and firm efficiency. Other interaction terms do not
have strong effects.
I use a quality-based relative talent abundance measure in my baseline regres-
sions because according to the model, the relative quantity of inventors and research
firms will affect firms with different efficiencies proportionally. To make sure the
empirical finding is not the result of improperly measuring the relative talent abun-
dance, in the second column, I add the interaction between firm efficiency and the
ratio of the number of inventors and the number of R&D active firms. Reassuringly,
this quantity ratio does not have a statistically significant impact itself and does not
substantially change the interaction term between host relative talent quality and
firm efficiency.
For a fuller picture of how host talent affects firms with different efficiencies,
in the third column, I add indicators for firms with R&D efficiency above the 25th,
75th, and 90th percentiles of the R&D efficiency distribution in their home countries,
as well as the interaction of these indicators with the full set of controls in the second
column. The effect of a better host talent distribution is substantially larger for firms
in the upper tail of the distribution. A 1% increase in host relative talent abundance
leads to a 0.45% larger increase in R&D output for firms in the top 10% of the firm
efficiency distribution than for firms in the bottom 25% of the distribution.
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So far, all the regressions have pooled patents over all categories to construct
measures for both the dependent and independent variables. Aggregation reduces
measurement errors, but given that industries do not equally rely on patents for IPR,
using aggregate patenting data might confound sectoral composition with country-
level relative talent quality. For robustness, I also construct all variables within
each individual patent category, classified by Hall et al. (2001).6 For each firm, I
keep only the category in which it patents most. Columns four and five perform
regressions using category-level data. The fourth column controls for host-category
fixed effects, and the last column controls for bilateral pair-category fixed effects.
Both columns confirm that the effect of host country talent is significantly larger for
more efficient firms. Although the sample size is substantially smaller as more fixed
effects are added, the coefficients are quantitatively similar to those in the third
column, so the differential sectoral specializations of countries are unlikely to be the
explanation for the benchmark results.
To ensure that the results are not driven by the specific ways in which I mea-
sure efficiency and talent, I perform additional robustness checks, using alternative
measures of host relative talent abundance, R&D center innovation output, and
firm innovation efficiency. The results are reported in Table 2.3. In columns 1-4, I
aggregate data across all patent categories to construct measure for firm R&D out-
put and host relative talent abundance. In columns 5-8, I use category-level data
to construct R&D output as well as talent abundance (in regression, only the main
6There are in total six categories: chemical (excluding drugs), computers and communications,
drugs and medical, electrical and electronics, mechanical, and others.
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Table 2.2: Determinants of Offshore R&D: Alternative Explanations and Heteroge-
neous Effects
Dependent Variable: Log (Offshore patents invented in a host country)
Aggregated Across All Categories Only Firms’ Main Category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Host relative talent abundance * I (Parent R&D >25%) 0.131 0.107 0.187
(0.084) (0.142) (0.158)
Host relative talent abundance * I (Parent R&D >median) 0.105* 0.093* 0.117 0.134 0.217
(0.054) (0.051) (0.091) (0.159) (0.175)
Host relative talent abundance * I (Parent R&D >75%) 0.208** 0.126 0.217
(0.095) (0.148) (0.185)
Host relative talent abundance * I (Parent R&D >90%) 0.465*** 0.354* 0.579**
(0.146) (0.173) (0.217)
Host per-capita income * I (Parent R&D >median) -0.093 -0.063
(0.148) (0.146)
Host GDP * I (Parent R&D >median) 0.119*** 0.101**
(0.039) (0.043)
Host human capital * I (Parent R&D >median) -0.102 -0.161
(0.214) (0.224)
Host IPR * I (Parent R&D >median) 0.167 0.155
(0.196) (0.197)
Host inventor relative quantity * I (Parent R&D >median) 0.125
(0.146)
Home-Host FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X
Host-Category FE X
Host-Home-Category FE X
Host Characteristics *Full set of firm efficiency indicators X X X
Observations 7687 7687 7687 4381 3907
R2 0.490 0.490 0.496 0.562 0.605
Notes: See Table 2.1 for descriptions of variables and sample period. The first three columns use information aggregated
over all patent categories. The last two columns use variables similarly constructed at the patent category level. For each
firm, only the category in which it generates the most patents is used in regressions. Although not reported, columns 3-5 also
include the interaction of host country characteristics in column 2 with the full set of firm R&D efficiency indicators.
Standard error (two way clustered at the host-country and parent-company levels) are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
category of each firm is kept). In all these regressions, I include full control variables
from the second column in Table 2.2.
Within each of these two sets, I vary how I measure key variable to see if
the results are sensitive. In columns 1-3 and 5-7, I use the same measure for the
dependent variable, but vary how I construct independent variables. Specifically, I
first vary the cutoff in defining “top” inventors and “top” firms from the top 1% in
the baseline analysis, to top 10% in columns 1 and 5. In columns 2 and 6, I use the
ratio between the average number of patents by inventors and the average number of
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patents by firms as the measure for the relative abundance in talented researchers.
Since the dispersion in inventors’ output is primarily driven by the output of the
most talented inventors in a country, in columns 3 and 7, I use the ratio between the
standard deviation of inventor output and the standard deviation of firm innovation
output as a proxy for the relatively abundance of talented researchers. Finally, in
columns 4 and 8, I use citation counts, rather than patent counts, to measure both
the outcome variables and firms’ R&D efficiency. All these alternative measures
yield similar results.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Offshore R&D: Alternative Measures
Regression Level: Aggregated Across Categories Only Firms’ Main Category
Dependent Variable: Benchmark (patent) Citation Benchmark (patent) Citation-based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Host relative talent abundance 2* I (Parent R&D >median) 0.146* 0.259*
(0.083) (0.145)
Host relative talent abundance 3* I (Parent R&D >median) 0.110* 0.254*
(0.056) (0.130)
Host relative talent abundance 4* I (Parent R&D >median) 0.140** 0.225*
(0.066) (0.127)
Host relative talent abundance* I (Parent R&D2 >median) 0.106** 0.173*
(0.048) (0.093)
Home-Host FE X X X X
Host-Home-Category FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X X
Full Controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 8083 8149 8149 7687 4882 5265 5238 3907
R2 0.486 0.486 0.486 0.501 0.591 0.588 0.587 0.600
Notes: All regressions include the full set of controls in the second column of Table 2.2. The definition of common variables are the same as Tables
2.2. Host relative talent abundance 2 is defined as the ratio between the share of top inventors and the share of top firms, in which “top” is defined as
among global top 10%. Host relative talent abundance 3 is defined as the ratio between the average number of patents by inventors, and the average
number of patents by firms. Host relative talent abundance 4 is defined as the ratio between the standard deviation of the number of patents by
inventors, and the standard deviation of the number of patents by firms. Parent R&D 2 is the total citation of the patents invented by a parent
company in its home country.
standard errors (two way clustered at the host-country and parent-company levels) are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.5 Results on Positive Assortative Matching
Now I turn to the results on positive assortative matching between inventors
and firms. The main findings are reported in Table 2.4. There are two panels in
Table 2.4, each corresponding to a set of regressions with the same outcome variable.
Each specification in the table regresses a measure of firm innovation efficiency on
a measure of inventor talent, on a sample of inventors that have just moved to a
new firm. The independent variable, same across all panels, is my preferred measure
of inventor quality, which is the lagged value of log total forward citations to the
patents filed by the inventor to date, adjusted by the number of inventors on each
of these patents. The lagged value refers to the previous observation of the inventor
in the database when he/she does not work for the present employer. This might
be a few years back, however, if an inventor’s last patent is from the distant past.
The dependent variable in panel A is the lagged value of the log of total number
of forward citations to the patents a firm has been granted. I use lag value here
to ensure that the inventor under investigation is not also included in the outcome
variable, leading to a mechanical correlation.
The first column adds no control variables. In the second column, I add the
years since first patenting for firms and inventors to capture the life cycle effects,
as it is plausible that inventors with different ages prefers firms at different stages
of growth, for reasons not necessarily related to firms’ innovation efficiency. In
the third column, I add year fixed effects as well as category fixed effects. After
controlling for these fixed effects, the point estimate shrinks somewhat, but is still
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Table 2.4: The Match Between Firms and Inventors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Outcome: ln (Total citation to patents of the firm) t−1
Inventor Quality: Measure 1t−1 0.192∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 54733 54733 54733 54733 54733 54733
Firm/Inventor Controls X X X X X
Year/Category FE X X X X
New Employer FE X X
Previous Employer FE X X
R2 0.017 0.240 0.315 0.898 0.664 0.927
Panel B Outcome: Firm Productivity (total citation per inventor) t−1
Inventor Quality: Measure 1t−1 2.460∗∗∗ 3.598∗∗∗ 3.244∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 1.480∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.092) (0.091) (0.061) (0.098) (0.066)
Observations 56096 56096 56096 56096 56096 56096
Firm/Inventor Controls X X X X X
Year/Category FE X X X X
New Employer FE X X
Previous Employer FE X X
R2 0.037 0.059 0.101 0.673 0.458 0.801
Notes: The regressions reported in this table use a sample of inventors that have switched firms. The independent variable is
the lagged value of the log of total forward citations to the patents filed by the inventor to date, adjusted for the number of
inventors for each of these patents. Firm/Inventor Controls refers to years since first patenting for the firm and for the inventor.
Year/Category FE refers to year fixed effects and category fixed effects. Categories here are defined by Hall et al. (2001).
There are in total six categories: chemical (excluding drugs), Computers and Communications, drugs and medical, electrical
and electronics, mechanical, and others.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
statistically significant. Column 3 is my preferred specification. The point estimate
indicates that, an inventor with talent that is 1% higher will be matched to a firm
with 0.2% higher innovation efficiency.
Columns 4 through 6 push further by adding fixed effects for previous employ-
ers, current employers, and both, respectively. Identifying the effect from overtime
changes for a given origin or destination employer help overcome biases that might
arise from unobserved firm heterogeneity. The cost is that the attenuation effect
might be stronger. As indicated by the R2, when both current and former em-
ployer fixed effects are added in Column 6, they absorb most of the variation. The
coefficient decreases by more than 80%. However, it is still statistically significant.
Total forward citations might be a noisy measure of invention efficiency for
99
the firm. For example, firms with larger researcher teams tend to have more in-
ventions, hence higher citations, to their patents. Although researcher team size is
a theory-consistent measure for innovation efficiency, some firms might have more
inventors for reasons outside the model. Panel B uses a measure similar in spirit to
firms’ “labor productivity”, defined as the per-inventor total forward citations in a
given year, to address this concern. The results are all statistically and economi-
cally significant. The preferred specification in column 3 suggests that one percent
increase in inventor productivity would increase the per-inventor citation of his/her
employer by 3.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents two sets of empirical results to test the model developed
in the first chapter. The first set of results focuses on the model predictions on
the impact of firm efficiency and host country characteristics on offshore R&D.
The baseline specification finds that more efficient firms perform offshore R&D in a
larger number of countries, and more R&D in each of them. Larger and more talent
abundant countries are more attractive as a destination of offshore R&D. Moreover,
the effect of talent abundance is stronger for more efficient firms. All of these
results are consistent with the model. Additional exercises that consider alternative
explanations and measurements do not substantially weaken the evidence.
The second set of results focuses on testing a direct implication of the com-
plementarity assumption. I find that more efficient firms work with more talented
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inventors, consistent with positive assortative matching implied by the assumption.
Taken together, these results provide support for the key ingredients of the
model of offshore R&D presented in the first chapter: talent-acquisition and market-
access motives of offshore R&D, and the complementarity between researcher talent
and firm efficiency.
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Chapter 3: Internal Geography, Labor Mobility, and the Distributi-
onal Impacts of Trade
3.1 Introduction
In recent decades we have witnessed increasing integration of large developing
countries, such as Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, into global trade. This trend has
renewed the interest of policymakers and academics in understanding the impacts
of globalization on income and inequality.
Existing research on this topic focuses on the impacts of international trade
on workers in different industries, or with different skills, but abstracts from the
geographic dimension of the distributional impacts.1 Consider workers living far
away from a nation’s ports. Because of the high intra-national trade costs, they
might not benefit much from cheaper imported products, and international trade
can exacerbate the intra-national inequality in living standards. Moreover, in a
world with both skilled and unskilled workers, if one type of worker is more mobile
than the other, and responds to trade liberalization by migrating to the coast, then
the workers left behind might even lose from trade. These losses can be independent
of regional sectoral specializations. This geographic margin in the distributional
1More discussion of existing literature may be found in the next section.
102
impacts of trade is not only plausible, but also empirically relevant.2
The scenario discussed above naturally leads to the following questions: First,
in the presence of intra-national trade and migration costs, how does international
trade liberalization affect the aggregate income of a country, and its within-country
inequality—including both the between-region inequality among workers with si-
milar level of skills, and the within-region inequality between different types of
workers? Second, most countries mentioned in the opening paragraph are inves-
ting in infrastructure and launching structural reforms, with the aim of reducing
the within-country spatial frictions. To what extent would these changes affect our
answer to the first question?
With a focus on China, this chapter answers these two questions through
the lens of a quantitative model. The coexistence of rapid trade growth, large
spatial inequality, and recent regional reforms that significantly reduced the internal
migration costs makes China a useful setting for this study. As is well known, China
has experienced rapid integration into world trade since its economic reform in 1978,
and the process accelerated after China joined the WTO in 2001. At the same time,
China has historically had high intra-national trade costs and strict controls on
worker migration. Perhaps partially due to these intra-national frictions, China’s
economic growth over the past decades has been uneven. Indeed, as shown in Kanbur
2Limão and Venables (2001) documents that poor infrastructures dampen a country’s participa-
tion in international trade; Atkin and Donaldson (2012) estimates the intra-national trade costs to
be 4-6 times larger in their sample of African countries than in the United States. Topalova (2010)
shows that in India, trade liberalization hurt the poorest workers because of their limited inter-
regional and inter-sectoral mobility. See also Kanbur and Venables (2005) for an excellent overview
of the UNU-Wider project on “Spatial disparities in development,” which analyzes evidence in over
50 developing countries, and concludes that international trade and the lack of infrastructure are
two important factors in the increasing spatial disparities in many of these countries.
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and Zhang (2005), inter-regional inequality grew rapidly during the period of fast
trade expansion in China. In terms of migration restriction, China has gone through
several waves of labor market reforms since the late 90’s. Gradually, Chinese cities
have relaxed the once-strict restriction Hukou restriction—a household registration
certificate that ties individuals to their home region—so that people migrating from
other cities have an easier access to employment and local public goods. Importantly,
these reforms differ in timing and strength, providing variation to estimate the
impact of such structural reforms on worker mobility. This estimate can then be
fed into structural models to quantify the interaction between domestic reforms and
international trade integration.
This chapter proceeds in three steps. In the first step, I document large spatial
inequalities among Chinese cities in terms of participation in international trade, in-
come, and urbanization, which underscore important domestic trade and migration
costs in China. I also construct the first city-level panel of Hukou reform policies,
spanning 1997-2010, using information from databases on law and government re-
gulations. Combining this database with micro-data from the Chinese population
censuses, I show that relaxing the Hukou restriction increases migrants into a city.
From this estimate, I back out the underlying change in migration costs due to the
Hukou restriction, which is used in counterfactual experiments.
In the second step, I develop a spatial equilibrium model with multiple regions
representing Chinese regions and a statistical aggregation of the rest of the world.
Regions are connected to each other through costly migration and trade. The trade
block of the model builds on the quantitative trade theory (Eaton and Kortum,
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2002). To capture the effect of international trade on income and the skill premium,
the model incorporates several channels emphasized in the literature: the factor
content of trade dating back to Stolper and Samuleson, trade in capital goods and
capital-skill complementarity (Burstein et al., 2013 and Parro, 2013), and input-
output linkages (Caliendo and Parro, Forthcoming). While these ingredients are
not new, in this chapter, these channels will have differential impacts on Chinese
regions due to these regions’ differences in skill composition, sectoral specialization,
and participation in international trade, all of which are endogenous. On the worker
side, workers decide where to work, based on the utility they would obtain from all
potential destinations, which in turn depends on region-specific amenities, prices,
and wages, as well as city-specific labor productivity draws. The differential impacts
of trade across regions and the migration of workers will prove important in shaping
how trade affects skilled and unskilled workers from different parts of China.
The third step parameterizes the model and performs counterfactual experi-
ments. I estimate migration costs using individual level data from the 2000 popu-
lation census, separately for skilled and unskilled workers. This estimate includes
both workers’ home biases and restrictions arising from policies such as the Hukou
system. I take this estimate as the benchmark measure. In some counterfactuals, I
reduce the estimated migration costs by an amount implied by the empirically esti-
mated effect of actual Hukou reforms in the first step, to investigate how migration
reforms affect international trade integration. I estimate domestic trade costs using
regional trade flows. I calibrate additional parameters to match the distribution
of income and employment, and trade openness in 2005, using various micro and
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macro data sources,
I examine the distribution of the gains from international trade within China,
by shutting down trade between the model economy and the rest of the world. In
line with results from papers without internal geography, the average gains from
trade (across regions and worker groups, weighted by population) are around 7.5%.
However, the welfare gains are distributed unevenly. Along the skill dimension,
skilled workers gain 11% on average, while unskilled workers gain only 5%, so the
average skill premium increases by 6%. Impacts also differ among workers with
similar skills. For example, among urban unskilled workers, some gain as much as
20%, while others experience 2% welfare losses. The geographic location of a region
is important: regions on the coast reap most of the welfare gains, and regions in
the interior benefit little. Aggregate inequality, as measured by the Theil index, in-
creases by 8% after the international trade liberalization in China. The geographic
dimension—the increases in inequality between geographic regions—accounts for
64% of the overall increase in inequality, while the skill dimension—the increase
in within-region inequality—accounts for the rest. Despite the rise in inequality,
however, only the unskilled workers from a dozen of regions experience welfare los-
ses. Therefore, there is scope for government redistribution to ensure that trade
liberalization is a Pareto improvement for China.3
Consistent with existing reduced-form evidence (Han et al., 2012), there is an
active interaction between the geographic dimension and the skill dimension: the
3Since the workers that experience welfare losses are geographically concentrated, place-based
transfers might be a way to target these people. In the text I also discuss the impacts on the
welfare of these people of structural reforms that reduce domestic trade or migration.
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rises in regional skill premia are larger in coastal regions, that is, there is a nega-
tive gradient in changes in skill premia with respect to regions’ distances to the
coast. In addition to capital-skill complementarity, which intuitively increases skill
premia more in regions that import more capital goods, I uncover two forces behind
the gradient of changes in skill premia with respect to location, both of which are
inherently related to geography. First, because capital and other manufacturing
industries use intermediate varieties more intensively, they tend to locate in regions
with better access to suppliers. After trade liberalization, the coastal regions ex-
perience a larger increase in access to foreign suppliers and therefore have stronger
comparative advantages in these industries. As a result, coastal regions specialize
in capital and manufacturing industries, which hire skilled workers more intensively,
while interior regions specialize in the unskilled-intensive agricultural industry. This
change in the domestic specialization pattern following trade liberalization increa-
ses skill premia on the coast and decreases skill premia in the interior. Because
this channel works through the factor content of intra-national trade, I call it the
“Domestic Stolper-Samuelson Effect.”4 To the best of my knowledge, this is a novel
channel in the literature. An implication of this channel for empirical studies is
that in measuring a region’s exposure to international trade, it is important to take
into account the responses of both international trade and domestic trade to the
reductions in international trade barriers.
The second force is related to the differential mobility of skilled and unskilled
4The standard Stolper-Samuelson effect, which operates through international specialization, is
less important here, as the trade between China and the ROW is largely within sector.
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workers. Because the estimated migration costs are lower for skilled workers, more
skilled workers respond to trade liberalization by migrating out of their hometowns
in the interior towards the coast, resulting in higher skill shares on the coast, and
lower skill shares in the interior. This channel decreases skill premia on the coast
and increases skill premia in the interior, offsetting the “Domestic Stolper Samuelson
Effect”.
I show that both forces are quantitatively important for changes in skill premia
after trade. Incorporating the internal geography of a country is thus relevant for
our understanding of the distributional impacts of trade, along both the geographic
dimension and the skill dimension.
To shed light on how domestic frictions affect the welfare impacts of trade, I
conduct four additional hypothetical international trade liberalization experiments.
The only difference among these experiments is that the model “China” in these
economies has either inter-provincial trade costs, or migration costs, or both, reduced
through structural reforms. To make sure that these reforms are realistic—in the
sense that the decrease in frictions in these reforms are attainable—I use the U.S.
as the benchmark for the scale of the domestic trade reform, and the estimate of
the mobility effect of Hukou policy changes for scale of the migration reform.
I find that reductions in both domestic trade and migration costs can help
distribute the gains from international trade more evenly across the country. Howe-
ver, while Hukou reforms increase the gains from international trade, domestic trade
reforms decrease gains from trade. The intuition is as follows: when domestic trade
costs are smaller, coastal regions trade more with the interior region. Moreover,
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as the interior region becomes more attractive due to the decrease in the internal
trade cost, more workers are willing to move there, increasing the size of the region
that does not trade much with the rest of the world. The country as a whole there-
fore participates less actively in and benefits less from international trade. Overall,
these results highlight the potential impact of domestic infrastructure investment
and structural reforms on international trade. The different outcomes across these
experiments also call for a quantitative approach for a concrete understanding of
how domestic reforms interact with international trade liberalization.
3.2 Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the literature on the impact of trade on inequality.
Inequality manifests itself in many dimensions. While existing studies have analyzed
this issue from different angles, 5 the inequality between skill and unskilled workers is
an important dimension emphasized by the literature. Different from most existing
work in this literature, this chapter also studies the geographic dimension, that
is, the inequality between geographic regions. It makes two contribution to this
literature. First, I find that the geographic dimension accounts for a larger share
of the increase in inequality from trade than the skill dimension, highlighting the
5Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) offers a review on the effects of globalization on various measures
of inequality, including the skill premium; Ma (2013) and Tang (2014) study inequality between
top income earners and the rest of the population; Helpman et al. (2016) studies trade and the
exporter premium both theoretically and empirically; Dix-Carneiro (2014) and Cosar (n.d.) study
the impacts of trade on workers with different sector-specific experience; Levchenko and Zhang
(2013) uses a framework similar to this chapter to assess the impacts of trade under different
assumptions on the inter-sectoral mobility of labor and capital; Autor et al. (2013), Kovak (2013)
and Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) focus on the impacts of trade on different local labor markets,
but in settings in which the differential impacts are only driven by sectoral specializations of regions,
not geography. Rodriguez Chatruc (2016) and Kumar (2007) emphasize the role of geography.
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importance internal geography for the relationship between trade and inequality.
Second, I find that international trade has differential impacts on regional skill
premia due to domestic trade and migration costs. Because of this interaction,
modelling the geographic dimension is important even when one’s main interest is
in understanding how international trade affects the skill premium.
The spatial equilibrium model in this chapter builds on Redding (2012), which
studies the gains from international trade, taking into account the mobility of labor
within a country.6 Contemporaneously, Tombe and Zhu (2015) also extends Redding
(2012) to examine issues related to trade and labor mobility frictions in China.
Relative to these two papers, the first contribution of the present chapter is that,
in addition to internal geography, it also incorporate skill and unskilled workers.
Doing so allows me to decompose the aggregate inequality effect of trade into a
geography and a skill dimension, and demonstrate the relative importance of the
two. Moreover, I show these two dimensions interact with each other to shape the
distribution of the welfare gains from trade.7 There exist other work that looks at
either domestic trade costs, or migration costs in China, but not both. See, for
example, Poncet (2005), Tombe and Winter (2014), and Au and Henderson (2006).
This chapter models both trade and migration costs in a unified framework for
6Also closely related to this literature is an economic geography literature that examines the
interaction between international trade and the distribution of economic activities within a country.
See for example, Krugman and Elizondo (1996), Venables and Limão (2002), and Hanson (2001,0)
for earlier contributions. More recent studies, such as Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Cosar and
Fajgelbaum (2016), develop quantitative models to take to the data. This strand of literature,
however, typically treats workers as perfectly mobile, ruling out the analysis of the distributional
impacts.
7To analyze how international trade affects skill premia across regions, the model here is richer
than Redding (2012) and Tombe and Zhu (2015) in that it incorporates three channels: trade
in capital good and capital-skill complementarity, regional specialization and the skill content of
trade, and differential mobility of skilled and unskilled workers.
110
quantification. Doing so is important as the welfare impacts of international trade
integration will only have a spatial dimension when both channels are present.
The second contribution is the empirical application. In the application to
China, to understand the scope for domestic migration reforms to interact with
international trade, it is necessary to isolate the part of migration cost that could
potentially be changed by policies. Building on recent work Kinnan et al. (2015)
and Sun et al. (2011), I construct a new city-level panel database on Hukou reforms.
The database spans the period 1997-2010, and documents more than 600 changes
to Hukou policies at city-year level. I use this data to estimate the effect of Hukou
policy changes on migration. This allows me to predict what would happen to trade
if there was a comprehensive across-the-board Hukou reform.
This chapter thus also contributes to empirical research on internal migration
in China. The Hukou reform database constructed in this chapter might be of use
to other people interested in this topic. The effect of Hukou reform on migration,
estimated in this chapter, is also an important question yet to be settled.8
3.3 Background
This section documents some important stylized facts about the economic
geography of China and the background of the Hukou system. This information
will be incorporated into the quantitative framework.
8Using province-level Hukou reform information, Sun et al. (2011) finds little evidence for
impact of Hukou reform on migration. On the other hand, using province-level Hukou reform tally
interacted with network effect between province pairs, Kinnan et al. (2015) finds strong effect of
Hukou reform on migration.
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3.3.1 The Economic Geography of China
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure (3.1) plot trade openness and urbanization rates
for cities in China.9 The border regions in China, especially those on the east coast,
trade with the rest of the world much more intensively than the interior cities. At
the same time, as Panel (b) shows, the east coast also tends to have a much larger
urban sector. These spatial differences can be due to the large intra-national trade
costs in China, or to differential regional comparative advantages. The quantitative
exercise below incorporates both domestic trade costs and regional differences in
sectoral productivity. I will estimate the former using domestic trade data, and
back out the latter using the distribution of sectoral production.
Panel (c) plots the log average wage relative to Beijing, taking into account
worker force differences in worker characteristics across cities.10 The southeastern
coast tends to offer higher wages than the interior. (The exceptions are a few
cities in the northeast, which are mostly natural resource cities with low population
density.) The wage differences across cities are on a magnitude of 30-40%. Panel
(d) plots the size of cities. Despite the higher wages in the coast, a large number
of people are concentrated in central China, which is consistent with significant
migration costs. This initial distribution of population also implies that when a
reform reduces restrictions on migration, not all people will flock to the coast cities.
Instead, many people in the central will migrate to productive cities nearby.
9There are, in total, 34 provinces and 340 cities in China.
10The regional average wages are measured as the regional fixed effects in an individual-level
Mincer regression, so worker composition differences are controlled for.
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(a) Trade Openness (b) Share of Urban Employment
(c) Average Wage (d) City-level Employment
Figure 3.1: City-level Statistics
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2005 City Statistics Yearbook (Panel a), 2000 population
censuses (b,d), and 2005 population survey (c)
In all figures, there is considerable heterogeneity, even among cities that are
geographically close to each other. This motivates a city-level analysis in the quan-
titative section.
3.3.2 The Hukou System and Reforms
The Hukou system is one of the reasons why migration has been limited in
China. Hukou is a household certificate system that ties individuals to locations.
Introduced in the 1950’s, its original goal was to manage individual mobility and
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occupation. In the era of a command economy, since most jobs were controlled by
the state, foods rationed according to Hukou, the Hukou system could be strictly
enforced. The boom in the private economy in the 80’s and 90’s made enforcement
difficult. People started to move to cities for job opportunities. However, without
official Hukou, migrants were ineligible for many local public goods, such as health
care, schooling and social security. As a result, even though it was possible to find a
job in the private sector, the Hukou system still imposes restrictions on migration.
Beginning the mid 1990’s, Chinese cities gradually started to reform the Hukou
system, allowing qualified people from the rural area and other cities to obtain
local Hukou. Experimental in nature, these reforms were initially carried out in a
very small number of cities. In 1997, the State Council and the Ministry of Public
Security launched a large-scale experiment that relaxed the strict constraint imposed
by the central government on provincial and local authorities in terms of what types
of Hukou policies were allowed. Under this experiment, each province was allowed
to select up to 10-20 counties (there are 34 provinces and about 2800 counties in
China) to experiment with a relaxed Hukou policy for 2 years. At the end of this
“trial period’, in 2001, the reform was then scaled up to potentially all counties.
Importantly, since the original Hukou policy was a top-down constraint, the reforms
were in the form of the central government allowing local government to relax Hukou
policies. Substantial freedom was given to provincial and local governments to decide
how far they wanted to go in the reform, but they were not allowed to go beyond
the framework given by the central government. Indeed, in the official statement,
the central government specified that the reforms should be determined based on
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local economic conditions.
To understand the potential impact of a comprehensive reform on how China
responds to international trade, we need to isolate the component of migration costs
that are due to the Hukou system. For this purpose, I construct a database with
city-level information on Hukou policies to estimate the effect of Hukou reforms on
migration. The construction of the database follows recent work by Sun et al. (2011)
and Kinnan et al. (2015). I manually searched a list of key words related to Hukou
reforms in the most comprehensive online law library in China, and the webpage of
the official news agency of the China’s Communist Party.11 Based on the content
of the Hukou policies from these two sources, I rate the Hukou openness of each
city on a scale of 0-6, with 0 being completely closed, and 6 being the most open.
I focus on the period 1997-2010, as 1997 is when the large-scale experimentation
first started, and 2010 is the year of the latest census, the best source of reliable
information on migration. A detailed account of how I constructed this database is
provided in the appendix.
Table 3.1 summarizes the database by time. As Column 1 in the table shows,
the average reform index across cities is virtually 0 in 1997. It increases gradually
over time, and reaches 3.31 in 2010. The cross-sectional standard deviation of the
index starts small—as most cities controlled Hukou strictly in the beginning—and
eventually converged to around 1.3. So the average increase in Hukou openness over
the period is more than 200% of the standard deviation of the openness across cities.
11The address of these two sources are http://www.pkulaw.cn/ and http://www.xinhuanet
.com/, respectively.
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The third column reports the number of cities that actually experience a change in
the reform index in a given year. In most years, 15–50 cities experience a change
in the index. In 2001, however, two thirds of cities relaxed their Hukou restriction.
This is consistent with the switch from experimentation in selected towns within a
province to a comprehensive reform in 2001.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Hukou Reforms
Reform Index
Year Mean Standard deviation No. of reforms
1997 0.01 0.15
1998 0.11 0.52 14
1999 0.63 1.14 73
2000 0.91 1.19 60
2001 1.67 0.9 236
2002 1.77 0.93 33
2003 2.04 1.12 41
2004 2.42 1.24 65
2005 2.46 1.23 12
2006 2.55 1.23 18
2007 2.74 1.27 44
2008 2.78 1.3 6
2009 3.15 1.34 51
2010 3.31 1.45 25
Table 3.1 shows large variation in changes to Hukou policies across cities.
Indeed, official statements frequently state the requirement that Hukou policy should
depend on the development stage of a city. In the early period of the reform, the
concern seemed to be that cities might not be able to provide enough job to all
migrants, so more developed cities were encouraged to be more open. In the late
2000’s, however, the concern became congestion and pollution in the largest cities.
Policy statements from this period emphasized controlling the size of large cities
and encouraging more people to move to small cities.
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This change in attitude is visible from the database. In Figure 3.2, I plot
the average scores for four different types of Chinese cities. The province-level
municipalities, which include Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, have the same
status as a province in China’s political hierarchy. They are also among the largest
cities in China. One tier below are the sub-provincial cities, many of which are
provincial capitals. They also tend to be the most economically vibrant cities in
China. Further below are the remaining provincial capitals, and finally all other
cities. Figure 3.2 shows that the provincial municipalities and sub-provincial cities
were more open than other cities at the beginning of the sample period. But other
cities started to catch up. After the 2000’s the province-level municipalities became
more restricted than other cities. By the end of the sample period, the sub-provincial
cities were also less open than other cities.





















I merge the Hukou reform panel data with information from the 2000 and
2010 population censuses, the 2005 population survey, and other city characteristics
from city statistics yearbooks. Because the population census and survey are only
available for these three years, I take the average of the Hukou openness measure
over three intervals: 1997-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010.
I first analyze the determinants of reforms using a regression framework. Table
3.2 reports the results in which the Hukou reform index is the dependent variable.
In the first column, I include only provincial fixed effects. These fixed effects alone
explain about 24% of the variation in the reform index. In the second column,
I include time dummies for the three time periods. Consistent with the gradual
opening up, the time fixed effects tend to increase over time. Together, provincial
and time fixed effects account for around 80% of the variation in the reform index.
This reflects the fact that policies changes tend to be correlated across cities within a
province. The third column adds city fixed effects. The R squared increases further
to 85%. In the fourth column, I add the interaction between the administrative level
of a city and time trend. The administrative level of a city ranges from 0 to 3, with
the highest value representing province-level cities, and the lowest corresponding
to cities that are not provincial capitals. Consistent with the previous narrative,
the regression indicates that more important cities became relatively more closed to
migrants over time.
The discussion so far supports the claim that the Hukou reforms depend on
a city’s economic and political status. This gives rise to an endogeneity concern
when we estimate the effect of Hukou reforms on migration. The last column of
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Hukou Reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hukou Reform Index
time=2 1.654∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗ 1.684∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.045) (0.047) (0.185)
time=3 2.489∗∗∗ 2.493∗∗∗ 2.543∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗
(0.054) (0.057) (0.064) (0.368)
city level=1 × trend -0.086 -0.129
(0.087) (0.087)
city level=2 × trend -0.192∗ -0.400∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.126)
city level=3 × trend -0.730∗∗∗ -1.064∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.222)
log per capita GDP -0.069
(0.131)




log population × trend 0.166∗∗∗
(0.030)
Constant 1.667∗∗∗ 0.286 -0.467 -0.742∗ -0.523
(0.276) (0.359) (0.658) (0.450) (0.947)
City Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Provincial Fixed Effects yes yes
Observations 1019 1019 1019 1019 1009
R2 0.239 0.792 0.850 0.852 0.859
Notes: city level indicates the administrative level of a city, with 3 being the highest, and 0 being
the lowest. time indicates the time period, which takes a value between 1 and 3. Reform index
is averaged over the following interval: 1997-2000 (period 1), 2001-2005 (period 2), and 2006-2010
(period 3).
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Migration in the 20000 Census
Variable Mean Median Std N
Urban Sector Share of inter-province migrants 0.11 0.07 0.11 340
Share of intra-province migrants 0.19 0.17 0.10 340
Rural Sector Share of inter-province migrants 0.05 0.02 0.10 339
Share of intra-province migrants 0.05 0.03 0.06 339
Notes: Source: authors’ calculation based on the 2000 census. Sample includes all prefecture
jurisdictions. Migration is defined based on the difference between the place of residence and
the place of birth.
Table 3.2 reassures us that the endogeneity problem might not be too severe, con-
ditional on the set of fixed effects we include. Specifically, I add per-capita GDP
and population—two most important characteristics of a city—into the regression.
Although some coefficients are different, because of the correlation among variables,
the explanatory power of the specification, as measured by the R squared, barely
changes. This result suggests that after controlling for city fixed effects, time fixed
effects, and differential trend between cities with different administrative levels, Hu-
kou reforms are unlikely to be correlated with other time-varying city characteristics.
3.3.3 Mobility and the Effect of Hukou Reforms
This subsection describes the evidence on migration in China, and assesses the
effect of Hukou reforms on mobility.
While the full-fledged Hukou reforms did not start until the late 1990’s, migra-
tion to many cities began growing in the 1980s as the market economy developed.
Indeed, using the 2000 population census, Table 3.3 shows that about a third of the
people in the urban sector, and 10% of the people in the rural sector, are migrants.
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I estimate the effect of Hukou reforms carried out in the sample period on
labor mobility. I focus mainly on two outcome variables: the share of residents with
local Hukou, and the number of migrants in a city. To isolate the policy change from
time-invariant unobserved regional heterogeneity that can affect migration decisions,
I use the following first-difference specification:
4yi,t = β1pt + β2ci + β34xi,t + εi,t (3.1)
In the specification, 4yi,t, is the change in an outcome variable of city i bet-
ween two consecutive periods, t-1 and t. pt are the period fixed effects. To capture
differential trends by city types, I include city administrative level fixed effects, ci.
4xi,t captures contemporaneous changes in the economic environment in city i.
Table 3.4 reports the effect of Hukou reforms on the share of residents with
local Hukou. There are three snapshots for this outcome variable, so we have a
two-period panel for specification 3.1. In the first column, only the reform index
and time fixed effects are included. The coefficient for the change in the Hukou
reform index is statistically significant. The point estimate is 1.1 percentage point.
To put this number into perspective, at the time of 2000, the average share of
residents in a city without a local Hukou is 6%. A one-point increase in the Hukou
reform index therefore decreases the share of residents without local Hukou by 16%.
The second column adds city administrative level indicators to allow for differential
trends by city types. The coefficients for these indicators suggest that larger and
more important cities are becoming stricter over time in granting residents local
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Hukou. The inclusion of these variables, however, does not affect the magnitude and
significance of the coefficient for Hukou reforms. To further capture the differential
trends among cities, the third column adds changes in per-capita GDP, population,
and a proxy for local public good, the teacher-to-student ratio in local public primary
schools. Reassuringly, none of these variables have a significant impact. Moreover,
the coefficient for the Hukou reform index barely changes.
Table 3.4: The Effect of Hukou Reform on Access to Local Hukou
(1) (2) (3)
4 Share of residents with local Hukou
4 Hukou Reform Index 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
time=3 0.070∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
city level=1 -0.021∗∗ -0.021∗∗
(0.010) (0.009)
city level=2 -0.072∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
city level=3 -0.122∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028)
4 log per capita GDP 0.012
(0.011)




Constant -0.009 0.002 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 679 679 672
R2 0.152 0.207 0.209
Notes: see Table 3.2 for the definition of variables. TeacherStudentRatio is the
teacher-to-student ratio in local public primary schools.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.4 provides a direct validation of the reform database by showing that
the reforms documented indeed made it easier for migrants to obtain local Hukou.
Did the better prospect of obtaining Hukou makes a city more attractive to mi-
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grants? Table 3.5 reports the effect of Hukou reforms on inward migration. Columns
1-3 focus on log changes in the number of migrants in a city that moved in during
the past year, and Columns 4-6 focus on log changes in the number of migrants that
moved in during the past five years. Such information is only available for 2000 and
2005, so after taking the log fist difference, we have only one snapshot.12 Columns
1 and 4 include only the change in reform index as the independent variable. Coef-
ficients in both columns are positive and statistically significant. According to the
estimates, a one-point increase in the reform index increases the one-year migration
by 16%, and increases the five-year migration by 21%. To rule out differential trends,
I gradually add city administrative level fixed effects and additional control varia-
bles, including changes in per-capita GDP, population, and the teacher-to-student
ratio in local primary schools. After the inclusion of these variables, the coefficient
of Hukou reform loses its significance in predicting one year migration, although the
point estimate remains positive and economically meaningful. On the other hand,
the coefficient for five year migration remains robust. According to the preferred
specification in Column 6, a one-point increase in the Hukou reform index increases
the five year migration by 18%. I will use this estimate to back out the implied
change in migration costs from a Hukou reform in the quantitative section. Now let
me describe the quantitative model.
12The 2010 census only publicizes county-level population, which does not include one year and
five year migration.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Hukou Reforms on Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
4Log(No. of migrants in the past year) 4Log(No. of migrants in the past 5 years)
4Hukou Reform Index 0.161∗ 0.139 0.093 0.209∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.072) (0.072) (0.069)
city level=1 -0.567∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗ -0.334∗∗
(0.205) (0.209) (0.146) (0.144)
city level=2 -0.594∗∗∗ -0.542∗ -0.137 -0.076
(0.152) (0.314) (0.162) (0.162)
city level=3 -0.330∗∗ -0.259 0.333∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.689) (0.095) (0.102)
4 log per capita GDP -0.631∗∗∗ -0.328
(0.223) (0.229)
4 log population 0.017 0.366
(0.331) (0.282)
4 TeacherStudentRatio -0.032 -0.040
(0.038) (0.030)
Constant -0.088 0.051 0.519∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗ -0.091
(0.180) (0.190) (0.242) (0.133) (0.141) (0.208)
Observations 295 295 292 331 331 327
R2 0.009 0.041 0.085 0.025 0.041 0.088
Notes: Notes: see Table 3.2 for the definition of variables. TeacherStudentRatio is the per-student number of teachers in local
primary schools.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4 Theoretical Framework
3.4.1 The Environment
There are 2N + 1 regions in the economy. These regions consist of rural and
urban sectors of the N Chinese cities, in total 2N regions, and one last region that
represents the rest of the world (ROW). Denote the set of regions G. I will use
o ∈ G and d ∈ G to refer to the origin and destination of trade and migration
flows. I also introduce R and U to denote the rural and urban subsets of G:
G = R ⋃ U. There are four production industries in the economy: agricultural
(A), capital and equipment (K), other manufacturing (M), and services (S). The
agricultural industry is located in rural regions, and the three other industries are
located in urban regions. A, K, and M are tradable; S is non-tradable. In the
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following, I describe the decisions of workers and firms, and define the equilibrium
of the economy.
3.4.2 Workers
There are two types of workers, with different levels of skill. I use e, e ∈
{h, l} to denote the skill level of a worker, where h and l stand for high-skill and
low-skill, respectively. A worker’s sole source of income is his or her wage, which
depends on the wage rate for each labor unit, and the number of labor units a
worker possesses—or a worker’s productivity—in the local labor market. I assume
a worker’s productivity in any region is a random draw from a given distribution, to
be specified below. The random draw assumption captures in a reduced-form way
the match quality between a worker and a region. Workers value both amenities
and consumption goods. They choose where to live within the country based on
regional outcomes—amenities, wages and prices—and individual-level outcomes—
their productivity draws across regions.13 The idiosyncracy of workers’ productivity
draws allows the model to generate bilateral migration flows, a prominent feature
of the data.
3.4.2.1 Preference
Based on a migrant survey, Akay et al. (2012) documents that migrants in
China remit on average 10% of their earnings to their hometowns. Remittances
13I model migration as driven by idiosyncratic productivity draws and use wage data to discipline
the distribution that governs the productivity draws. An alternative is to model migration as driven
by idiosyncratic preference shocks.
125
could potentially lead to trade imbalances. To account for this phenomenon, I
assume that, for worker i, born in region o (origin), working in region d (destination),
the consumption optimization problem is:
maxCo, CdCo,d = (BoCo)
λ(BdCd)
1−λ
s.t. PoCo + PdCd ≤ W ed zd(i),
(3.2)
where Po and Pd are prices for Co and Cd— the final consumption goods in regions o
and d, respectively; Bo and Bd are the amenity values of regions o and d to workers;
W ed is the nominal wage for each unit of type-e effective labor; and zd(i) is worker i’s
productivity in region d. According to this utility function, workers value amenities
and consumption in both their hometowns and destinations, with a weight of λ
placed on home consumption. Therefore, a λ share of income will be remitted.









where sA + sM + sS + sK = 1. Let P so be the price of Cso , s ∈ {A,M ,K,S}. Then








where κp is a constant. Worker i’s indirect utility from the consumption of goods
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and amenities, in both origin and destination is
Co,d(W
e






where κc is a constant.
3.4.2.2 Migration Decision and Labor Supply Across Regions
Migration is a once-for-life choice. Upon birth, workers learn their draws of
productivity in all regions within the country and decide where to work, taking
into account their utility from consumption, Co,d, and the migration costs they will
have to incur. Migration costs, denoted as deo,d, are both skill-specific and source-
destination specific.
Formally, given productivity draws, {zd(i) : d ∈ G}, worker i chooses the
destination d to maximize welfare:























can also be interpreted as how workers discount income from the destination. This
cost is similar to the iceberg cost assumption used in international trade literature.14
14The underlying assumption is that the migration cost for any given origin-destination pair
is a fixed share of income, regardless of worker i’s income or productivity. In reality, of course,
migration costs have both fixed and variable components, and I abstract from the fixed costs for
tractability.
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. Then vd is the amenity-adjusted
real wage rate in region d. Worker i will move to region d if and only if this move





















, ∀g ∈ G
(3.7)
Following Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), I assume {zd(i) : d ∈ G} are generated from
the Frechet distribution. To capture the individual-specific component in workers’
productivity, I allow each worker’s draws to be correlated across regions. Specifically,
the vector of productivity draws for any given worker is generated from the following
CDF:





where ρ controls the inter-regional correlation of productivity draws and εe controls
their cross-sectional dispersion.15 Under this assumption, the probability that a
15Hsieh et al. (2013) also uses this parametric assumption to model individuals’ comparative
advantage in different occupations. I normalize the mean of the productivity distributions to be
the same across regions. Differences in regional productivity enter the economy from the production
side.
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worker from origin o moves to destination d (derived in the appendix), is:
































Let Led denote the number of workers with skill level e who are working in d,
and let leo denote the number of workers who are born in o. Then Leo,d := leoπeo,d is










Led is different from the supply of effective labor units in region d, due to the self-
selection on productivity in migration. To derive the supply of effective labor units, I
first derive the expected productivity of migrants from region o to region d, denoted
E(zed|Leo,d), in two steps.
In the first step, I derive the expected value of the destination-specific compo-
nent in workers’ indirect utility (3.6), ueo, for workers moving from o to d, denoted











}. I show in the ap-













e measures the welfare of being born in region o. The more
connected region o is to other labor markets (smaller do,g), and the more attractive
the nearby regions are (higher veg), the higher the utility workers born in region o
enjoy.
Notice this expression is independent of d—for workers from the same region,
their average utility will be the same regardless of their destination. The intuition
is as follows: a destination with higher wages attracts more marginal workers, who
obtain lower welfare from the move, pushing down the average utility for the group
of workers making the move. This selection along the extensive margin exactly
offsets the higher welfare received by the infra-marginal migrants with the same
destination, under the parametric assumption of productivity draws. This selection
channel is present under more general distributional assumptions, although it might
not exactly cancel the effect from infra-marginal migrants.16
In the second step, we use E(ueo|Leo,d) to derive E(zed|Leo,d), the expected pro-
16This channel is similar to the selection in trading partner in Eaton and Kortum (2002), in
which a country with lower production costs export more marginal goods, and the higher costs
of these marginal products offsets the cost advantage of the country. As a result, varieties from
different countries have the same average price. See also Hsieh et al. (2013) for the discussion of a
similar channel in an occupation-choice context.
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Let Eeo,d denote the total number of effective labor units, brought to d by workers
from o. Then Eeo,d = E(zed|Leo,d)Leo,d = E(zed|Leo,d)leoπeo,d. Aggregating over migrants










3.4.2.3 The Distribution of Consumption Expenditures
Workers remit a share λ of income to their hometowns for the purchase of
consumption goods. The total remittances sent to location o by its out-immigrants





















d (1− λ). (3.15)










Remittances and spending from stayers
(3.16)
3.4.3 Production and Trade
The production side of the economy is a multi-sector version of Eaton and
Kortum (2002), extended to incorporate input-output linkages and capital-skill com-
plementarity.
3.4.3.1 Intermediate Variety Production
Within industry s, s ∈ {A,M ,K,S}, there is a continuum of intermediate
varieties, denoted {ω : ω ∈ Ωs}. Intermediate varieties are produced using industry
final outputs and equipped composite labor, both of which are introduced below.
In many developing countries, there is segmentation between rural and urban labor
markets (Swiecki, 2017). To capture this, I assume intermediate variety producers
in urban industries (industries M, K, and S) are located only in urban regions
and hire equipped composite labor from urban labor markets; intermediate variety
producers in the agricultural industry are located only in rural regions and hire
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equipped composite labor from rural labor markets.










s ∈ {A} if d ∈ R; s ∈ {M ,K,S} if d ∈ U,
(3.17)
where asd(ω), msd(ω), and ssd(ω) are the amounts of industry final outputs in agri-
cultural, manufacturing (non-capital), and service industries that are used in pro-
duction. lsd(ω) is the employment of equipped composite labor. γs
′
s , s, s′ ∈ {A,M ,S,L},
are the shares of different inputs in production. tsd(ω) is region d’s efficiency in pro-
ducing variety ω.
Recall that P sd is the price of the final outputs of industry s in region d; let
Wd be the price for one unit of equipped composite labor in region d. The marginal














where Kγ is a constant. csd, introduced for ease of notation, is the marginal cost of
































3.4.3.2 Industry Final Goods Production
In each city, there is a representative final goods producer in each industry.
Industry final goods producers combine intermediate varieties of the same industry
into final outputs, to be used for final consumption and the production of interme-
diate varieties. I assume industry final outputs are non-tradable across cities, but
freely tradable between the rural and urban regions within each city. Therefore,
residents and intermediate variety producers in rural and urban regions of the same
city have the same access to industry final goods of all sectors, despite their different
specializations in intermediate variety production. The production technology for








σs−1 , s ∈ {A} if d ∈ R; s ∈ {M ,K,S} if d ∈ U, (3.20)
where is qsd(ω) is the quantity of variety ω used.
3.4.3.3 Trade in Intermediate Varieties
Intermediate varieties in A, M, and K industries are tradable, both domes-
tically and internationally; intermediate varieties in the service industry are non-
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tradable.17 Final goods producers source the intermediate varieties they use from
the cheapest source, taking into account trade costs. I further assume markets for
intermediate varieties are competitive, so the producers of intermediate varieties
sell their products at marginal costs. Region d’s price of intermediate variety ω,




where τd,d′ , the iceberg trade cost, is the amount of goods needed to be shipped by
producers in d′ for one unit to arrive at d. The price for variety ω that a producer
in region d actually pays is the cheapest price among all sources:




As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), I assume {tsd(ω) : ω ∈ Ωs} are generated
from the Frechet distribution with location parameter T sd and dispersion parameter
θ, with the following CDF:
F sd (t) = exp(−Tsdt−θ). (3.23)
Under this distribution, among the expenditures spent on intermediate varieties in
17In the following, I assume trade costs are infinite for intermediate varieties in the service
industry, and proceed as if services were tradable.
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where the denominator sums over all urban regions if s ∈ {M ,K,S}, that is, if s
indexes an urban industry, and over all rural regions if s ∈ {A}.
The parametric assumption on productivity also implies that region d’s distri-
bution of prices for intermediate varieties in industry s is








−θ. Again, the summation is taken over urban regions
for urban industries, and over rural regions for the agricultural industry. The unit
price for industry final goods corresponding to production function (3.20) is















3.4.3.4 Equipped Composite Labor Production
Equipped composite labor is produced by a representative producer in each
region, from capital and two types of labor units. I incorporate capital-skill com-
plementarity by specifying the production function of equipped composite labor
in a nested CES form, with capital being complementary to high-skill labor, and
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substitutable to low-skill labor.18
Formally, effective high-skill labor units, Ehd , low-skill labor units, Eld, and
capital and equipment, Kd, are combined into equipped composite labor, Ed, through
the following technology:






















where Eehd is equipped high-skill labor, the output from the inner nest. ρkh (ρkh < 1)
is the elasticity of substitution between high-skill labor and capital, and ρlkh (ρlkh >
1) is the elasticity of substitution between equipped high-skill labor and low-skill
labor. ηhd and ηld determine the region-specific shares of different factors in equipped
composite labor.
Let W hd /W ld be the wage rate for high-/low-skill labor, W ehd the unit price for
equipped high-skill labor, and Wd the unit price for equipped composite labor. The
optimization decision and the zero-profit conditions of equipped composite labor
production imply the following:
18This formulation has a tradition in macroeconomics (see, for example Krusell et al., 2000),
and has recently been adapted to the international setting to examine impacts of globalization on
wage inequality by Burstein et al. (2013) and Parro (2013).
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W ehd = [(1− ηhd )(PKd )1−ρkh + (ηhd )(W hd )1−ρkh ]
1
1−ρkh



























Equation (3.30) expresses the ratios between the shares of different factors in equip-
ped composite labor as functions of relative prices and technological parameters, ηhd
and ηld. Factors’ shares vary by regions and prices. Nonetheless, to simplify nota-
tion, I use βKd , βhd , and βld to denote the shares of capital, high-, and low-skill labor





d = 1. (3.31)
3.4.3.5 Goods and Labor Markets Clearing Conditions
Let Xsd be region d’s production of final output in industry s. Since final
output producers add no value in converting intermediate varieties into industry
final outputs, Xsd is also the value of their input demand for intermediate varieties.














d′,d, s ∈ {A}.
(3.32)
To produce Dsd amount of intermediate varieties in industry s, the producers
in region d use, respectively, DsdγAs ,DsdγMs , and DsdγSs amounts of the industry final
outputs of agricultural, manufacturing, and service industries. The producers also
employ DsdγLs worth of equipped composite labor, whose income will be distributed
to capital and workers. The labor market clearing conditions, which are different
for rural and urban labor markets in each city, are
Rural (d∈ R): EhdW hd = DAd γLAβhd ; EldW ld = DAd γLAβld,












The demand for industry final outputs in each region comprises demand from
residents and intermediate variety producers. Since residents and producers in both
the rural region and the urban region of a city purchase industry final outputs from
the same representative producer in that city, to express market clearing conditions
for industry final goods, I use d to denote an urban region, and d′ to denote the rural






























































d . d ∈ U
(3.34)
In Equation (3.34), the left side is the total supply of industry final out-








s are the demands
from intermediate variety producers in the agricultural industry and the three ur-
ban industries, respectively; Csd + Csd′ is the sum of consumption demands in rural
and urban regions of the city. The consumption demand term is calculated as
ss[Rd+Rd′ − (Sd+ Sd′)], where Rd is region d’s aggregate income, remittances in-
cluded; Sd+Sd′ is the city’s international trade surplus taken as exogenous from the
data, scaled to the model economy;19 and ss is the share of industry s in the final
consumption bundle. Adjusting for trade surpluses ensures that the calibration of
regional productivity takes into account the international trade imbalances, about
5% of the GDP of China in 2005. After calibration, however, in all counterfactual
experiments, I focus on the competitive equilibrium defined below, without inter-
national trade imbalances (but allowing for intra-national imbalances arising from
remittances).
19I provide details on the construction of city-level surpluses in the appendix.
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3.4.4 Definition of Equilibrium
The parameters in the economy are the following: preference parameters, in-
cluding {σA,σM ,σK} {sA, sM , sK , sS}, and λ; spatial frictions, including migration
costs {do,d} and trade costs {τo,d}; production technology, including {γs
′
s }, {ηd},
{ρks, ρlks}, and θ; local productivity and amenities, {T sd} and {Bed}; and initial
labor endowments in each region, {leo}.
Definition 3 A competitive equilibrium of the economy is defined as a set of prices
and allocations that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Workers’ migration decisions are optimal, that is, Equation (3.7) is satisfied.
In aggregate, this implies Equation (3.9).
2. The distribution of effective labor units Eed, and final consumption expenditu-
res, Rd, are consistent with workers’ migration choices—Equations (3.13) and
(3.16).
3. The decisions of intermediate variety producers are optimal—Equations (3.18)
and (3.19).
4. The decisions of composite labor producers are optimal—Equations (3.29) and
(3.30).
5. Industry final goods producers’ production and sourcing decisions are optimal—
Equations (3.24) and (3.26).
6. Workers’ consumption decisions are optimal.
7. Labor markets and goods markets clear—Equations (3.32)-(3.34).
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The definition of the equilibrium also highlights the key departure from the existing
applications of similar quantitative trade models in cross-country settings: exoge-
nous labor supply is replaced with migration decisions, summarized by Equation
(3.9), so the distribution of labor across regions is endogenous.
3.5 Parameterization
Before conducting counterfactual experiments, I calibrate the model to data
from the Chinese economy in 2005.20 This section explains how I determine the
parameters in the model, starting with data sources.
3.5.1 Data Descriptions
Quantifying the model primarily requires the following information: to cali-
brate regional productivity, we need, by skill level, the average wage in each region,
and the employment for each city-industry pair; to calibrate region-specific parame-
ters in equipped composite labor production function, we need the shares of different
factors in equipped composite labor; to estimate domestic migration costs we need
migration flows; to estimate trade costs we need information on domestic trade
flows; finally we need the measures of geographic and cultural distances between
regions. This section describes briefly the sources of data; the appendix provides
more details.
20An alternative is to solve the model in changes, as in Dekle et al. (2008). This alternative
is infeasible because the level of aggregation in migration and trade are different, between the
model and the data. An additional advantage of calibrating the benchmark equilibrium rather
than solving the model in changes is that we can assess the fit of the model by looking at moments
that are not direct targets of calibration.
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I use the 2005 mini population census to estimate the wage rates for Chinese
regions. I estimate the average wage for unskilled workers and the skill premium
in each region as the regional fixed effects and the region-specific skill dummies, in
an individual wage regression that controls for a rich set of individual demographic
and occupation variables. This regression approach nets out the differences in de-
mographics and detailed industry structures across regions, which are not explicitly
modeled. The specification and the results of this regression are reported in the
appendix.
I also use the 2005 mini census to construct the number of workers employed
in each city-industry. Once we have the estimates for migration costs and regional
amenity-adjusted real wages, we can use Equation (3.13) to convert the number
of workers into the employment of effective labor units. Combining this with the
regional wages estimated above, I obtain the total wage bill for high- and low-skill
workers at the city-industry level.21
Using the data described above, we can readily compute the relative shares of
wage payments to high- and low-skill workers. Determining ηhd and ηld, the region-
specific parameters in the equipped composite labor production function, further
requires the relative shares between capital and equipment (K) and labor. For the
urban sector, I use the 2004 Annual Survey of Industrial Production to construct
21We run into a small sample problem and end up with zeros for the employment capital and
equipment industry in some cities, as my sample is only a 1% sub-sample of the mini-census.
To overcome this problem, I tabulate employments, differentiating only between agricultural and
urban industries, even though the data contains employment by two-digit industry. (As a re-
sult, we do not know the distribution of employments across the three urban industries in each
city.) I supplement this information with the ratio of employment in industry K over industry
M, constructed from the manufacturing sub-sample of the 2004 economic census, to obtain the
employment information at the city-industry level. I provide more details in the appendix.
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wage bill and capital expenditures for each city, which I combine with the relative
shares of skilled over unskilled workers, to obtain the shares for all three inputs into
equipped composite labor;22 for the rural sector, due to the lack of regional data, I
assume all cities have the same capital/labor share, and determine this share using
the national input-output table.
To construct a database of inter-regional and inter-sectoral migration, I use
the 2000 population census. The 2000 census serves the purpose best because it
reports birthplace information, which is essential for the definition of migration, a
lifetime decision in the theoretical framework.23 For each worker, I identify his or
her skill level, current city, birth province, type of Hukou, and whether he or she
is currently working in a rural or urban industry, and then determine his or her
migration status based on this information.24
I construct proxies for geographic distance and cultural distance between Chi-
nese cities. For any two cities, their geographic distance is calculated as the greater-
circle distance between the coordinates of their city centers, proxied by the locations
of their local governments, extracted from Google Maps. The cultural distance is
22This is an annual firm-level survey, containing detailed financial information for all state-owned
enterprises, as well as private firms with sales over 5 million RMB yuan, in the industrial sector. I
aggregate firm-level expenditures on capital and equipment and labor to compute the city-specific
labor share in equipped composite labor.
23The 2005 mini population census, on the other hand, reports only migration information during
the past 5 years and, therefore, is inconsistent with the notation of long-term migration adopted
here. We cannot combine 5-year migration with long-term migration constructed from the 2000
census, because of the possibility of repeat migrants or return migrants.
24Hukou is the household registration system in China, which records the place of legal residence
and the sector of origin for Chinese residents; the information on birth place is only up to the
provincial level in the census, so I tabulate only the source province for migrants. The census does
record the source city of the most recent migration move for each individual. That city, however,
is not necessarily the same as an individual’s birth city, as he or she may be a repeat migrant. In
the appendix, I provide additional background information on the Hukou system and a discussion
of the drawbacks of alternative ways of constructing migration flows.
144
constructed as 1− corr(Vo,Vd), where Vo is a vector, the elements of which are the
shares of various ethnic groups in the total ethnic minority population in o in the
1990 census. The cultural distance between two cities is small if two cities had
similar compositions of ethnic minorities in the 1990s.25
Finally, I use the 2002 inter-regional input-output table of China to construct
trade flows between Chinese provinces, which are then used for the estimation of
domestic trade costs.
3.5.2 Parameters Calibrated Independently
I calibrate the following parameters independently. The dispersion parame-
ter εe governs the variance of the idiosyncratic component of workers’ productivity
draws. The parametric assumption in Equation (3.8) implies that, the wage dis-
tribution of workers staying in their hometown follows a Frechet distribution with
dispersion parameter (1− ρ)εe (proved in the appendix). A property of the Frechet








2 − 1. (3.35)
Guided by this relationship, I use the wage distribution of stayers to recover
εe(1− ρ).26 Specifically, I regress the log wage of stayers on regional fixed effects,
25Migrations were less common prior to 1990; therefore correlation constructed this way captures
the historical cultural distance between regions, and is unlikely to be driven by current migration.
I provide background information on ethnicity in China and the summary statistics of cultural
distance in the appendix.
26Hsieh et al. (2013) also uses this relationship to recover the ability dispersion and follows a
similar strategy, described below, to calibrate ρ in an occupation-choice model.
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individual demographics, and industry fixed effects, for high- and low-skill worker
samples separately. I then take the exponents of the residuals, compute their coef-
ficients of variations, and choose εe(1− ρ) so that Equation (3.35) gives the same
value. This procedure determines εh(1− ρ) = 2.72 and εl(1− ρ) = 2.88. By deri-
ving statistics for only stayers’ wage distribution, and matching them to their data
counterparts, this procedure takes into account the self-selection on productivity in
migration.27
The parameter ρ controls the correlation of individuals’ productivity draws
across regions. My strategy for calibrating it is first to compute the explanatory
power of individual fixed effects in an individual-panel wage regression using real
data. Then I choose ρ so that, in the simulated data, individual fixed effects have
the same level of explanatory power. This procedure determines ρ to be 0.4. In the
appendix I provide more details on this procedure.
Productivity dispersion in intermediate varieties, θ, is not separately identi-
fiable from trade costs using the data I have. I assign a value of 4, the preferred
estimate of Simonovska and Waugh (2014), to the productivity dispersion for A,
M, and K industries.28 The elasticities of substitution between high-skill labor and
capital, and between low-skill labor and equipped high-skill labor, are set to the
27We can also use migrants for this calibration. In that case, the model predicts that, only
for migrants sharing the same origin and destination, will the wage distribution follow a Frechet
distribution. This approach is infeasible for two reasons: first, in the data, we identify the source
region only up to the provincial level, and second, for many origin-destination pairs, there are only
a few workers.
28Simonovska and Waugh (2014) focuses on aggregate trade flows. Papers focusing on agricul-
tural trade alone, for example, Donaldson (2017) and Sotelo (2014), report similar estimates for
the elasticity of trade. In this model, trade is driven by Ricardian comparative advantage, so the
love-for-variety parameters do not have impacts on the levels and elasticities of trade; they are
used solely for computing the aggregate price indices, and the only requirement is that θ− σ > 1,
so that the price indices are integrable.
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estimates in Krusell et al. (2000)—0.67 and 1.67, respectively.29 These values im-
ply that capital and high-skill labor are complements, and both are substitutes to
low-skill labor.
The share of remittances in migrants’ income is calibrated to 10%, following
Akay et al. (2012). The shares of different industries in the final consumption
bundle, {sA, sM , sK , sS}, are calibrated to the shares of these industries in final
consumption. The calibration determines sA = 0.23, sM = 0.24, sK = 0.01, sS =
0.52. The shares of different inputs in intermediate variety production, {γs′s }, are
calibrated to the 2002 national input-output table.
The upper panel of Table (3.6) summarizes the sources and values of these
parameters. The lower panel provides information on other parameters, which I
discuss in the rest of this section.
29Parro (2013) and Burstein et al. (2013) use the same parameter values when examining the roles
of skill-biased technological change and globalization in explaining the rise in the skill premium.
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Table 3.6: Model Parameterization
A: Parameters Calibrated Independently
Parameter Description Target/Source Value
ρ Correlation in worker productivity draws Idiosyncratic component of individual wage 0.4
εh,εl Dispersion in worker productivity draws Equation (3.35) εh = 2.731−ρ , ε
l = 2.881−ρ
θ Elasticity of trade Simonovska and Waugh (2014) 4
λ Share of remittances Akay et al. (2012) 0.1
ρkh, ρlkh Elasticities in equipped composite labor Krusell et al. (2000) ρkh = 0.67, ρlkh = 1.67
sA, sM , sS , sK Sectoral shares in final consumption Aggregate consumption in the economy sA = 0.22, sM = 0.24
sS = 0.52, sK = 0.01
γs
′
s Input-output linkages National input-output table See the appendix
B: Parameters Estimates/Calibrated in Equilibrium
Parameter Description Target/Source Value
{do,d} Migration Costs Migration Flow See Table(3.7)
{τo,d} Domestic Trade Costs Domestic Trade Flow See Table(3.8)
ta, tm, tk International Trade Costs International Openness See Table(3.8)
{ηhd}, {ηed} Factor weights in equipped composite labor Corresponding factor shares in the data -
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3.5.3 Migration Cost Estimation
3.5.3.1 The Specification of Migration Cost
I specify the cost of a migration from o to d as
ln(deo,d) = βe1I1 + βe2 ∗ I1 ∗ disto,d + βe3I2 + βe4 ∗ I2 ∗ disto,d + βe5I3 + βe6 ∗ I3 ∗ disto,d + βe7 ∗ I4 + βe8 ∗Cdisto,d,
(3.36)
where I1-I4 are mutually exclusive dummy variables: I1 indicates if o and d belong to
different cities within the same province; I2 indicates if o and d belong to different
provinces within the same large region (of which there are seven in China, each
containing five provinces on average); I3 indicates if o and d belong to different
large regions; and I4 is the indicator for rural-urban migration. These dummy
variables capture different kinds of institutional barriers to the free mobility of labor.
disto,d is the geographic (great-circle) distance between o and d, while Cdisto,d is the
cultural distance: these two variables capture the geographic and cultural barriers
to migration.
3.5.3.2 Estimation Strategy
If migration flows are recorded at the city-to-city level in the data, both migra-
tion cost parameters, {β}, and amenity-adjusted real wages, {ved}, can be estimated
in linear regression. In this section, I use this simpler case to illustrate the source
of identification; as discussed in the data section, however, the migration data is re-
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corded at province-to-city level, so in actual implementation, I use non-linear least
squares and estimate the parameters by minimizing the distance between the data
and the model-predicted province-to-city flows. I provide the details on estimation
in the appendix.





[ln(ved)− ln(veo)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed Effects
− lndo,o︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+ lndo,d︸ ︷︷ ︸
Migration Cost
] (3.37)
We can then substitute Equation (3.36) into the migration costs component in the
expression, and estimate this specification using linear regression. The specification
demonstrates clearly that the dispersion of workers’ productivity, εe, is not separa-
tely identifiable from migration costs, and therefore I calibrate it using information
on wage dispersion. Parameters governing migration costs, {β}, are identified from
within variation; if, within a region, the majority of workers are from regions that
are far away, the estimated migration costs will be small. The logs of the amenity-
adjusted real wages, ved and veo, are identified as destination and origin fixed effects;
intuitively, if a region employees a larger number of workers (relative to the number
of workers born in the region), it either pays a good wage, or offers attractive ame-
nities. Once we calibrate the remaining parameters in the benchmark economy and
solve the model, we can back out amenities, Bed, by subtracting wages and prices
from ved.30
30Note that I use the 2000 data to estimate the long-run migration costs; the wage and employ-
ment data, on the other hand, represents the 2005 economy. To ensure that the recovered {ved} are
consistent with the 2005 employment distribution, after estimating {β}, I use workers’ birthplace
and employment distribution in 2005, and solve the migration model again. Specifically, I solve
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3.5.4 Calibrating the Rest of the World
With the estimated migration costs and {ved}, Equation (3.13) predicts the
supply of effective labor in each place. Together with the regional wage estimated
before, I compute the regional and, in turn, the national labor value added in China.
I then use the share of Chinese value added in the world, calculated from Penn World
Table 6.1, to determine the GDP of the ROW:




To calibrate the total number of effective labor units available in the ROW, I
assume that EROW = EChina PopulationROWPopulationChina , where E stands for number of effective
labor units.31 The wage for each effective labor unit in the ROW is then GDPROWEROW .
for {ved}, so that the model-predicted total number of workers in each region is the same as that in










p,d, where Lep,d (data) is numbers of workers
working in region d; leo (data) is the number of workers born in region o; and πeo,d is the model-
predicted probability of migration, as functions of {ved}. The workers employment distribution in
2005 comes from the 2005 mini census directly. Because the 2005 mini census does not provide
birthplace information, I construct the birthplace distribution using the 2000 census, focusing on
appropriately adjusted age groups. The appendix provides more details. One additional benefit of
updating {ved} is that, even if there are changes in migration costs during the period 2000–2005,
our benchmark calibration still ensures that the number of workers in each place is the same as
that in the data.
31I assume that in the ROW, intermediate varieties are produced using industry final outputs and
effective labor units directly, without equipped composite labor, so there is neither the distinction
between skilled and unskilled workers nor capital-skill complementarity.
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3.5.5 Joint Estimation of Trade Costs and Regional Productivity
3.5.5.1 The Specification of Trade Cost
Following the gravity literature in international trade, I specify the trade costs
between any two regions within China as a log linear function of the geographic,
institutional and cultural distance between them:
log(τo,d) = γ1I ′1 + γ2 ∗ (1− I ′2 − I ′3) ∗ disto,d + γ3I ′2 + γ4 ∗ I ′2 ∗ disto,d + γ5I ′3 + γ6 ∗ I ′3 ∗ disto,d + γ7 ∗ I ′4 + γ8 ∗Cdisto,d
(3.39)
Dummy variables I ′1-I ′3 in this specification are the same as I1-I3 in the migra-
tion cost specification.32 I ′4 is an indicator for common provincial border. Cdisto,d
and disto,d are also defined in the same way as in the migration cost specification,
except that here I allow for positive trade costs within the same city—disto,o > 0. I
proxy within-city distance, disto,o, using city o’s radius, constructed as half of city
o’s average distance to its five closest neighboring cities.
I further specify the trade cost between a given Chinese city and the ROW as
the trade cost between that Chinese city and its nearest port city, plus a parameter
for international trade cost that captures tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and information
flow costs, among other barriers to trade. These costs likely differ across industries,
so I allow international trade costs to be industry-specific, too. The international
32Under this specification, the marginal impact of within-city distance on trade cost is γ2, the
same as that of between-city, within-province distance. I also try treating these two variables sepa-
rately, and it seems the data does not allow for simultaneous identification of these two variables.
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trade costs will be calibrated to match industry trade openness in China in 2005.
The targets for industry openness are reported in Panel B of Table (3.8).
3.5.5.2 Estimation Strategy
Similar to the migration cost estimation, if we have city-pair trade flow data,
we can estimate the specification using a linear regression. For the clarity of ex-
position, in this section, I focus on this simple setup to illustrate the sources of
identification in estimation. I provide more details on the actual computational al-
gorithm in the online appendix, in which, to accommodate the aggregate nature of
the trade data, I jointly determine trade costs and region-specific productivity, by
solving the full model and choosing the parameters, so that the distance between
the model-predicted trade flows and the data is minimized.














ln(T jo )− ln(cjo))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed Effects
− lnτo,o︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trade Cost (within city)




We can then obtain the estimation specification by substituting Equation (3.39) into
trade cost in this equation. Applying this specification to domestic trade flow data,






), the cost-adjusted productivity, with origin and destination
fixed effects. Intuitively, if region d purchases a lot from local producers (large δjd,d),
region d is either very productive in converting input bundle into output, or it has
153






). We can also
recover {γ}, the coefficients determining domestic trade costs, where the source of
identification comes from the extent to which region d sources from regions that are
at different distances.33








), we can use the model structure to se-
parate T jd and c
j
d and to calibrate the industry-level international trade costs. Note
that cjd depends on local wages and the prices of industry final outputs, which in
turn depend on productivity and wages in all regions in the economy. Therefore,
fixing wages at the observed value, for any given level of industry trade barriers, we
can choose a distribution of {T jd} such that, given wages and productivity across















). We can then determine the international trade costs so that
the model exhibits the same level of international trade openness as in the data.
3.5.6 Estimation Results
3.5.6.1 Migration Costs
Table (3.7) reports the estimates for the migration costs. The model fits the
data well, as indicated by the high R2s. The signs of coefficients are as expected:
33Since I actually implement the estimation using provincial-level trade data, the identification of
the two variables that vary only within a province, the inter-city dummy and the within-provincial
geographic distance, relies on differences in trade patterns for provinces with different internal
structures. Intuitively, the larger these coefficients are, the higher the within-province trade costs
are and the more intensive the inter-provincial trade is. Suppose a province trades intensively with
itself. All else equal, if this province has many cities, then its low trade-penetration rate will be
reflected in a large estimate for the intercity dummy; if, on the other hand, this province has only a
small number of (geographically) large cities, then the low trade-penetration rate will be reflected
in a large estimate for the coefficient for within-province distance.
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all measures of distance increase migration costs. In terms of magnitude, the cost
of migrating to other cities within the same province is around 117 log points for
both types of workers. As a migration move covers more distance, it incurs a larger
cost: for skilled workers, the additional cost of crossing a provincial border is about
30 log points, and the additional cost of crossing a regional border is another 20 log
points; these costs are slightly higher for unskilled workers.
Table 3.7: Estimates of Migration Costs
Skilled Workers Unskilled Workers
I(Different Cities, Same Province) 1.167 1.192
(0.0492) (0.043)
I(Different Provinces, Same Region) 1.502 1.555
(0.0318) (0.03)
I(Different Regions) 1.719 1.812
(0.0275) (0.0305)
I(Rural to Urban) 0.586 0.606
(0.0191) (0.0172)
I(Different Cities, Same Province)*Distance 0.378 0.332
(0.2761) (0.1984)
I(Different Provinces, Same Area)*Distance 0.367 0.738
(0.0578) (0.048)
I(Different Regions)* Distance 0.215 0.539
(0.0225) (0.0292)




Notes: This table reports the estimates of domestic migration costs. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Distance is measured as the great circle distance between cities
(in 1000 km); Cultural Distance is measured as one minus the correlation in lagged ethnic
minority shares between cities.
The continuous components of geographic distance have nonlinear effects on
migration costs: when the origin and the destination are in the same province, the
marginal cost of moving an extra 1000 kilometers is not significant; when the origin
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and destination are in different provinces within the same large region, the marginal
cost is sizable and statistically significant; when the origin and destination are in
different large regions, the marginal cost becomes somewhat smaller, but is still
significant. This pattern holds for both types of workers, but the coefficients are
much larger for unskilled workers.
The estimation also reveals substantial costs, about 60 log points, associated
with rural-urban migration. This magnitude, however, is only about one-third of the
calibrated “labor wedge” for China in Swiecki (2017). The difference underscores
the importance of accounting for the geographic dimension: a large proportion of
the measured rural-urban wedge could be a joint product of regional inequality and
spatial frictions.
Finally, for both types of workers, the coefficients for cultural distance are
positive and significant. The standard deviation of cultural distance is 0.3, so incre-
asing cultural distance by one standard deviation leads to an increase of around 5
log points in migration costs.
It is instructive to compare my estimates to those based on the U.S. data.
While no existing papers use the exact same specification to this paper, some recent
studies estimate a spatial equilibrium model, in which workers choose where to
work, taking into account real wages, amenities, and migration costs. For example,
Diamond (2016) specifies a discrete choice model for workers’ migration decision,
and estimates the structural parameters governing migration costs in workers’ utility
function. Since these are “deep” parameters in the sense that they capture something
fundamental about American workers and their mobility, they can be compared
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to my estimates. Diamond (2016) estimates the model separately for four worker
groups with different races (black and non-black) and education (college and non-
college). Since most worker in my sample period are not college graduates, I compare
my results to the non-black and non-college worker group.
The results from the full model of Diamond (2016) suggest that living in a
city outside the state of birth is equivalent to a 55 log point decrease in the real
wage, and living in a city outside the census division of birth is equivalent to a
82 log point decrease in the real wage.34 In terms of size, a state in the U.S. is
similar to a province in China, and the American census division is similar to the
big geographic region used in my estimation. Therefore these estimates are most
comparable to the migration cost associated with crossing provincial and regional
borders in my specification. For both skilled and unskilled workers, my estimates
suggest that crossing a provincial border is equivalent to a 150 log point decrease in
the real wage, and crossing a regional border is equivalent to a 180 log point decrease
in the real wage. Comparison based on these two sets of coefficients suggests that
migration in China is two to three times as costly as it is in the U.S., consistent
with strong restriction on worker mobility in China.
34According to Tables 4 and 5 of Diamond (2016), in workers’ utility function, the coefficient
associated with living in the same state of birth is 3.44, and that associated living in the same
region of birth is 1.219 (the leave-out category is living outside the census division of birth), whereas
the coefficient for wage is 4.026. Therefore living outside the state of birth, but within the same
census division is equivalent to 3.433−1.2194.026 ∗ 100 log points of the real wage, and living outside the
census division of birth is equivalent to 3.4334.206 ∗ 100 log points in the real wage.
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3.5.6.2 Trade Costs
Panel A in Table (3.8) presents the estimates for domestic trade costs. The
model fits the data well, with an R2 of 0.7. According to the estimates, crossing a
provincial border increases trade costs by about 100 log points; crossing a regional
border adds another 20 log points; sharing a common provincial border, on the
other hand, could reduce the costs by 6.5 log points. If the dummies variables
indeed capture the institutional barriers to domestic trade, the estimates indicate
that these barriers are large.
Geographic distance significantly increases trade costs: for trading partners
from different provinces within the same large region, distance has a large impact—
each additional 1000 kilometers increases trade costs by 18 log points; for trading
partners from two different regions, the impacts of distance are smaller: each addi-
tional 1000 kilometers increases trade costs by 8 log points. Cultural distance does
not appear to affect trade costs. Perhaps due to the lack of variation in the number
of cities within a province, and the radiuses of these cities, the estimation does not
identify any trade costs associated with crossing city borders, or with additional
kilometers between cities within the same province.
Overall, the estimates suggest that the trade costs between cities within China
increase with both institutional and geographic distances. The former, captured by
dummy variables in the regression, play a more important role, especially for close
trade partners. The size of the inter-provincial dummy is smaller than in studies
examining market fragmentation in China using earlier data (Poncet, 2005; Poncet,
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2003). On the other hand, relative to comparable estimates for the U.S. (Wolf,
2000; Crafts and Klein, 2014), my estimate of the provincial-border effect is about
twice as large, reflecting larger barriers to trade flows at provincial border in China.
Since my estimates use variation in province-level trade costs, one valid concern is
whether, due to the aggregate nature of the data, I might misattribute the cost
of trading within a province to provincial borders. If that is the case, a further
concern is whether the results from counterfactual experiments would be affected.
In the appendix, I discuss related issues arising in the literature focusing on U.S.
and perform a robustness exercise, in which I decrease the provincial border dummy
in the economy to the U.S. level while increasing the coefficients for continuous
distance components, keeping the overall level of domestic trade costs the same.
All of the counterfactual results are robust to this alternative domestic trade cost
structure.
Panel B of Table (3.8) presents the level of sectoral international openness
by sector in China, defined as trade over production. Capital and manufacturing
industries are more open compared to the agricultural industry, and this is reflected
in the higher calibrated sectoral trade costs for the agricultural industry. Consistent
with anecdotal evidence, international trade costs are smaller than the estimated
inter-provincial costs, capturing the feature in the data that coastal provinces trade
much more intensively with the ROW than with interior provinces.35
35In a state council meeting in 2014, Prime Minister Keqiang Li mentioned the complaint of
producers in Shanghai that shipping costs within China were so high that it was cheaper to ship
goods to California than to Beijing.
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Table 3.8: Domestic and International Trade Costs
A. Domestic Trade Cost Estimates
Coefficient Standard Error
I(Different Cities, Same Province) 0.0001 (0.0572)
I(Different Provinces, Same Region) 1.0897 (0.0719)
I(Different Regions) 1.2276 (0.0507)
I(Sharing Provincial Border) -0.0648 (0.0393)
I(Same Province)*Distance -0.0003 (0.1829)
I(Different Provinces, Same Region)*Distance 0.1836 (0.0683)
I(Different Regions)* Distance 0.0833 (0.0206)
Cultural Distance 0 (0.0554)
Observations 900
R2 0.70
B. International Trade Cost Calibration: Targets and Parameter Values
Trade/Production International Trade Costs
Agricultural Industry 0.12 0.93
Manufacturing Industry 0.36 0.75
Capital and Equipment Industry 0.46 0.67
Notes: Panel A of this table reports the estimates of domestic trade costs. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses; Distance is measured as the great circle distance between cities (in 1000 km); Cultural Distance
is measured as one minus the correlation in lagged ethnic minority shares between each city pair. Panel B
of this table reports the level of industry openness in the data, and the calibrated international trade costs.
The data on sectoral-level trade is aggregated from the 2005 UN Comtrade database. Production data is
from the 2005 statistics yearbook.
Table 3.9: Non-targeted Moments
Data Model
Trade/Labor VA: mean 0.45 0.41
Trade/Labor VA: std 0.86 0.58
Corr ( Trade/VA, Wage)
For Worker Group:
Urban unskilled 0.29 0.26
Rural unskilled 0.37 0.33
Urban skilled 0.25 0.14
Rural skilled 0.41 0.23
Notes: The data sample excludes the top 1% most open
cites, with trade/GDP greater than 3, which is also the hig-
hest level of openness predicted by the model. Trade/Labor
VA refers to the ratio between trade (imports+exports) and
total payments to labor.
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3.5.6.3 Additional Validations of the Model
The good fit of the migration and trade regressions suggests that the model
is a reasonable approximation of the Chinese economy. Since I fully parameterize
the model, I can look at additional moments that are not targets of calibration or
estimation, to further assess the fit of the model.
Table (3.9) presents summary statistics for city-level openness, and the cor-
relation between city openness and average wage.36 Overall, the model performs
reasonably well in this test. It reproduces the mean city openness and the correla-
tion between openness and wages for unskilled workers. It also captures the higher
correlations between wages and trade in the rural sector compared to the urban sec-
tor for both types of workers. However, the model under-predicts the dispersion of
city level openness, and the correlation between openness and wage, for high skilled
workers.
3.5.6.4 Welfare and Productivity Distribution in the 2005 Equili-
brium
I compute the expected value of the welfare of workers, defined by Equation
(3.6), by their places of birth. Figure (3.3) plots the density distribution of the
log welfare for different worker groups. There is considerable dispersion in welfare
among all worker groups. Among skilled workers, those born in cities with desirable
36City openness is computed as the sum of imports and exports, divided by local labor value-
added. Since the model does not incorporate all primary inputs to GDP (e.g., land), for consistent
comparison, I normalize city-level trade by wage payment instead of GDP.
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amenities or high wages can be 150-250 log points better off than those born in other
cities; among unskilled workers, the dispersion is even larger. Figure (3.4) plots the
wage for each region (y axis) against the region’s calibrated productivity (x axis). In
both rural and urban sectors, wages clearly increase with local productivity; through
the lens of the trade model, high wages imply high productivity in equilibrium. But
because of the differences in market access across regions, the relationship is not
perfect; if the trade costs were identical for each trading partners, the competition
between producers in different regions would impose a perfect relationship between
wages and productivity.
(a) Welfare of Unskilled Workers (b) Welfare of Skilled Workers
Figure 3.3: Welfare Distribution
These two sets of figures underscore the importance of limited worker mobility
and internal geography in determining both trade and welfare. It is therefore critical
to take these two elements into account when studying the welfare implications of
trade.
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(a) Rural Wage and Agricultural Productivity (b) Urban Wage and Manufacturing Producti-
vity
Figure 3.4: Wage and Productivity
3.6 Counterfactual Experiments
3.6.1 Benchmark Experiment
I use the model as a laboratory to conduct a sequence of policy experiments
in order to examine the impacts of trade on welfare and inequality and the roles of
within-country frictions in determining these impacts. In the first experiment, I keep
all parameters of the model at the calibrated values and shut down international
trade between China and the ROW by increasing the international trade costs to
infinity.
3.6.1.1 Impacts of Trade on Welfare and Inequality
I compute the welfare gains from trade for each type of worker by calculating
the relative changes in their welfare as China moves from the autarky to the open
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economy equilibrium.37 Panel A of Table (3.10) reports the mean, standard devia-
tion, and 5% and 95% percentiles of the distribution of welfare gains from trade, by
worker skill groups. I compute the national average gains from trade by averaging
over all worker groups in all regions, weighted by population. The national average
gains from trade are 7.61%, similar in magnitude to the predictions of models wit-
hout within-country heterogeneity and internal frictions.38 However, the welfare
gains do not accrue to everyone in the economy equally. First, different types of
workers benefit differently from trade. The average gains from trade are about 11%
for skilled workers, and 5% for unskilled workers. Within skill group, the impacts
of trade also differ dramatically; among all worker groups, the standard deviations
of the distributions of the welfare gains are similar to, or larger than, the respective
means. The most-benefited group receives a welfare improvement of 20-30%, while
some workers, likely unskilled ones, could experience welfare losses.
These patterns suggests that international trade might have important impacts
on inequality, between workers with different skills, and among similar workers from
different regions. I use the Theil index to measure the overall inequality in real
wages in China, decomposing it into between-region and within-region components,
and examine the impacts of international trade on each component.
Panel B of Table (3.10) presents the results. The first row is the decomposi-
tion for the benchmark economy. The between-region component constitutes about
90% of the overall inequality in China, while the within-region inequality between
37If we use per-capita real wage as the proxy for income and welfare, both qualitative and
quantitative results hold.
38See, for example, Parro (2013) and Burstein et al. (2013)
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Table 3.10: Aggregate and Distributional Impacts of Trade
A. Gains from Trade for Different Worker Groups
Mean std 5% 95%
Urban Skilled 11.48 11.29 1.50 30.86
Urban Unskilled 5.19 8.43 -1.86 19.61
Rural Skilled 11.02 10.78 1.74 29.98
Rural Unskilled 4.98 8.31 -1.62 19.71
National Average 7.612
B. Impacts of Trade on Inter- and Intra-Regional Inequality
Between Region Within Region Theil Index
Open Economy 0.182 0.031 0.213
Autarky 0.172 0.025 0.197
Increase (%) 5.8% 24.0% 8.15%
Relative Contribution 63.5% 36.5% 100%
Notes: Panel A of this table reports the summary statistics of the city-level welfare gains
from trade for different worker skill groups. All numbers are in percentage points. National
Average is the population-weighted average (across regions and worker skill groups) gains from
trade. Panel B reports the decomposition of inequality, measured by the Theil index, into
within- and between-region components in both the autarky and the open economy. The last
row reports the relative contributions of the two components to the increase in the aggregate
inequality after trade liberalization.
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skilled and unskilled workers contributes only 10%. The second row of the table is
the decomposition for the autarky economy. Again, the between-region component
contributes more than 80% to the overall inequality.
As reported in the third row of Panel B, moving from the autarky economy
to the open economy, the overall inequality in the country increases by 8%; both
between- and within-region inequality increase. Although the within-region compo-
nent accounts for only about 10% of inequality, its contribution to the increase is
36%. The between-region component accounts for the remaining 64% of the increase
in aggregate inequality.
3.6.1.2 Trade and Inequality: the Role of Internal Geography
The decomposition in the previous section suggests that both within- and
between-region components matter in the context of the impacts of trade on ine-
quality. Since one important difference in the model between regions is their geo-
graphic environments, in particular, their accesses to foreign markets, in this section,
I examine to what extent geography can explain the impacts of trade on different
regions.
Each panel in Figure (3.5) plots the relationship between access to foreign
markets and the city-level average welfare gains from trade for one worker group.
The vertical axis is the ratio between the average welfare in the open economy and
the average welfare in the autarky; the horizontal axis is each city’s distance to
its nearest port; the size of bubbles indicates city size. In all panels, regions form
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two groups in terms of their gains from trade: a coastal group that reaps most of
the benefits and an interior group that benefits very little. For unskilled workers,
some interior regions lie below 1, indicating that residents there bear welfare losses.
The segregation of gains from trade is reminiscent of the segregation in terms of
international trade integration in panel (a) of Figure (3.1): cities in the coastal
provinces trade much more intensively with the ROW than with most interior cities.
By limiting free mobility of goods within the country, intra-national trade costs
indeed prevent interior regions from benefiting from trade.39
To illustrate the impacts of international trade on within-region inequality and
how the impacts differ along the geographic dimension, Figure (3.6) plots changes
in skill premia in rural and urban regions against regions’ distances to their nearest
ports. In the urban sector, except for a couple of regions in the hinterland, almost
all regions experience increases in their skill premia after trade. The increase is
around 10% in the coastal areas and about 5% in the interior. In the rural sector,
on average, skill premia increase by 5% in coastal regions but decrease by 1-2% in
the interior. The negative correlation between changes in skill premia and distances
to the coast is consistent with empirical findings from a diff-in-diff approach (Han
et al., 2012).
These figures illustrate clearly that within-country geography is relevant for
39The discontinuities in the gains from trade in Figure (3.5) as we move along the horizontal axis
from the interior to the coast are largely driven by the large estimated value of the inter-provincial
dummy in the domestic trade specification. As discussed in Section 5.5, and more in the appendix,
I might potentially misattribute the costs of shipping over geographic distance to the provincial
dummy. To address this concern I perform a robustness check, reported in the appendix, with a
more continuous domestic trade cost structure (while keeping the overall level of domestic trade
costs unchanged) and show all results are robust to this alternative domestic trade cost structure.
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Figure 3.5: Geographic Distribution of Gains from Trade
(a) Welfare Effect: Urban Skilled Workers (b) Welfare Effect: Rural Skilled Workers
(c) Welfare Effect: Urban Unskilled Workers (d) Welfare Effect: Rural Unskilled Workers
Figure 3.6: Trade and the Skill Premium
(a) Change in Urban Skill Premium (b) Change in Rural Skill Premium
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workers’ gains from trade. The prediction that, within each skill group, workers
from the coastal regions benefit more, is intuitive: international trade is, on average,
welfare-improving, and since coastal regions trade more, workers there also benefit
more. On the other hand, the forces behind the differential impacts of trade on
skilled and unskilled workers within the same region (i.e., the changes in skill premia)
and how the differential impacts vary across locations (i.e., the negative gradient of
the changes in skill premia with respect to regions’ distances to the coast) are less
obvious. The next section will explain these patterns.
3.6.1.3 Explaining the Gradient of Changes in Skill Premia
The impacts of international trade on skill premia rest on its impacts on the
relative demand and the relative supply of skilled versus unskilled workers. I discuss
forces affecting these two factors separately.
The factor content theory of trade predicts that in an open economy, a de-
veloping country with abundant unskilled labor will specialize in producing and
exporting unskilled-intensive products. Opening to trade causes a change in the
pattern of specialization, and the relative demand for unskilled labor increases. The
“Stolper-Samuelson Theorem” then predicts a decrease in the skill premium in de-
veloping countries following trade liberalization. This channel, however, is not an
important channel in the current context: trade between China and ROW is largely
within sector; therefore the change in relative demand for workers induced by the
factor content of trade is unlikely to be large.40
40In the model, all industries in the urban sector uses the same composite equipped labor,
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However, there is an mportant channel related to the factor content theory of
trade, but operating through within country specialization. Because urban tradable
industries (K and M industries) employ intermediate goods more heavily than the
agricultural industry, they are more “transportation intensive.” When a country
opens up to trade, the coastal regions, due to their proximity to foreign suppliers,
have stronger comparative advantage in these industries, and increase their specia-
lization in producing capital and manufacturing products. The interior regions, on
the other hand, increases their specialization in the agricultural industry. This shift
in specialization patterns increases the relative demand for skilled workers in the
coastal regions and decrease it in the hinterland, resulting in a negative relationship
between the increases in regional skill premia, and regions’ distance to the nearest
port, as shown in Figure (3.6).
A second channel that affects relative demand for skilled workers is the capital-
skill complementarity in production. China is a net importer of capital goods, which
are complements to skilled workers. As a result, after international trade liberali-
zation, skill premia increase across the board. Because coastal regions experience
larger drops in the prices of capital goods, skill premia increase more on the coast.
Now consider changes in skill composition across regions after trade liberali-
zation. A region’s change in skill composition is determined by the net numbers
of skilled/unskilled labor units migrating into that region, which in turn depend
with the same skill intensity, so the factor content of trade theory can only operate through the
reallocation of workers between urban and agricultural sectors; and this force is less important,
because surplus is only 1% of production in the agricultural industry. Even if we allow capital and
equipment industry to have a different skill intensity from the manufacturing industry, the factor
content of trade is unlikely to change much, because the deficit in capital and equipment industry
is less than 2% of production.
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Figure 3.7: Reallocation After Trade
(a) City Growth (b) Skill Share in Employment
(c) Urban Share in Value Added
on regions’ access to labor pools and workers’ costs of migration. Since the coastal
regions gain more from trade, they will experience a net gain in population. As the
estimated migration costs are lower for skilled workers, there will be more skilled
workers moving from the interior into the coastal regions, pushing down skill premia
on the coast and driving them up in the interior. The differential mobility between
skilled and unskilled workers constitutes a third channel that tends to flatten the
gradient of changes in skill premia and offset the channels described above.
Apart from capital-skill complementarity, the two other channels work through
reallocation of workers across regions or sectors. I provide evidence of the realloca-
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tion pattern predicted by these channels in Figure (3.7). Panel (a) plots the changes
in a city’s GDP against its distance to port and shows that coastal cities expand
after trade at the expense of interior cities, due to the movements of workers from
the interior to the coast. Panel (b) plots each city’s skill share in local employment.
Consistent with the prediction from the differential mobility channel, skill shares
increase in the coast, and decrease in the hinterland. Finally, Panel (c) plots the
share of urban value added in each city. As predicted by the “Domestic Stolper-
Samuelson Effect”, the share of urban value added in local economies increases on
the coast and decreases in the hinterland.
To illustrate the quantitative importance of these channels, I conduct a se-
quence of counterfactual exercises and plot the changes in skill premia in these ex-
periments in Figure (3.8).41 “Benchmark” refers to the previous experiment. “Case
1” increases skilled workers’ migration costs to the level of unskilled workers; expe-
riment “Case 2” further shuts down capital skill complementarity by setting both
the elasticity between capital and skilled worker and the elasticity between equipped
and unskilled worker to 1.1, the estimates of Dix-Carneiro (2014) using a symmetric
CES specification. In both cases, I compute the open economy and autarky equi-
libria and calculate the changes in wages and welfare as the country opens up to
trade.
In Figure (3.8), when migration costs are the same for skilled and unskilled
workers, the gradient for the changes in skill premia with respect to distance to
41For ease of comparison, I plot only the fitted value from a weighted least squares regression of
changes in skill premia on regions’ distances to port.
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Figure 3.8: Changes in the Skill Premium
Notes: Each line is the fitted value from the weighted (by city size)
least squares regression of changes in skill premia on the log of
cities’ distances to coast. Case 1: equal migration costs for both
types of workers. Case 2: equal migration costs and no capital-skill
complementarity.
the nearest port becomes steeper. The coastal regions now experience around 15%
increases in skill premia, 5% points higher than in the benchmark experiment, and
the interior regions experience roughly 5% decreases in skill premia. When I further
shut down capital-skill complementarity, while there is still a mild gradient, the
fitted line shifts downward, and becomes flatter, as expected. Globalization now
increases within-region inequality more evenly across regions.
These experiments suggest that the various channels related to internal geo-
graphy are all quantitatively important for both the geographic dimension, and the
skill dimension of the distributional impacts of trade. In particular, the “Domestic
Stolper-Samuelson Effect” is unexplored previously. Operating through changes in
domestic specialization patterns, this channel has important implications for mea-
suring regional trade exposures: since the interior regions in the country trade little
with the ROW, most conventional measures of trade exposure will overlook these
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regions’ exposures. However, because of international trade liberalization, the eco-
nomic environment of these regions change dramatically. It is therefore important
to take into account not only regions’ international trade participation but also their
trade with domestic partners, in measuring the regional impacts of trade.
3.6.2 Trade Liberalization Under Alternative Internal Geographies
In this section, I perform four additional experiments to examine how the
distributional impacts of international trade differ in economies with different in-
ternal frictions. This question bears policy significance, as many countries that
have recently experienced trade reforms are also liberalizing their domestic labor
markets, or constructing transportation infrastructures aimed at lowering domestic
trade costs.
In all four experiments, I solve the model for its open-economy equilibrium,
in which international trade costs are set at the calibrated values, and the autarky
equilibrium, in which international trade is shut down. Across these experiments
the model economies differ in its intra-national frictions, which capture hypothetical
reforms. In the first experiment, the provincial “border effect” in China’s domestic
trade—the trade costs associated with crossing a provincial border per se—is set to
the U.S. level, estimated in the literature. In addition to domestic protectionism
that might be at play in China, the domestic “border effect” might also capture
geographic frictions that are not easily measured. Therefore rather than completely
eliminating this effect, setting it to the U.S. level appears more reasonable.
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In the second and third experiments, I eliminate the migration frictions arising
from the Hukou policy for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. In the fourth
experiment, I combine all changes in the first three experiments.
The Hukou system affects many aspects of migration. In particular, its im-
portance differ by city. Measuring the heterogenous effect of Hukou across cities is
beyond the scope of this paper. As a starting point, I assume that the empirical
estimate in the third section reflects the effect of Hukou on migration costs. Speci-
fically, the empirical result suggests that each additional point of the Hukou reform
index increases gross migration into a city by around 20%. Liberalizing all cities
from the average degree of Hukou restriction in 2000 to complete openness, a score
of 6 in my database, implies a 5-point change. According to this estimate, this me-
ans doubling the gross migrant inflow into a city.42 Based on the model structure, I
back out the corresponding average migration cost change corresponding to a 100%
increase in inward migration, and use this in the experiments. In the appendix, I
report the sources and values of the geographic parameters for the U.S. economy,
and the way I back out the change in migration costs from the estimated effect of
Hukou reform.
Table (3.11) reports the results of these experiments. The first column is the
benchmark experiment. The second column is the experiment with lower intra-
national trade costs. Panel (A) reports summary statistics for welfare impacts by
worker group, while Panel (B) reports aggregate outcomes. Compared with the ben-
42Obviously, when all cities implement the reform simultaneously, not all of them will experience
a net increase in inward migration. But the gross migration could still increase.
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chmark experiment, there are two major differences. First, with smaller domestic
trade costs, the effect of international trade on inequality is smaller. The standard
deviations of the welfare impact of trade for all worker groups decrease by about
50%. Measured the by Theil index, the trade-driven inequality increase shrinks by
more than half. The shrinkage is mostly due to a smaller between-region inequality
component. Intuitively, smaller domestic trade costs allow the impact of internatio-
nal trade to be spread more evenly across geographic regions. The second finding is
somewhat surprising: with lower domestic trade costs, the overall gains from trade
are smaller for all worker groups, and the country as a whole trades less intensively
with the rest of the world. This result stands in contrast to the empirical findings
(see, for example, Coşar and Demir, 2016) that better domestic infrastructures in-
crease regional exports. Two reasons explains why the aggregate effects are different
from the empirically identified effects: first, with lower domestic frictions, the coas-
tal regions now trade more with the interior and less with the ROW; second, as the
interior regions become better connected, they are more attractive as destinations,
so more workers stay or migrate there. The size of the coastal regions—the regi-
ons that originally trade more intensively with the ROW—shrink. Therefore, the
country’s aggregate international trade decreases.
In the third and fourth columns, I report the experiments in which the Hukou
system is abolished, for skilled and unskilled workers, separately. In both cases, the
increase in the Theil index due to trade is smaller than in the benchmark economy.
When the Hukou constraint is abolished, more workers are able to respond to the
international trade liberalization by migrating to the coast. If more skilled workers
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Table 3.11: Trade and Inequality: Different Domestic Frictions
A. Statistics by Worker Category
Benchmark (2) TC (3) SMC (4) UMC (2)+(3)+(4)
Mean std Mean std Mean std Mean std Mean std
Urban Skilled 11.48 11.29 9.01 5.78 11.57 8.06 12.03 10.71 7.22 3.97
Urban Unskilled 5.19 8.43 4.49 3.86 7.67 8.77 7.15 10.58 4.32 3.24
Rural Skilled 11.02 10.78 8.81 5.22 11.53 8.42 12.09 10.65 7.40 3.08
Rural Unskilled 4.98 8.31 3.79 3.39 6.64 9.06 6.39 7.58 4.04 3.93
B: Aggregate Statistics
Benchmark (2) TC (3) SMC (4) UMC (2)+(3)+(4)
National Average 7.61 4.95 7.78 7.66 4.76
Trade Openness 60.13 41.18 57.89 55.63 37.35
Increase in Inequality 8.15% 3.50% 5.29% 6.15% 2.00%
Contribution-Between 63.54% 36.32% 73.00% 54.18% 23.45%
Contribution-Within 36.46% 63.68% 27.16% 45.82% 76.55%
Notes: This table reports the effects of trade on welfare and inequality in economies with different internal geographies.
All numbers are in percentage points. The first column, Benchmark, is the same as the experiment reported in Table
(3.10); TC refers to the case with lower domestic trade costs; SMC refers to the case with lower skilled migration
costs; UMC refers to the case with lower unskilled migration costs; the final column combines the reductions to trade
costs, skilled migration costs, and unskilled migration costs. Panel A reports the means and standard deviations of
city-level welfare gains from trade for different worker groups. Panel B reports national average welfare gains, changes
in inequality after trade, and the compositions of the changes in inequality. The measures for average gains from trade
and inequality are the same as in Table (3.10). Trade openness is defined as the sum of imports and exports over
GDP.
migrate, the increase in the skill premium in the coast will be smaller. Conversely,
if more unskilled workers migrate, the skill premium in the coast will be even hig-
her. Since the increase in the skill premium in the coast is the main source of the
increase in the with-in region inequality component, the above discussion implies
that if Hukou is abolished only for skilled (unskilled) workers, the within-region
component will be less (more) important than in the benchmark case. This impli-
cation is consistent with the decomposition of inequality changes in Columns three
and four of Table 3.11. In both cases, the gains from trade are slightly higher than
the benchmark case, despite the fact that the economy trade less. So liberalizing
domestic labor market through Hukou reforms can not only help with inequality,
but also amplify the gains from trade.
The last column in Table 3.11 reports the result from the experiment in which
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reductions in trade and migration costs are combined. In this scenario, the Theil
index increases by 2%, only a quarter of the benchmark case, and lower than all
previous experiments. Reforms in goods and labor markets are complements in
distributing the gains from trade more evenly. On the flip side, the aggregate gains
from trade also decrease, and are even lower than the case with reduced domestic
trade costs (the second column). With lower migration costs, more workers are
attracted to the interior China as a response to the reduction in domestic trade
costs. This decreases the country’s participation in international trade, and reduces
the welfare gains from trade.
In summary, the experiments in this section show that, reducing the domestic
“border effect” and abolishing the Hukou system can both help the gains from trade
to be spread more evenly across the country. Importantly, these reforms ensures al-
most everyone benefits through international trade liberalization in China (unskilled
workers from one region still lose in the case of domestic trade reform, and all wor-
kers benefit in all other cases). Therefore these reforms offer an alternative way
to place-based transfers to make international trade liberalization a Pareto impro-
vement for China. On the other hand, these reforms also can have different effects
on aggregate trade and the gains from trade. This result calls for a quantitative
approach to evaluate the effect of domestic reform on international trade.
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3.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
This section reports the sensitivity analysis of the results to the parameters
that are calibrated outside the model. Since the choice of these parameters affect
the equilibrium distribution of wage, for each new parameters, I recalibrate regio-
nal productivity to match the 2005 equilibrium, and then solve the corresponding
autarky equilibrium for the welfare effects of international trade.43
Table 3.12: Sensitivity Analysis
Parameters Openness Average Gain Inequality Increase Contribution (%)
Between Within
Benchmark 60.13 7.61 8.15 63.54 36.46
ρkh = 0.67, ρlkh = 1.1 60.14 7.83 7.48 67.70 32.30
ρkh = 1.1, ρlkh = 1.67 60.29 7.69 6.56 69.94 30.06
ρkh = 1.1, ρlkh = 1.1 60.28 8.01 5.12 78.11 21.89
ρ = 0.2 : R2 = 0.6 58.34 7.09 9.52 66.39 33.61
ρ = 0.55 : R2 = 0.8 60.45 7.78 7.17 61.49 38.51
θ = 4.5 46.57 4.89 6.72 64.03 35.97
θ = 5 35.81 3.16 5.43 63.36 36.64
Notes: This table reports the effects of trade on welfare and inequality under alternative parameterizations. All
numbers are in percentage points. Measures for average gains from trade and inequality are the same as in Table
(3.10). Trade openness is defined as the sum of imports and exports over GDP.
The elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled workers, ρkh, and the
elasticity between equipped skilled workers and unskilled workers, ρlkh, are impor-
tant parameters in the model. For robustness, I first reduce ρlkh, to 1.1, implying
that the upper nest is close to the Cobb-Douglas production function. I then in-
crease ρkh to 1.1, keeping ρlkh at the benchmark level. Finally, I treat capital,
skilled workers and unskilled workers as symmetric input into composite labor pro-
duction by setting both ρlkh and ρkh, to 1.1. Rows (2)–(4) in Table (3.12) report
43This is different from the previously reported experiments in which we change only the exoge-
nous parameters, without calibrating the economy to the 2005 equilibrium again. There, the goal
was to understand the impacts of trade, in an otherwise similar economy with different structural
parameters, so I kept regional productivity at the calibrated level.
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the findings. As we can see, the aggregate gains from trade remain similar, while
the changes in aggregate inequality and the contributions from the within-region
component become smaller, as expected.
In the previous analysis, I calibrate the correlation between an individual’s
productivity draws across regions, ρ, to 0.4, to match the explanatory power of
individual fixed effects in panel wage regression: individual fixed effects explain
70% of the remaining variation in wages, after controlling for regional fixed effects
and individual demographics. I perform the policy experiment again, for ρ = 0.2
and ρ = 0.55, corresponding to an explanation power of 60% and 80%. Rows (5)
and (6) in Table (3.12) report the findings. The results do not change much.
Finally, I increase the elasticity of trade, θ, from 4 to 4.4 and 5, and conduct the
same exercise. The last two rows in Table (3.12) reports the results. When trade
is more elastic, the country, in particular the coastal regions, benefits less from
trade liberalization. Because of this, fewer people will migrate to the coast, further
reducing the country’s trade with the ROW. The increases in overall inequality are
also smaller in these two cases.
Overall, the experiments suggests that the conclusions of the chapter are robust
to alternative parameter values.
3.6.4 Discussion of Modeling Assumptions
In modeling the economy, I make several assumptions. In this section, I discuss
how the violations of these assumptions would affect the main results.
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In terms of the timing of migration, I assume that workers learn their idiosyn-
cratic productivity draws in all regions prior to their move. Admittedly, in reality,
there is substantial uncertainty about the payoffs to migration, which can be infer-
red from the fact that many migrants return to their birthplaces shortly after their
migration (Kennan and Walker, 2011). In the empirical analysis, I classify workers
as migrants if they are currently not in their birthplaces. Some of them might be
temporary migrants who will shortly return to their hometowns. However, these
migrants are unlikely to constitute an important part of the total migrants: even
if 50% of migrants are temporary workers who return to their hometowns within
two months, over a period of twenty years, the stock of migrants in each place will
mostly be the permanent ones. My estimates of the migration costs, then, corre-
spond to the long-run migration costs, which could be interpreted as reduced-form
approximations of the real migration costs when there is uncertainty.
I use the Frechet distribution to model individuals’ productivity draws. This
distribution is a reasonable approximation of the wage distribution. In particular,
it has a fat right tail. Most existing work in the migration literature makes similar
parametric assumptions, using Logit or Pareto distributions. Instead of treating
idiosyncratic migration decisions as outcomes of idiosyncratic individual preference
shocks, an approach commonly adopted in migration literature, I assume they are
driven by idiosyncratic productivity shocks, as in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). The advan-
tage of this approach is that, while individual preference is unobservable, parameters
governing productivity shocks can be inferred directly from the wage distribution.
The Frechet distribution is particularly attractive because under this assumption,
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we have tractable expressions to aggregate supply of efficiency units in each re-
gion. However, all the channels discussed in the chapter would apply under other
distributional assumptions.
Since China’s economy is growing quickly, and my model is static, one might
worry that this discrepancy will make my results less useful. In analyzing the po-
tential problems, it is important to be clear what dynamics one has in mind. First
of all, the demographic structures are changing over time. My framework is general
enough to incorporate multiple age groups, but I abstract from this mainly because
of the limited sample size. Hence, my estimates could be interpreted as average mi-
gration costs across different age groups. If we want to simulate how the economy
would evolve in the long run for a future policy change, it would be problematic be-
cause the future demography is different. However, the counterfactual experiments
are backward looking; the counterfactuals aim to analyze the implications of China’s
past trade integration on welfare, when there are different magnitudes of internal
frictions. Hence, the changing demography will not invalidate the results.
Another potential threat is that in 2005, the domestic labor markets are not
yet in equilibrium; that is, there is potential migration that has not been realized.
The existence of those workers will result in overestimating regional fixed effects
for the regions experiencing migration outflows, and given the observed wages, this
will in turn be reflected in overestimated amenities in these regions; similarly, I will
under-estimate the amenities in popular migration destinations. In quantification,
I find large dispersion in amenities, and if this argument is true, the real dispersion
will be larger. In counterfactual experiments, however, since I keep the amenities
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fixed, the biases in the measured amenities will not affect the relative changes in
the variables of interest, between trade and autarky equilibrium.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter studies the aggregate and distributional impacts of trade on an
economy with internal trade costs and migration costs. Focusing on China, I find
that relative to the aggregate welfare gains, the distributional impacts of trade are
large: the average welfare gain is about 7%, and the increase in overall inequality,
as measured by the Theil index, is around 8%. Both the between-region inequality
among workers with similar skill levels, and the within-region inequality between
workers with different skill levels, contribute significantly to the increase in overall
inequality. Reforms in domestic markets for factors or goods increase the internal in-
tegration of the country and reduce the effects of international trade on inter-regional
inequality, but also reduce the welfare gains from international trade integration.
The impacts of trade on skill premia are not even across regions. Counter-
factual experiments show that differential mobility between skilled and unskilled
workers and changes in the specialization pattern of regions within the economy are
important for the change in the gradient of skill premia. As neither of these forces
arises in a model without frictional domestic trade or migration, it is important to
take into account the role of internal geography, even when the interest is in the
impacts of trade on the skill premium.
This chapter abstracts from some interesting and important aspects of the
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real world that could affect the impacts of international trade liberalization. For
example, regional agglomeration effects might amplify both the distributional and
the aggregate impact. Both agglomeration and dynamic effects are potentially im-
portant features to incorporate into future research.
As an independent contribution, this chapter constructs the first panel data
of city-level Hukou reforms in China. Using this database, I show that Hukou
reforms have a large impact on workers’ mobility, and the potential to shape China’s
responses to international trade. The database could be of use to other researchers
interested in the Chinese economy.
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Appendix A: Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Theory
A.1.1 Lemma 1
Proof Country index i is omitted in this proof. Consider two R&D centers
characterized by management scores (zP1 , zR1 ), and (zP2 , zR2 ), with zR2 > zR1 . Let
T : ZP ×ZR → Θ be the mapping from the type of an R&D center to the type(s)
of researchers it recruits. Let θ1 = T (zP1 , zR1 ), θ2 = T (zR2 , zP2 ), so the first R&D
center recruits θ1 and the second θ2.
I prove by contradiction that θ1 <= θ2. Suppose θ1 > θ2, given that (zP1 , zR1 )
hires θ1, it must be the case that it at least weakly prefer researchers with talent θ1
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where the first inequality is from Equation A.1, and the second from Assumption 1.
The above contradiction suggests that θ1 ≤ θ2, and that T (zP , zR) is weakly
increasing in zR. Now suppose θ1 = θ2, given the weak monotonicity of T , for
R&D centers with zR ∈ (zR1 , zR2 ), regardless of their production efficiency, will also
recruit θ1. Therefore in equilibrium, the demand for researchers with ability θ1 will
have a mass point, which contradicts with the assumption that talent distribution
in each country has no mass point. Therefore the equilibrium matching function,
T (zP , zR), will be strictly increasing in zR.
Now consider (zP1 , zR1 ) and (zP2 , zR1 ). If these two R&D centers hire different
types of researchers, θ1, and θ2, then from monotonicity, all researchers with ability
between θ1 and θ2 would be recruited by R&D centers with innovation efficiency zR1 .
The demand for researchers by R&D centers with this efficiency will be a positive
mass, which contradicts that the distribution of efficiency for R&D centers have no
mass point. Therefore Ti(zP , zR) is independent of zP .
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A.1.2 Lemma 2
Proof Country index i is omitted. To show that w(θ) is differentiable,
we consider an R&D center with innovation efficiency zR1 , which is matched to
T (zR1 ). Consider zR and θ = T (zR1 ). By the definition of T (zR1 ), R&D centers
with innovation efficiency zR1 prefers researchers with ability θ instead of those with
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2 , θ+ dθ)
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From these two equations, we have:
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Proof Country index i is omitted. Consider two talent distributions H(θ)
and H̃(θ), with H̃(θ) more talent abundant than H(θ) according to Definition 1,
and ˜h(θ) and h(θ) being the corresponding PDFs. I use tilde to denote variable
under H̃(θ). I first show that T̃ (zR) ≥ T (zR), i.e., firms are matched with more
talented researchers under H̃(θ) than under H(θ).
I prove by contradiction. From the definition of talent abundance, T̃ (zR) =
θ̃ > T (zR) = θ, and T̃ (zR) = θ̃ > T (zR) = θ. Suppose for zR ∈ (zR, zR),
T̃ (zR) < T (zR), then there must be zR1 < zR and zR2 > zR, so that T̃ crosses
T from above at zR1 , and crosses it again from below at zR2 . In zR ∈ (zR1 , zR2 ),
T̃ (zR) < T (zR).













































Note that π(zP ) depend on the talent distribution because the latter determines ge-
neral equilibrium outcomes, such as X and P . However, if one of the two additional



















1−γ gP (zP |zR1 )dzP
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1−γ , so the above inequality
cannot hold. Thus we have proved that T̃ ≥ T ,∀zR ∈ (zR, zR).
Let y(zP , zR) and ỹ(zP , zR) denote the number of varieties an R&D center
with efficiency (zP , zR) develops when the talent distribution is H(θ) and H̃(θ),
respectively. Now consider the output difference between R&D centers with zR1 <
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= log( ỹ(zP , z
R
1 )
ỹ(zP , zR2 )
),
where the inequality uses the definition of log-supermodularity and the above con-
clusion that T̃ (zR) ≥ T (zR).
A.1.4 Proposition 3
Proof To derive the gains from openness under Assumption 3, I proceed





, in terms of measurable flows and total number of domestically invented
varieties. The second step is to derive the relationship between production wage
and total expenditure, Xi
wPi
in order to obtain XiPi , the real income of a country. In
the final step, I use XiPi to derive the gains from openness.





. The key step is to derive the total measure of varieties in each










Under the assumption of zero fixed marketing cost, the per-variety variable













The total innovation output by an R&D center with (zP , zR) is therefore:
yi(z




































The measure of varieties invented in country i that can be produced with zP is
mi(z

























































From Equation A.2, the productivity distribution for varieties developed in
country i follows a Pareto distribution, with minimum ziP and dispersion parameter
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γ(σ−1)
1−γ − κP . Given the measure of new varieties, Mi, the offshore production and
trade block of the model corresponds to the model in Arkolakis et al. (2014) with









Then λEid denotes the share of consumption expenditure in country d that are spent
on goods invented in country i, and λTld denotes the share of consumption in country
d that are imported from country l.
Given that the total measure of varieties developed in country i is Mi, and
that their productivity distribution is Pareto, the ideal price index in country d is
given by:
P 1−σd = Γ(

























































































































































































































































































































Step 2: Relating consumption to wage: In the second step, I derive
the ratio between production wage and expenditures, XdPd . I start with the market





























The first term on the right hand side is total demand for production workers from
production, while the second term on the right hand side is demand from the over-
head of R&D centers. The second line uses the fact that GEo (z̃R) follows Pareto
distribution. The goal here is to express the second term in the right hand side in
the form of aggregate flow variables.













P , zR)πPi (zP )g(zP )dzP
























































Therefore the cutoff innovation efficiency level for a firm from o to open R&D center





















































so the overhead cost is a fixed share, (1−γ)κR−1γκR , of total R&D expenditure by foreign
firms. Noting that this ratio holds true for offshore R&D center from all other
countries, except for the home country because they do not incur additional fixed
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where Md is the measure of varieties innovated in country d in the benchmark
equilibrium, while M ′d is the measure of output invented under the counterfactual
autarky equilibrium.
Step 3: deriving relative change in measure of varieties: The final step
is to express Md
M ′d
in terms of observable flows. To do this, we first derive wd, the
wage for the bottom researcher in country d. Notice that under the multiplicative
assumption, wage schedule is wi(θ) = wiθ
β
γ , and the optimal demand for researcher








In this case, the wage schedule can be interpreted as each unit of researcher
efficiency, defined as θ
β
γ , is paid a unit of wage, wi. Therefore the payment to a
researcher whose ability is 2θ
β




















which states that for an R&D center (zP , zR), each unit of innovation management
efficiency, zR
1




1−γ unit of researcher efficiency

















































































As this expression makes clear, under the multiplicative assumption of f(zR, θ),
the aggregate innovation output is a Cobb-Douglas function of total stock of in-
novation efficiency stock, and researcher talent stock in an economy. This expres-
sion also implies that in the absence of immigration, the ratio between the me-






















)1−γ , where the denominator is the stock of innovation
efficiency units in autarky equilibrium when offshore R&D is not possible.
Recall that each unit of zR
1
1−γ is matched with γwi
1
1−γ units of researcher
efficiency units. Since the draw of zP is independent of zR, the share of researcher
efficiency units recruited by foreign R&D centers in the open economy is proportional





















































































which is equivalent to Equation 1.17 in Section 2.
A.2 Quantification
This section provides additional information on the quantification section of
the first chapter.
A.2.1 Data
I use the OECD harmonized USPTO data to construct the bilateral offshore
R&D measure. Specifically, for each country, the OECD counts the number of
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USPTO patents invented in that country that are assigned to firms from other
countries. The data is up to country pair level, so we know, for example, the
number of patents invented by individuals residing in Germany, but are assigned to
firms located in the U.S. I use this data set to measure the share of R&D performed
within the border of a host country by firms from each foreign country. Based on
this measure, the first column in Table A.1 reports combined share of offshore R&D
by foreign firms in total R&D in each host country.
One important drawback of using patent data is that, it might be biased due
to differential selection into patenting across countries. For example, if only firms
selling to the U.S. patent at USPTO, then the measure of offshore R&D will be
biased towards these firms. I present two pieces of evidence to show this selection
is not important in the context of this paper.
Figure A.1: The Comparison of Two Measure
Notes: The figure plots measure of offshore R&D based on R&D expenditure against the measure based on patenting
from the OECD harmonized USPTO data, averaged over 1998-2007. Redline indicates perfect correlation.
First, in Figure A.1, I compare the patent-based measure of offshore R&D
to the expenditure-based measure, to show that such selection is unlikely to be
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Table A.1: Country Characteristics
Innovation Mgt. Dist. Talent Dist.
ISO Offshore R&D Mean Std. Skewness Imputed Mean Top Share Basic Share
AUS 27.09 6.43 3.64 1.88 5.09 11.241 93.84
AUT 50.41 6.14 3.80 2.49 Yes 5.09 9.7359 93.106
BEL 57.25 6.20 3.85 2.48 Yes 5.04 9.3775 93.129
BRA 37.29 5.26 3.33 2.35 3.64 1.087 33.846
CAN 33.73 8.40 6.09 2.01 5.04 8.3302 94.843
CHN 52.24 5.94 2.74 1.85 4.94 8.3393 93.478
DEU 23.99 8.21 5.25 2.20 4.96 8.1654 92.694
DNK 33.69 6.87 5.00 2.67 Yes 4.96 8.7538 88.78
ESP 43.23 5.29 3.46 2.21 4.83 7.9337 85.88
FIN 18.22 7.00 5.10 2.67 Yes 5.13 12.386 95.775
FRA 33.97 6.43 4.25 2.52 5.04 8.4914 92.621
GBR 45.88 7.33 4.84 2.06 4.95 8.7857 92.885
GRC 58.26 5.63 3.70 1.89 4.61 4.2429 79.772
IND 58.03 5.93 5.00 3.02 4.28 1.2742 92.188
IRL 55.46 7.14 6.73 3.86 4.99 9.4048 91.371
ITA 29.70 6.47 4.15 2.17 4.76 5.4455 87.543
JPN 5.33 7.83 5.57 1.82 5.31 16.758 96.669
KOR 5.05 6.76 4.05 1.88 Yes 5.34 17.835 96.159
MEX 49.42 6.90 4.43 1.66 4.00 0.88366 48.933
NLD 34.82 6.56 4.14 2.46 Yes 5.12 9.1594 96.536
POL 60.79 7.25 4.60 1.73 4.85 9.8585 83.764
PRT 50.24 5.38 2.99 1.94 4.56 3.1628 80.269
SWE 27.25 7.06 4.17 1.99 5.01 8.7552 93.943
TUR 51.82 5.86 2.58 2.09 4.13 3.9199 58.233
USA 8.08 10.94 8.15 2.15 4.90 7.3299 91.824
Notes:“Offshore R&D” refers to the share (%) of patents invented in a country but owned
by firms from foreign countries, based on the USPTO data. “Innovation Mgt. Dist.” refers
to the sample distribution statistics constructed from the World Management Survey as
described in text. “Imputed” indicates whether the innovation management distribution
statistics are imputed. “Talent” refers talent distribution statistics from Hanushek and
Woessmann (2012), in which “Mean” is the mean score for a country, and “Top Share” and
”Basic Share” are share of students achieving ”top” and ”basic” performance, respectively.
The performance standards are common across countries.
200
Table A.2: Correlation Between Various Measures of Offshore R&D
Full Sample
R&D USPTO EPO PCT
R&D 1.00
USPTO 0.37 1.00
EPO 0.42 0.89 1.00
PCT 0.57 0.88 0.93 1.00
Excluding Three Outliers
R&D USPTO EPO PCT
R&D 1.00
USPTO 0.72 1.00
EPO 0.67 0.90 1.00
PCT 0.76 0.93 0.93 1.00
Notes: The upper panel presents correlations bet-
ween four measures of the share of R&D activities
done by foreign firms in a host country. The four
measures are based on R&D expenditures, and
patenting data from three patent offices: USPTO,
EPO, and PCT. The lower panel present the cor-
relation excluding three outlier countries: Latvia,
Bulgaria, and Turkey.
important in the context of offshore R&D. As the figure indicates, other than three
outliers, Latvia, Turkey, and Bulgaria, the two measures line up closely.
Second, if differential selection in patenting in the U.S. due to product market
consideration is important, one should expect the same measure based on the Eu-
ropean Patent Office (EPO) and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patents to
give different results. The upper panel in Table A.2 presents the correlation matrix
of the four measures. As the table indicates, the three patent-based measures are
close to each other, and they are all different from the expenditure-based measure.
However, the discrepancies are mainly driven by the three outliers, Latvia, Turkey,
and Bulgaria. Once the three outliers are excluded, as the lower panel in Table A.2
shows, all patent-based measures are strongly correlated with the expenditure-based
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measure.
The calibration uses the World Management Survey (Bloom et al., 2012) and
an internationally comparable cognitive ability score database (Hanushek and Woes-
smann, 2012). I compute the mean, standard deviation, and skewness of innovation
management efficiency distribution in each country, by computing the corresponding
statistics of the exponent of firm-level talent management scores for each country.
I take exponent so that the distribution of scores has a right tail that resembles
the firm size distribution. The distribution statistics for cognitive test scores are di-
rectly from Hanushek and Woessmann (2012). These statistics include the average
cognitive score for high school students in a country, the share of students that
achieve “top” performance, and the share of student that achieve “basic” perfor-
mance. Thresholds for “top” and “basic” performance are defined in absolute level
so the shares are comparable internationally. These statistics are reported in Table
A.1.
A few countries in the sample are not included in the world management sur-
vey. I impute their management distribution statistics by regressing each statistics
on income, R&D share, and geographic-region fixed effects, where geographic re-
gions are at sub-continent level. The R2 of these regressions are all above 0.85.
In general, geographic-region dummies have biggest explanatory power. Table A.1
indicates which countries have imputed management scores.
The model economy consists of the 25 countries reported in the table, and
a statistical aggregation of another 23 countries: Argentina, Belarus, Switzerland,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Croatia, Iran, Islamic Rep, Israel, Leba-
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non, Malaysia, Norway, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, El Salvador, Thai-
land, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Africa. The main constraint in modelling
these countries explicitly is the availability of World Management Survey and the
World Input-Output Database. In calibrating the distributions for this “country”,
I use the same imputation method as described above when World Management
Survey is not available, and then use country population as weights to compute the
average distribution statistics.
A.2.2 Calibration
A.2.2.1 Relating Production Efficiency to Innovation Efficiency
To discipline the relationship between firms’ innovation and production mana-
gement efficiencies, I use micro data from the World Management Survey to estimate
the following equation:
Prob(zP ∈ H|zR) = exp(A+B × z
R)
1 + exp(A+B × zR) . (A.10)
This data base covers around 11000 firms from 34 countries. I classify a firm as
being a H type, if its production management scores falls in the top 1% in the
sample. Because in calibration, I assume the management score in the model, zR, is
exponent of the management score in the data, in this estimation, I transform the
innovation score accordingly. Table A.3 presents summary statistics on innovation
management score, defined this way, and the indicator for H type.
203
Table A.3: Firm Management Score Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
zR 11338 6.68 4.92 1 54.6
IzP∈GPH
11340 0.0109 0.104 0 1
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics
for firm-level innovation management score and
the indicator for whether a firm is in the top 1%
production efficiency.









Notes: This table presents re-
sults from a Logit regression of the
high production efficiency indicator
IzP∈GPH
, on firms’ innovation effi-
ciency, zR. The high production ef-
ficiency indicator takes a value of 1 if
the production management score of
a firm is in the top 1% in the world.
Standard errors are in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A.4 presents result from Logit estimation of Equation A.10, using the full
sample. Consistent with positive correlation between innovation and management
efficiency, the estimate for A is positive and statistically significant.
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A.2.2.2 Estimating the Matching Function
In calibration, I use a nonparametric patching function to determine the value
for the complementarity parameter. I estimate this matching function based on
Panel B of Table 2.4. The measure for firm innovation efficiency and inventor talent
is the same as in the regression. I estimate a local linear regression of inventor talent
on firm innovation efficiency, focusing on the job-switching inventors. I control for
the fixed effects for year and patent category, as well as firm and inventor age,
defined as years since firs time the firm/inventor appears in the USPTO database.
A.2.2.3 Model Fit: Additional Figures
In assessing the model fit, I construct a measure of foreign affiliates’ mana-
gerial advantage. The measure I use is the ratio between the average innovation
management score of foreign affiliates in each country, and the average score of do-
mestic firms in that country. Figure A.2 plots this ratio to its data counterpart
for each country. The figure shows that, consistent with the summary statistics in
Table 1.2, there is a positive relationship between the model and the data, although
the model over predicts the premium.
A.2.2.4 Computational Algorithm
To solve the model and calibrate it to match the data, I use the following
calibration algorithm:
1. Choose cM , cR, zRH , α, κP .
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Figure A.2: Foreign Affiliate Managerial Advantage
Notes: The vertical axis shows the model-based foreign affiliate innovation managerial advantage, defined as the
ratio between the average innovation management score of foreign affiliates in each country and the average score
of domestic firms. The horizontal axis shows the empirical counterpart of this ratio, based on the data from Bloom
et al. (2012). The correlation between the model and the data is 0.53.
2. Choose {Λl}, country-specific production efficiency.
3. Choose {φRoi}, {φPil}, {τld}, bilateral frictions.
4. Solve the model, compare the model-predicted bilateral shares in offshore
R&D, offshore production, and trade, to the data. If they are not the same,
go back to Step 3, and update international frictions accordingly. Otherwise
proceed to the next step.
5. Compare the model-generated GDP with the data. If they are not the same,
go back to step 2, and update country-level productivity accordingly.
6. Compute the moments on the firm size distribution, and the extensive margin
of offshore R&D and trade, reported in Table 1.2. Compare these moments
to their data counterparts. If these moments are not the same with the data,
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go back to Step 2. If they are the same, then the calibration procedure is
finished.
I solve the model in step 4 of this calibration procedure, using the following
algorithm. I start with a guess of aggregate variables {Xi}, {Pi}, {wPi }, cutoffs for
workers to become researchers, {θ̂i}, and cutoffs for offshore R&D, {ẑRoi}. Given
the aggregate variables, I solve for the cutoffs to export for each producer-consumer
country pairs, {ẑPld}, and the corresponding per-variety profit, {πPi (zP )}. I then use
{ẑRoi} to solve for the measure and efficiency distribution of R&D centers in each
country. With this information, I solve the researcher labor market equilibrium in
each country, finding the researcher wage schedule, wi(θ) and the matching function
Ti(zR), which further allows me to solve for the number of varieties in each country,
and the productivity for these varieties. The offshore and trade block of the model
then determines {Xild}. Based on {Xild}, I distribute all revenues from sales to the
production workers, researchers, and firm owners from different countries.
I then update the guess {Xd} using the current account balance conditions,
{wd} using the production labor market clearing condition, and {Pd} using the
model-implied price indices (Equation 1.12). I also update the guess for occupation
choice and offshore R&D based using their respective indifference conditions. I
continue this process until the updated aggregate objects and the cutoffs are the
same as the input.
A crucial step in solving the model is to solve for the research market equili-
brium for each country, characterized by Equations 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8. This is compu-
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tationally difficult for two reasons. First, due to firms’ offshore R&D decisions, the
density of R&D center efficiency distribution is discontinuous. This discontinuity
leads to kinks in the matching function. Commonly used boundary value problem
solver take a long time or, under many parameter values, fail to find the solution.
Second, the density of R&D center efficiency distribution depends on the offshore
R&D decision of firms from all over the world. Evaluating the R&D density function
therefore requires summing over all home countries (Equation 1.10). Similarly, we
also need to evaluate πPi (zP ), which depends on aggregate variables of all countries.
The computational burden increases quadratically in the number of countries in the
economy.
I solve the first problem by using the “shooting” method, that is, to recast
the boundary value problem as a sequence of initial value problems. Specifically,
given a wage for the bottom researcher, wi(θ̂) = wi, Equations 1.6, 1.7 constitute
an initial value problem. This problem can be solved by simply forward integrating
the two Equations starting from the initial value of wage. I use the Runge-Kutta
Cash–Karp method in solving the initial value problems.
Let the solution to the initial problem be Ti(zR|wi). If Ti(zR|wi) = θi, then
the solution to the initial problem is also the solution to the original boundary
value problem. We can therefore search over the initial wage, wi(θ̂i) and solve a
sequence of initial value problems until we find the solution to the original problem.
Further, as shown in Proposition 4 at the end of this section, Ti(zR|wi) decreases
monotonically in wi. This feature of the model makes this search efficient and
robust.
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To further speed up the process, I use the model feature that given all the
aggregate variables, the research market equilibrium in each country is independent.
I use the OpenMP protocol to parallelize the computation. In solving for each
researcher market equilibrium, evaluating gRi (zR) and πPi (zP ) requires summing
over all home countries. I further parallelize this process by using SIMD.
In the following proposition, I prove the monotonicity of Ti(zR|wi) in wi:
Proposition 4 Define Ti(zR|w) and wi(θ|w) as the solution to the initial problem
given by Equations 1.7, 1.6, and initial conditions wi(θ̂i) = w, Ti(zR) = θi. Then
the end value of the solution to this initial problem, Ti(zRi |w), decreases in w.
Proof Consider two wages for the bottom researcher in country i, w1 < w2. This
proposition claims that Ti(zRi |w1) ≥ Ti(zRi |w2). I prove by contradiction.
Suppose Ti(zRi |w1) < Ti(zRi |w2). Given that w1 < w2, Equation 1.7 implies
that at T ′i (zR|w1) > T ′i (zRi |w2), that is, at least initially at zRi , when facing a lower
wage wi, R&D centers will hire a larger number of researchers. This means that
at an ε interval to the right of zRi , Ti(zR|w1) > Ti(zR|w2). Since Ti(zRi |w1) and
Ti(zRi |w2) are both continuous function of zR, for Ti(zRi |w1) ≤ Ti(zRi |w2) to hold,
there must be at a point z̃R, such that Ti(zR|w2) crosses Ti(zR|w1) at z̃R for the
first time from below. Suppose θ̃ = Ti(z̃R|w1) = Ti(z̃R|w2). From Equation 1.7,
wi(θ̃|w1) > wi(θ̃|w2).







dx. Under the log super-
modularity assumption of function f , the integrant on the right hand side increases
with zR. Because z̃R is the first point where the two matching functions intercept,
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for all θ ∈ (θ̂i, θ̃), T−1i (θ|w1) < T−1i (θ|w2). Therefore wi(θ̃|w1) < wi(θ̃|w2), which
contradicts the above result.
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Appendix B: Chapter 3 Appendix
This section provides additional theoretical and empirical materials on the
third chapter.
B.1 Theory Appendix

































































is the probability that
the draw from region d is zd and this draw dominates all other draws.
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B.1.2 Deriving Equation (3.11)









































It can be shown that, ∀d ∈ G, the cumulative distribution function of u for workers
































































) (Definition of Gamma function)
B.1.3 Deriving Equation (3.35)




= veozo, hence the distri-
bution of productivity draws for workers choosing to stay in o is:
1This is obtained by showing Fue
o,d



























which is also a Frechet distribution. For different regions, the productivity distri-
bution of stayers there have different means, but their dispersions will be the same.
Therefore, I regress stayers’ log wages on regional fixed effects to net out the different
average regional productivity draws and interpret the exponents of the residuals as
random draws from a Frechet distribution with dispersion parameter εe(1− ρ). The
coefficient of variations for this distribution is given by Equation (3.35).
B.1.4 Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is used in Section 3.2 of this appendix, in estimating migration
costs.
Proposition 5 Given migration costs {do,d}, there exists a unique set of {vd} (up
to normalization), such that the model-predicted number of workers employed in each






o is satisfied, where Led is the
number of workers working in d (data), leo is the number of workers born in o (data),
and πeo,d is the model-predicted probability of workers born in o to move to d.
Proof The proof follows Michaels et al. (2011) and Lemma 1, Lemma 2 in Ahlfeldt
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et al. (2015), so I only sketch the key steps here.


















. Given {do,d}, leo, and Led, the
only unknowns in this equation is {ved}. Let ve be the vector (ve1, ve2, ..., ved, ...).
Define WD(ve) (worker deficits) as






WD is simply the gap between the number of workers working in region d in the
data, and the number predicted by the model. WD(ve) is a function of ve. To
prove Proposition 1 we show the following:
1. WD(ve) is continuous;
2. WD(ve) is homogeneous of degree zero;
3. ∑d∈G WDd(ve) = 0,∀ve ∈ RG+
4. WD(ve) exhibits gross substitute property.
It is easy to verify that requirement (1) and (2) are satisfied. Requirement (3) can be
shown to be satisfied by noting that ∑d∈G πeo,d = 1; requirement (4) can be shown
to be satisfied by computing the derivatives directly.
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Requirements (1)–(2) guarantee the existence of a solution. The proof is a
constructive one: by homogeneous of degree zero, we can normalize ve to the
simplex {ve ∈ R+ :





, then f is a continuous function mapping the unit sim-
plex onto itself. The existence of a solution to v = f(v) then follows from the
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
Requirement (3)-(4) then guarantee the uniqueness of the solution, see Ahlfeldt
et al. (2015) for a more detailed explanation.
The implication of proposition 1 is that, given migration costs, we can solve
Equation (3.10) for the unique set of amenity-adjusted real wages for all locations.
B.2 Background Information and Data Appendix
B.2.1 Background Information on the Chinese Hukou System
The Hukou system, dating back to the 1950, is the household registration
system in China. It was originally established to control the rural-urban migration
in China. Back then, residents in cities were subsidized with downward-distorted
prices for agricultural products, so there was a strong incentive for people to live in
cities. There are two types of Hukous, one for rural residents, the other for urban
residents, in each city.2 Before the 1980’s, people were tied to where their Hukous
were and were not allowed to move to any other places without permission from
the authority. As a result, there were only minimum rural-urban or urban-urban
2Therefore an urban Hukou in Beijing is different from either an urban Hukou in Shanghai or
a rural Hukou in Beijing
216
migrant workers.
Although people are free to travel now, the Hukou system is still important for
many aspects of life, as it determines the eligibility for health care, social insurance,
housing, and education, etc. In many aspects, it acts like within country visa system,
distorting the free mobility of labor.3 Therefore, a policy change that makes it easier
for migrants to obtain local Hukou still makes a material difference for their quality
of life.
I construct the database for Hukou reforms following the approach by Sun et
al. (2011) and Kinnan et al. (2015). The primary source of information I rely on
is one of the most comprehensive online law libraries, Peking University Law Infor-
mation Database (http://www.pkulaw.cn/), and the webpage of the official news
agency for the communist party (http://www.xinhuanet.com/). On these two da-
tabases, I search for the following keywords: first, any combinations of “hukou” or
“huji”(also means Hukou) with “gaige” (reform) or “guanli” (management), which
are the keywords used in Kinnan et al. (2015). I supplement these keywords with the
following words: “chengzhenhua”/“chengshihua” (both mean urbanization) and “lu-
ohu”/“ruhu” (both mean granting Hukou to someone). These additional keywords
expand the number of policy changes recorded by around 40%.
I read the news articles and law documents about the Hukou policy from the
keyword search, and rate them on a scale of 0–6. A 0 means a strict control on
Hukou, with virtually no room for mechanical growth (new Hukou due to migra-
3See the May 6th, 2010 issue of the magazine The Economist, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16058750, for more information about the Hukou system in
China.
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tion), while a 6 means an open-door policy that grants Hukou to anyone with legal
residence and a job in a city. The rating is done in the following way. First, I
separate a policy in terms of its geographic coverage within a city. Some policies
apply only to outside the central district of a city, while others apply to the central
district as well, so I rate policies on two sub scores based on their influence on the
central districts and other parts of a city separately. Each sub score takes a score of
0–3. The reform index will be the sum of two sub scores, so it takes a value of 0–6.
To evaluate each sub score, I focus on the policies that are relevant to a sub-
stantial part of population, so those that only apply to advanced degree holders
with overseas experience or high-tech entrepreneurs are excluded. Within the re-
maining policies, the details of the eligibility requirements differ, but most of the
requirements are based on the following criteria: 1) a migrant’s job prospect and
job stability, 2) his/her residential condition, and 3) his/her history of contribution
to local social security. I give a value of 0 to cities that grant virtually no Hukou
to migrants other than those initiated by public-sector employers. I give a value of
1, if a migrant can obtain Hukou by purchasing an apartment above certain size or
value. I give a value of 2, if a migrant can obtain Hukou by purchasing an apart-
ment (or renting a subsidized apartment from his/her employer), with no specific
requirement on its values, or by working and contributing to the social security by
more than 5 years. I give a value of 3, if a migrant can obtain Hukou by working
and residing in a city, and contributing to the local social security for a relatively
short period of time.
Importantly, in Chinese cities, the migration into the central districts are con-
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trolled much more strictly than into the outskirts. When I see a policy mentioning
only relaxing Hukou restriction in its central district, with no explicit statement on
the policy for the other parts of the city, I take the stand that such policy implicitly
apply to the entire city.
B.2.2 Sources of Additional Data and Sample Construction
The primary individual- and firm-level data I use are the following: the 2005
Mini Population Census, the 2000 Population Census, the 2004 Economic Census,
and the 2004 Annual Survey of Industrial Production. In addition to these micro
data sources, I also use the 2002 inter-regional and inter-sectoral input-output table,
and the data from national accounts and provincial statistical yearbooks.
The 2005 Mini Population Census covers 1% of Chinese population. It records
individual demographic and employment information. To my knowledge, this is
the only data set that provides individual-level income information for the entire
country, so I use it to estimate the average income in each region. I also choose 2005
as the benchmark year, as the calibration procedure requires wage information. The
sample I use in this paper is a 1% sub-sample of this data set.
The 2000 Population Census covers the entire Chinese population. My sample
is its 0.095% sub-sample. Respondents in this sub-sample fill a longer form than
others, which asks for information on migration, education, occupation, industry,
and housing conditions, but unfortunately, not for information on income.
The 2004 Economic Census covers the universe of registered firms. The sam-
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ple I have access to is its manufacturing sub-sample, with firm-level revenue and
employment information.
The 2004 Annual Survey of Industrial Production covers all state-owned en-
terprises, as well as private enterprises with annual sales over 5 million RMB yuan.
Different from the 2004 Economic Census, this data set contains detailed firm-level
financial information, rather than only employment and revenue information.4
The rest of this section covers details in sample construction.
B.2.2.1 Wage
There are two types of workers, two types of local labor markets (rural and
urban), and N cities in the economy, so in total there are 4N wages (mean wages for
skilled and unskilled workers in all regions in the economy) to estimate. The data I
use for this purpose is the 2005 mini census.
I estimate the following specification:
log(Wagee,i) =β0 + β1age + β2age2 + β3sex + β4ISkilled ∗ IAgriculture
+ Fi + Si ∗ FiISkilled + Ai ∗ FiIAgriculture + εe,i,
where Fi is the regional fixed effect, Fi ∗ ISkilled is the interaction between regional
fixed effect and high-skill dummy, and Fi ∗ IAgriculture is the interaction between
regional fixed effect and a dummy for agricultural sector. In this specification, I
restrict the relative skill premium in the agricultural sector (relative to the skill
4The 2004 Economic Census also covers detailed financial information, but I do not have access
to other variables.
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premium in urban sector of the same city) to be the same across cities (β4 is not
city-specific). This choice is constrained by the power of the regression, as in the
sample, in many cities, the rural sector only employee a small number of high-skill
workers. The omitted group in the regression is the unskilled worker in the urban
sector in Beijing, whose average wage is β0. Average wages for other groups of
workers can be calculated as follows:
Table B.1: Average wage for different groups
Education Sector Region Wage
Unskilled Urban i β0 + Fi
Unskilled Rural i β0 + Fi +Ai
Skilled Urban i β0 + Fi + Si
Skilled Rural i β0 + β4 + Fi + Si +Ai













t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The output of the regressions are presented in Table (B.2). The signs and
magnitudes of coefficients are reasonable. The R2 of the regression is 0.58, indica-
ting that the regression has a strong explanatory power. Figure (B.1) presents the
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distribution of the p-values for the fixed effects in the wage regression. The distri-
bution is heavily concentrated around zero (the spike in the figures corresponds to
p-value<0.0005), suggesting that the fixed effects are very precisely estimated. Fi-
gure (B.2) shows the distribution of average wage for different worker groups across
regions. Two patterns emerge: first, there is considerable heterogeneity across re-
gions; second, overall, wages are higher for high-skill workers and urban workers.
Figures 3.1c in the text cast the estimates for average wages of workers on the map
of China. The dispersions in wages shows up on the map as the difference both
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Figure B.1: Distribution of the P-value for Fixed Effects
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Figure B.2: Average Wages for Different Worker Groups
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Since I use the 2005 mini census to estimate regional wage and calibrate the
model to the 2005 economy, ideally I would like to use this data set to estimate
migration costs, too. Since the model neglects dynamic choice of individuals, the
migration decision in the model should be best interpreted as a life-time choice.
So the model-consistent definition of migration is one that is based on birthplace.
However, the 2005 data does not cover birthplace information, so I use the 2000
census to estimate the long-run migration costs.5 The underlying assumption is
that the long-run migration costs do not change much over the period of 2000-2005.
It is of course possible that some migration restrictions have been lifted during
the period; in that case, the counterfactual experiments in the paper should be
interpreted as: what are the welfare implications of international trade for China in
2005, had the migration costs stayed at the 2000 level.
The following are the procedures I use to construct migration flow: first of all,
I restrict the sample to those who already finished their schooling, aged between 20
and 60 (60 is the official retirement age for urban male non-physical-labor workers
in China), I also drop those who are currently not working, unless the reason for
not working is either “on vacation” or “on sick leave”. I classify a worker as a
5The mini census does report the place of residence in 2000. Therefore one alternative is to
combine the migration over the period of 2000-2005 with the long-term migration in 2000, to
construct the long-term migration in 2005. This is problematic, as a large fraction of the workers
that migrated during 2000–2005 might had been already living outside their birthplace in 2000, i.e.,
they are repeat migrants. Empirical studies focusing in the U.S. have documented the phenomena
of repeat migrant or return migrant (Kennan and Walker, 2011), and the fact that migrants
are more likely to respond to economic shocks by migrating, than native workers (Cadena and
Kovak, 2013). In light of the evidence, this approach will double count return migrants and repeat
migrants, overestimating the long-term migration in 2005.
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migrant, if he or she is not working in her or his birthplace. I identify the source
sector (rural or urban) of a worker with the type of Hukou (rural or urban) the
worker currently holds, and the destination sector of a worker by the locality the
survey respondent.6 Given the small proportion of workers with college degrees in
China in 2000, I classify a worker to be high-skill, if he or she has received more
than nine years’ formal education, equivalent to finishing junior high school.7 From
these procedures, for all workers in the economy, I identify their education level,
source province, source sector, destination city, and destination sector. I use this to
estimate inter-regional and inter-sectoral migration costs.
B.2.2.3 Worker Employment and Birthplace Distributions in 2005
Recovering {ved} After estimating the parameters governing migration costs,
I solve the labor market clearing conditions (Equation 3.10 in the text) for one more
time, to obtain {ved} for 2005, the regional fixed effects that are consistent with
employment distribution in 2005. For this purpose, I need workers’ birthplace and
employment distributions in 2005, by workers’ level of skills.
I construct the employment distribution from the 2005 mini census. For some
cities, due to the small sample size and the small share of skilled workers, there
are few skilled workers sampled. For these cities, I supplement the employment
6To the extent that some rural Hukou holders have switched an urban Hukou in 2000, this clas-
sification underestimate rural-urban migration. However, until recently, switching a rural Hukou
for an urban one was highly restricted.
7The higher education reform started in 1999 in China, which expanded the scale of the higher
education sector dramatically. Before the reform, the college admission rate in China was below
5%; in 1999, the college admission increased by 40%. The following years saw additional increase.
But until 2005, college graduates constitute only a small proportion of the Chinese labor market.
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distribution aggregated up from the micro data with the published aggregate city-
level statistics on employment from the same survey.
I construct workers’ birthplace distribution from the 2000 census. I restrict
the sample to workers aged 15–55 in 2000. The distribution of this sample will
be the distribution for workers aged 20–60 in 2005. To determine the skill level
of workers for this sample, if a worker has finished schooling in 2000, I classify his
or her skill level based on the education attainment directly; for workers that are
above 15, but have not yet finished schooling, I assume they are skilled—by this
age, a typical Chinese kid has received 8-9 years of education, so the possibility of
(wrongly) classifying a student receiving less than 9 years education as skilled is
minimized.
Recovering {T sd} The employment distribution constructed above gives us
the number of workers employed in each region. Once we have the estimates for mi-
gration costs and regional amenity-adjusted real wages, we can use Equation (3.13)
in the text to convert these into the employment of effective labor units. Since there
are three industries in urban regions, we still do not know the distribution of employ-
ment across industries in each urban region, which is needed for the calibration of
productivity at city-industry level.8 I supplement the regional employment informa-
tion with the share of employment in industry K over industry M, constructed from
the manufacturing sub-sample of the 2004 economic census, and use the service mar-
8In the main text, I analyze the intuition behind the quantification strategy in the context of
a linear-regression setup, where we need the trade flows between cities for estimation. Such data
is not available, so I use a joint quantification strategy, discussed in section 3.2 of this appendix,
for which I need employment distribution in each city-industry to determine the corresponding
productivity.
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ket clearing conditions to obtain the employment information at the city-industry
level.9
Specifically, let Ehd,s and Eld,s, s ∈ {A,M ,K,S}, d ∈ {U, R} be the sectoral
effective labor unit employment, then regional labor market clearing conditions are:
Ehd,A = E
h







d , Eld,M +Eld,K +Eld,S = Eld, d ∈ U
(B.1)
The right sides of these equations are already constructed from the data. Since only
agricultural industry is located in rural regions, from the above equation we know
labor effective unit employment in the agricultural industry.
From the optimality conditions of intermediate variety producers, given by
Equation (3.19), the production of intermediate varieties in each place can be cal-






























, s ∈ {M ,K,S}, d ∈ U,
(B.2)
With {Dsd : s ∈ {A,M ,K,S}} we can compute the city-level demand for industry














s , d ∈ U, (B.3)
9I do not directly use the 2005 mini census to construct industry-level employment because
due to the limited sample size, in some cities, there are no or only a small number of high-skill
employment in the capital and equipment industry.
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where CSd is the urban service consumption in region d; d′ indicates the rural re-
gion in the same city as urban region d and CSd′ is the service consumption of this
rural region. CSd + CSd′ is determined directly by workers’ wage and employment
distribution. Combine Equations (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3),10 we have a linear equa-
tion system, with 4N unknowns: Ehd,A, Ehd,M , Ehd,K , Ehd,s, and 3N equations—(B.3)
and the subset of (B.1) for high skilled workers. We combine these three equations
with one more data moment—regional employment share in capital and equipment




to solve for employments of
effective labor units in all city-industry.
Once we obtain these employments, we can also use Equation (B.2) to compute
the production of intermediate varieties in each industry in all cities.
B.2.2.4 Factor Shares in Equipped Composite Labor
We need the shares of payments to capital, high-skill workers, and low-skill
workers in each region, to calibrate the region-specific equipped composite labor
production functions. I compute the ratios between payments to high-skill workers
over low-skill workers directly from the estimated wages and the distribution of
effective labor units, both of which have been constructed previously. I further need
the ratio between the payment to capital, and the payment to labor, in each region.
For the urban regions, I use the 2004 Survey of Industrial Production. I aggre-
gate firm-level data to obtain the city-level ratio between wage bill and expenditures
on capital and equipment. The firm-level wage bill is the “total salary payments”
10We use Equation (B.2) to eliminate Eld,s
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entry in the data set; the firm-level expenditures on capital and equipment is the
“total capital depreciations” entry in the data set. The total depreciations entry
includes, in addition to depreciations to capital and equipment, depreciations to
properties and buildings. Therefore I adjust for this by subtracting the share of
buildings among aggregate tangible fixed capital stock in China in 2004, calculated
from the national statistical yearbook. The mean ratio across cities, constructed
this way, is similar to the corresponding ratio from the national input-output table
for the urban sector.
For the rural regions, since I am not aware of any data sources that contain
information on capital share at the regional level, I assume the capital shares are
the same for all rural regions and use the national input-output table to determine
it.
B.2.2.5 Cultural Distance
To proxy for the cultural distance between cities, I construct a cultural si-
milarity index based on the compositions of ethnic minority groups. I extract the
prefecture-level information on the compositions of ethnic minorities from the 1990
census. Migrations was not as pervasive in 1990 as it was in 2000, and therefore the
ethnic compositions largely reflect the cultural root of a city. Using the 1990 census
data helps us avoid the endogeneity problem that would arise, if we used the 2000
census to construct cultural distance.
There are 56 ethnic groups in China, with Han ethnic being the dominating
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one. I exclude it, because the share of Han population is so large that including
it eliminates most of the variation in the similarity index. For each city, I am left
with a 55 by 1 vector, each element of which is the share of one ethnic group in the
total local ethnic minority population. I then compute the correlations between the
vectors of all city pairs, and use these as the values of my cultural similarity index;
the cultural distance is then defined as one minus this similarity index.
Figure (B.3) is the density distribution of the index. The mean, median and
standard deviation of the similarity index are 0.2569, 0.0608, and 0.3645, respecti-
vely.
Figure B.3: Density Distribution of the Similarity Index
Source: Author’s calculation based on the 1990 census
B.2.2.6 City-level International Trade Surplus
To incorporate international trade imbalances into the calibration, I construct
a data set of city-level international trade surplus.
Each city’s trade surplus in 2005 is extracted directly from the provincial
statistical yearbook. I make two more adjustments. First, Beijing trades a lot with
the ROW, but the majority of the trade is done by big companies (especially those
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SOEs) with headquarters in Beijing. It is plausible that the trade is actually carried
in the subsidiaries of these companies, spread out over the country. Fortunately,
Beijing statistical yearbook reports “local trade” and “total trade” separately, the
later including trade done by SOEs. I assign “local trade” to Beijing, and the
remaining component of “total trade” to all Chinese cities, based on their relative
size. The implicit assumption is that the operation of those SOEs headquartered in
Beijing are distributed across all cities, proportionally to their size.
Second, sometimes the data is not well-behaved. For example, for Shaoshan,
a city in Guangdong Province, one of the coastal provinces, the trade surplus is
13 times of its GDP. My conjecture is that there are many trade intermediaries. I
make the following adjustments: I aggregate city-level trade surplus to the province
level, and then allocate the trade surplus of a province to the cities in the province,
according to the GDP of these cities. The underlying assumption is that those trade
intermediaries mostly work with other companies in the same province, and trade
surplus is proportional to size of economy within a province.
To determine the city-level trade surplus in the scale of the model economy,
I first calculate the aggregate trade surplus from the data. I convert the aggregate
surplus into the scale of the model and distribute it to all cities, proportionally
to each city’s contribution to the aggregate trade surplus in the data, constructed
above. These are the surplus terms, Sd, in Equation (3.34).
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B.2.2.7 Input-output Linkages for China and the ROW
In the model, the input-output parameters for China are constructed from
the 2002 national input-output table, which records, at the 2-digit industry level,
the usages of inputs in the economy. I aggregate the data to four industries—
agricultural, capital and equipment, other manufacturing, and service, and four
inputs—industry final outputs in the agricultural, other manufacturing, and service
industries, as well as equipped composite labor.
The input shares of the ROW are assume to be the same as the median coun-
try in Parro (2013). Since the industry classification is finer in this paper, for
values not directly available in Parro (2013), I use the corresponding value from
China, scaled appropriately. The underlying assumption behind this imputation
that, input-output linkages are similar across different countries, are strongly sup-
ported by Iones (2013). All results in the paper are robust to changes in the input
shares.
Table (B.3) report the shares of inputs in each industry.
B.3 Estimation and Calibration Appendix
B.3.1 Calibrating ρ
I obtain an individual panel data from China (China Nutrition and Health
Survey), and estimate a Mincer regression with regional fixed effects, along with
gender, education, age, and age square as control variables. I then add individual
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Table B.3: Input Shares in China and the ROW
γs
′
s Output Industry: China
Input A M K S
L 0.57 0.30 0.59 0.48
A 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.03
M 0.15 0.44 0.26 0.21
S 0.09 0.20 0.16 0.28
γs
′
s Output Industry: ROW
Input A M K S
L 0.58 0.42 0.56 0.63
A 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
M 0.16 0.41 0.26 0.11
S 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.26
Notes: This table reports the
input shares for different in-
dustries in China and the
ROW. The source of the va-
lues for China is the nati-
onal input-output table for
2002; the values for the ROW
are calculated based on Parro
(2013). L stands for the
equipped composite labor.
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fixed effects to the specification. I compare the R2 of these two regressions and see
how much of the variation unexplained in the first Mincer regression is explained by
the individual fixed effects.
As it turns out, about 70% of the unexplained variations can be explained
by individual fixed effects. Note that the correlation parameter, ρ, maps one-to-
one into the explanatory power of individual fixed effects in the wage regression.
For each given value of ρ, I simulate workers’ productivity draws from different
locations, then estimate a regression specification with only individual fixed effects,
and calculate the R2. I chose the correlation parameter so that this R2 is 70%. This
procedure determines a value of 0.4 for ρ.
B.3.2 Estimating Migration Cost
I use nonlinear least squares to estimate the migration cost, in which {β}
is determined by minimizing the difference between the model-predicted migration
flows and their data counterparts. Since the data is at the province-to-city level,
I aggregate the predicted city-to-city flows to province-to-city level and take as
the objective function the sum of square of the differences between the model’s
predictions and the data.
Formally, let p ∈ P indexes a province in the set of all provinces, P, and o ∈ p
indexes a region o belonging to province p. Recall that leo is the number of workers
born in o, and πeo,d is the model-predicted probability for workers to move from o to






o,d is the aggregate
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flow from province p to region d. Let Lep,d be the flow from p to d in the data, the










To predict the migration flows using the model, we need to know the regional
amenity-adjusted real wages, ved. Because there are more than six hundred regi-
ons (rural and urban sectors in 340 cities), it is infeasible to estimate all {ved} and
{β} simultaneously. I adopt a nested procedure, similar in spirit to Berry et al.
(1995), as follows: in the inner loop, for each given {β}, I solve the migration model
for the amenity-adjusted real wages, {ved}, so that the model-predicted total num-
ber of workers in each region is the same as that in data, that is, ∑o∈G leoπeo,d =∑
p∈P L
e
p,d, ∀d ∈ G. Once we have {ved}, we can compute the model-predicted mi-
gration flows, and evaluate the objective function for the given {β}. In the outer
loop, I then search over the space of {β} to minimize the objective function.11 Pro-
position 1 in Section 1 of this appendix ensures the feasibility of this approach by
establishing the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the problem in the inner
loop.
We use the 2000 migration data, constructed in section 1 of this appendix,
to estimate {β}. After obtaining the estimates, to ensure the recovered {ved} are
11This nested approach is equivalent to imposing a constraint that the (model-predicted) total
numbers of workers migrating to each place equals the total number of workers in that place in the
data, and therefore is similar in spirit to what is referred to as “structural gravity estimation” in
trade literature. See Fally (2015) for a discussion of the relationship between this and alternative
approaches of gravity estimation.
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consistent with the 2005 employment distribution, we solve Equation ∑o∈G leoπeo,d =∑
p∈P L
e
p,d, ∀d ∈ G again, using Led and leo from 2005, to obtain the new {ved}.
B.3.3 Jointly Estimating Trade Cost and Productivity
I determine international trade costs, domestic trade costs, and regional pro-
ductivity jointly.
As discussed in the text, due to the aggregate nature of the data, I use nonli-
near least square in estimation, which requires solving the model for the predictions
of trade flows. In solving the model, to ensure the size and specialization of the cities
in the model are consistent with the data, I compute the production of intermedi-
ate varieties in each industries in all cities (details in Section 2.2 of this appendix),
and force the joint estimation algorithm to respect this distribution of intermediate
variety production.
Figure (B.4) explains the joint estimation algorithm. I start with an initial
guess for international trade costs, and the parameters governing domestic trade
costs, {γ}, with which I compute the trade cost between any trade partners, {τo,d}.
I then guess a distribution for regional productivity, solve the trade model for prices
and trade shares, and check if the demand for intermediate varieties produced by
each region equals the supply.12 If not, I update the guess for the distribution by
12In the step where we solve the trade model, if we know ηhd and ηsd, Equations (3.18), (3.26),
and (3.29) in the text can be viewed as a system of equations with prices being the only unknowns.
Once we solve these equations for the prices, we can obtain trade shares. Although ηhd and ηsd are
unknown before the model is parameterized, in section 3.4 of this appendix I show that, conditional
on information on the shares of different factors in the equipped composite labor, ηhd and ηsd are
unnecessary in solving the model. Once the model is solved, however, we can use Equation (3.30)
to back out ηhd and ηsd, to be used in policy experiments.
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increasing productivity in regions with excess supply, and decrease productivity in
regions with excess demand. The intuition behind this is that, if a region faces excess
demand, it means the intermediate varieties produced there is competitive in the
international market. To restore the market clearing condition for this region, I make
the intermediate varieties produced in that regions more expensive by decreasing the
productivity.13
Once the distribution of regional productivity that clear all intermediate vari-





)− the model counterpart]2, (B.5)
where XP1,P2 is the export of goods from province P1 to province P2 in the data.
In specifying the objective function, since the domestic trade data is at provincial
level, to bring the model and the data together, I aggregate the model-predicted
trade flows to provincial level. I normalize the trade flows by aggregate domestic
sales of the source provinces, so that the estimates are not affected by the change
in international trade openness between 2002 and 2005.14
13The feasibility of this approach requires that, for any given level of trade costs, we can find
a set of unique T sd that clear all intermediate variety markets in all locations. Redding (2012)
proves this is true in a single-sector model. An earlier version of this paper extends the proof to a
multi-sector model with input-output linkages within the same broad sector. In the general model
here with flexible input-output linkages and capital-skill complementarity, the uniqueness cannot
be established. But in implementation, I find the update rule always converge uniformly to one
unique object.
14The domestic trade data is from 2002, whereas the employment data used to determine pro-
duction and consumption is from 2005. By normalizing the flows using domestic sales of source
provinces, I effectively use only the domestic trade patterns in 2002 for estimation.
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Figure B.4: Estimation Algorithm
Begin
International trade cots tA, tM , tK
Choose domestic trade cost parameters γ
Update regional productivity TAd ,TMd ,TKd










Calibrate t′A, t′M , t′K to match sectoral openness
Same as










I search over the space of {γ} until the global minimum is reached, after which
I calibrate international trade costs to match the sectoral openness, keeping both
domestic trade costs and regional productivity fixed. I repeat the process until
convergence.
B.3.4 Additional Information on the Joint Estimation
In solving the trade model, we need to compute the prices of tradable goods, for
the estimated regional wages and given distribution of technology {T sd}. Computing
the prices, however, requires ηhd and ηld (see footnote (12)).
To proceed with the estimation algorithm, not knowing ηhd , ηld, I substitute the
relative factor shares, Capital ShareSkilled Share and
Equipped Skilled Share
Unskilled Share , at the regional level, to
























I then substitute Equation (B.6) into (3.29), and solve the model without actually
knowing ηhd or ηld. The idea is that, ηhd and ηld must be consistent with the optimal
choices of equipped composite labor producers, and therefore when we vary the
prices, we also adjust ηhd and ηld so that the optimal factor shares are consistent
with data. Once the whole procedure is over and the model is solved, we can then
back out ηhd and ηld from (B.6). These are interpreted as the true parameter values,
which I keep fixed for all counterfactual experiments.
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B.3.5 Parameters for the Counterfactual Experiments with Different
Internal Geographies
In the counterfactual experiments with alternative internal geographies, re-
ported in Section 7.2, I reduce the values of inter-provincial dummies in the trade
cost specifications in China to the U.S. level. I also liberalize migration in China
through hypothetical Hukou reforms that decrease the destination-city specific mi-
gration costs. In this section I describe the sources and values of these parameters.
The value of inter-state trade costs are from Crafts and Klein (2014), which
estimates U.S. inter-state trade using the latest data. Under different specifications,
their estimates for the inter-state dummy range between 2 to 2.55. To be conserva-
tive, I use the upper bound of their estimates, 2.55. This estimate of the inter-state
dummy bundles together trade elasticity and trade costs, so I recover the inter-state
trade cost by dividing 2.55 by 4, the trade elasticity, arriving at 0.65. Therefore in
relevant experiments I reduce the provincial border effect from the benchmark level
of 1.1 to 0.65.
The change in migration cost from the hypothetical Hukou reforms are calcu-
lated as follows. Conceptually, I model the impact of Hukou in the following way.
Consider the migration cost from the origin o to destination d, deo,d. This can be
decomposed into a destination-specific component, dd, and a pair and skill type
specific component, deod, so that deo,d = ddd
e
od.
From Equation 3.9, the total number of workers that migrate to city d from
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where ≈ follows from the fact that in calibration, εh ≈ εl ≈ 4.67. For a local











od)) ≈ 4− εhln(dd)
≈ −4.674ln(dd).
(B.8)
Under the assumption that the bracketed term in the last line of B.7 does not
change,15 Equation B.8 can be interpreted as the model-based specification for the
results in Table 3.5. The estimate in Table 3.5 suggests that an one-point increase
in the reform index increases migration by 20%. Plug this into Equation B.8, we
have the following: each point of Hukou reform index implies a 0.2/4.67 = 4.3%
15This is certainly a strong assumption, but the empirical specification incorporates contempo-
raneous city characteristics and time fixed effects, which captures the change the city-specific real
wage, ved, and other terms in the bracket.
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decrease in the city-specific migration cost, dd. Liberalizing the entire economy
from the average Hukou restriction in 2000 to complete openness implies a 5-point
increase in the Hukou reform index for all cities. Therefore for this counterfactual
experiment, I assume that the Hukou reform would decrease the migration cost into
each city (from elsewhere) by 22%.
B.3.6 Discussion on the Estimated Inter-Provincial Effect and Addi-
tional Robustness
In Section 6.5.2, I report my estimates of the domestic trade costs. It is useful
to compare my estimates to those obtained using the U.S. Commodity Flow Survey
data. In the literature, the comparable coefficient for state border, after scaled
appropriately by the elasticity of trade, is on the range of 0.38 (Wolf, 2000) to 0.65
(Crafts and Klein, 2014, using 2007 data). So my estimate of the state-border effect
is about twice as large as the comparable estimates for the U.S., reflecting larger
barriers to trade flows at provincial borders in China. One lesson from the U.S. state
border literature is that, the estimates might be driven up by the wholesale industry
(Hillberry and Hummels, 2003), and might suffer from the aggregation bias—a lot
of trade costs are actually due to geographic distance, but might be captured by
the state-border dummy when state-level aggregate data is used. When these two
factors are taken into account, the estimates shrink (Hillberry and Hummels, 2008).
Therefore, as discussed in Section 6.5.2, one natural concern is whether in
China, due to the quality, or the level of aggregation, of the data, the estimates
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might also misattribute the impacts of geographic distance to the provincial borders;
and if that is the case, whether the results from the counterfactual experiments are
still valid.
Without detailed micro-level trade flow data available for China, I cannot ex-
amine the bias of the estimates. Instead, I use an additional experiment to show
that even if there is bias in the estimation, it will not affect main conclusions of the
counterfactual experiment. Specifically, I perform a robustness exercise, in which I
reduce inter-provincial and inter-regional trade costs to 0.65, the level of the U.S.
economy, while at the same time increase the coefficients for the continuous geo-
graphic components, so that the overall domestic trade costs and international trade
participation are similar to those of the benchmark economy. Effectively, I change
the composition of the domestic trade costs, keeping its overall level same as before.
I shut down international trade in this economy, and compute the welfare gains from
trade, as well as other outcome variables discussed in the text. The results, reported
in Table (B.4), are very similar to those of the benchmark experiment, reported in
the first column of Table (3.11).
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Table B.4: Counterfactual Experiment with an Alternative Domestic Trade Cost
Structure
Panel A: Statistics by Worker Group
Mean std
Urban Skilled 11.52 9.89
Urban Unskilled 5.43 7.41
Rural Skilled 11.10 9.12
Rural Unskilled 5.29 6.74
Panel B: Aggregate Statistics
National Average 7.47
Trade Openness 60.60
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